From prediction to learning: Opening experts' minds to unfolding history

International Security

Volumn 31, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 132-161

  Herrmann, Richard K ^a,b   Choi, Jong Kun ^c  

^a Mershon Center   (United States)

^b OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c Yonsei University   (South Korea)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34248366547     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: 15314804     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/isec.2007.31.4.132     Document Type: Review

References (159)

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2. Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984);
3. George Friedman and Meredith Lebard, The Coming War with Japan (New York: St. Martin's, 1991);
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10. and Stephen F. Szabo, Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2004).
11. Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report to the President (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 31, 2005), pp. 3, 13.
12. See also U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, 108th Cong., 2d sess., July 7, 2004, S. Rept. 1030, p. 18.
13. Richard Kerr, Thomas Wolfe, Rebecca Donegan, and Aris Pappas, "Issues for the U.S. Intelligence Community," Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 49, No. 3 (2005), pp. 47-54, at p. 52.
14. For a review of five CIA postmortem reports stressing the problem of fixed mind-sets, see Jack Davis, "Improving CIA Analytic Performance: Strategic Warning," Occasional Papers, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, September 2002), p. 5. See also the findings of Adm. David Jeremiah's report, Intelligence Community's Performance on the Indian Nuclear Tests
15. quoted in Tim Weiner, "CIA Study Details Failures: Scouring of the System Urged," New York Times, June 3,1998.
16. For the result of the review at the end of the Cold War led by Les Aspin and Harold Brown, see Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996).
17. More recently the 9/11 commission suggested "institutionalizing imagination." See National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), pp. 339-348.
18. Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report to the President, pp. 25-26, 399-400, 405-407.
19. Philip E. Tetlock, "Theory-Driven Reasoning about Plausible Pasts and Probable Futures in World Politics: Are We Prisoners of Our Preconceptions?" American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 43, No. 2 (April 1999), pp. 335-366.
20. Cheryl Koopman, Jack Snyder, and Robert Jervis, "Theory-Driven versus Data-Driven Assessment in a Crisis: A Survey of International Security Readers," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 34, No. 4 (December 1990), pp. 694-722.
21. John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 125-128.
22. On the gap between the academy and policy worlds, see Alexander George, Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993);
23. and Stephen M. Walt, "The Relationship between Theory and Policy in International Relations," Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 8 (June 2005), pp. 23-18.
24. For analyses of the debate, see Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang, Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003);
25. and Norman D. Levin and Yong-Sup Han, Sunshine in Korea: The South Korean Debate over Policies toward North Korea (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2002).
26. For examples of the current debate, see Selig S. Harrison, Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002);
27. Task Force on U.S. Korea Policy, Turning Point in Korea: New Dangers and New Opportunities for the United States (Washington, D.C.: Center for International Policy and Center for East Asian Studies, University of Chicago, February 2003);
28. Victor D. Cha, "Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula," International Security, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Summer 2002), pp. 40-78;
29. Ted Galen Carpenter, "Living with the Unthinkable: How to Coexist with a Nuclear North Korea," National Interest, No. 74 (Winter 2003/04), pp. 92-98;
30. Stephen J. Morris, "Averting the Unthinkable," National Interest, No. 74 (Winter 2003/04), pp. 99-107;
31. and James T. Laney and Jason T. Shaplen, "How to Deal with North Korea," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 2 (March/April 2003), pp. 16-30.
32. For reviews of how similar perspectives influenced previous decisions, see Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2004).
33. For an evaluation of past predictions, see David C. Kang, "International Relations Theory and the Second Korean War," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 3 (September 2003), pp. 301324.
34. For predictions of North Korea's collapse, see J.E. Hoare, "Review: Peace and Unification in Korea and International Law," China Quarterly, No. 112 (December 1987), p. 685;
35. Bruce Bennett, "The Prospects for Conventional Conflict on the Korean Peninsula," Korea Journal of Defense. Analysis, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 95-127;
36. and Robert A. Manning, "The United States and the Endgame in Korea: Assessment, Scenarios, and Implications," Asian Survey, Vol. 37, No. 7 (July 1997), pp. 597-608.
37. For predictions of a soft landing (i.e., muddling through), see Selig S. Harrison, "Promoting a Soft Landing in Korea," Foreign Policy, No. 106 (Spring 1997), p. 106;
38. Marcus Noland, "Why North Korea Will Muddle Through," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 4 (July/August 1997), pp. 105-118;
39. and Chung-in Moon and Yongho Kim, "The Future of the North Korean System," in Samuel S. Kim, ed., The North Korean System in the Post-Cold War Era (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 221-225.
40. For predictions concerning succession after Kim II Sung, see Alexander Zhebin, "North Korea after Kim II Sung: Hard Choices," Korea Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 211-232;
41. Byung Joon Ahn, "The Man Who Would Be Kim," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 6 (Fall 1994), pp. 94-108;
42. and Il Pyung Kim, "The Features of the Kim Jong Il Group and Their Possible Choice," East Asian Review, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Summer 1992), p. 16.
43. Participants came from the Korea Institute of Defense Analysis at the Ministry of Defense, Korea Institute of National Unification of the Office of Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea, Korea National Defense University, Graduate School of National Intelligence at the National Intelligence Service of the Republic of Korea, Sam Sung Economic Research Institute, Graduate School of North Korean Studies at Kyung Nam University, Kyung Hee University, Korea University, Dongguk University, Chung-Ang University, and the Catholic University of Korea.
44. Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report to the President, p. 13.
45. See also Bruce Jentleson, "The Need for Praxis: Bringing Policy Relevance Back In," International Security, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Spring 2002), pp. 169-183.
46. Baruch Fischhoff, "Hindsight Is Not Equal to Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment under Uncertainty," Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, Vol. 1, No. 3 (May 1975), pp. 288-297;
47. Jay J. Christensen-Szalanski and Cynthia Fobian Willham, "The Hindsight Bias: A Meta-analysis," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 48, No. 1 (February 1991), pp. 147-168;
48. and Baruch Fischhoff, "Learning from Experience: Coping with Hindsight Bias and Ambiguity," in J. Scott Armstrong, ed., Principles of Forecasting: A Handbook for Researchers and Practitioners (New York: Springer, 2001), pp. 543-554.
49. Robin M. Dawes, "Prediction of the Future versus an Understanding of the Past: A Basic Asymmetry," American Journal of Psychology, Vol. 106, No. 1 (Spring 1993), pp. 1-24.
50. See Colin Camerer, "Individual Decision Making," in John H. Kagel and Alvin E. Roth, eds., The Handbook of Experimental Economics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 590616.
51. For an introduction to Bayesian learning, see Douglas E. Hunter, Political/Military Applications of Bayesian Analysis: Methodological Issues (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1984).
52. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 217-271.
53. Ibid., pp. 275-282;
54. and Dan Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances, and World Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 39-40, 207-213.
55. On the impact of failure on learning, see also David A. Welch, Painful Choices: A Theory of Foreign Policy Change (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005).
56. See Zeev Maoz and Ben D. Mor, Bound by Struggle: The Strategic Evolution of Enduring International Rivalries (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), pp. 53-58;
57. Alex Mintz, ed., Integrating Cognitive and Rational Theories of Foreign Policy Decision Making (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003);
58. and Alex Mintz, "How Do Leaders Make Decisions? A Poliheuristic Perspective," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 48, No. 1 (February 2004), pp. 3-13.
59. i|NA) is the probability of observing a specific indicator if a hypothesis is not true. See Maoz and Mor, Bound by Struggle, pp. 303.
60. J. Frank Yates, Linda S. McDaniel, and Eric Brown, "Probabilistic Forecasts of Stock Prices and Earnings: The Hazards of Nascent Expertise," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 49, No. 1 (June 1991), pp. 60-79;
61. and Jerome S. Bruner and Mary C. Potter, "Interference in Visual Recognition," Science, Vol. 144, No. 3617 (April 1964), pp. 424-125.
62. Chaim Kaufmann, "Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas: The Selling of the Iraq War," International Security, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Summer 2004), pp. 5-48.
63. See also Yaacov Y. Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition, and Perception in Foreign Policy Decision Making (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1990), pp. 296-341.
64. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), chap. 20, clause 17, http:// www.ilt.columbia.edu/publications/locke_understanding. html.
65. Ziva Kunda, "The Case for Motivated Reasoning," Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 108, No. 3 (November 1990), pp. 480-498;
66. Ziva Kunda, "The Impact of Comprehension Goals on the Ebb and Flow of Stereotype Activation during Interaction," in Steven J. Spencer, Steven Fein, Mark P. Zanna, and James M. Olson, eds., Motivated Social Perception: The Ontario Symposium, Vol. 9 (Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2003), pp. 1-20;
67. and Steven Fein, Etsuko Hoshino-Browne, Paul Davies, and Steven Spencer, "Self-image Maintenance Goals and Sociocultural Norms in Motivated Social Perception," in Spencer et al., Motivated Social Perception, pp. 21-44.
68. Rupert Brown, "Social Identity Theory: Past Achievements, Current Problems, and Future Challenges," European Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 30, No. 6 (November 2000), pp. 745-778;
69. Henri Tajfel and John Turner, "The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior," in Stephen W. Worchel and W. Austin, eds., Psychology of Intergroup Relations (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1986), pp. 7-24;
70. and Marilynn B. Brewer and Norman Miller, Intergroup Relations (Pacific Grove, Calif.: Brooks/ Cole, 1996), pp. 22-49.
71. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), pp. 241-256.
72. Ibid., pp. 88-91.
73. Stephen Peter Rosen, War and Human Nature (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005), pp. 27-70;
74. Steven L. Neuberg and Catherine A. Cottrell, "Intergroup Emotions: A Biocultural Approach," in Diane M. Mackie and Eliot R. Smith, eds., From Prejudice to Intergroup Emotions: Differentiated Reactions to Social Groups (New York: Psychology Press, 2002), pp. 265-283;
75. and George E. Marcus, "The Psychology of Emotion and Politics," in David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis, eds., Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 182-221.
76. See Michele G. Alexander, Marilynn B. Brewer, and Richard K. Herrmann, "Images and Affect: A Functional Analysis of Out-Group Stereotypes," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 77, No. 1 (July 1999), pp. 78-93;
77. Michele G. Alexander, Shana Levin, and P.J. Henry, "Image Theory, Social Identity, and Social Dominance: Structural Characteristics and Individual Motives Underlying International Images," Political Psychology, Vol. 26, No. 1 (February 2005), pp. 27-45;
78. and Richard K. Herrmann, James F. Voss, Tonya Y.E. Schooler, and Joseph Ciarrochi, "Images in International Relations: An Experimental Test of Cognitive Schemata," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 3 (September 1997), pp. 403-133.
79. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, "Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions," in Kahneman and Tversky, eds., Choices, Values, and Frames (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 209-223;
80. and Richard H. Thaler, "Mental Accounting Matters," in Kahneman and Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, pp. 241-268.
81. See Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," in Kahneman and Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, pp. 17-43;
82. and Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, "Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty," in Kahneman and Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, pp. 44-66.
83. See also Kagel and Roth, The Handbook of Experimental Economics.
84. See Philip E. Tetlock, Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know? (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005), pp. 190-202;
85. and Philip E. Tetlock and Richard Ned Lebow, "Poking Counterfactual Holes in Covering Laws: Cognitive Styles and Historical Reasoning," American Political Science Review, Vol. 95, No. 4 (December 2001), pp. 829-843.
86. The exact wording was as follows: "Please mark on the scales below your judgment of the likelihood that in the next 1 year and 5 years: (1) There will be a serious attempt to overthrow Kim Jong II that fails. The attempt may fail for a variety of reasons. For example, the secret police and military get advance notice of the coup plan and crush it. Or it could fail even though the coup plotters had the advantage of surprise because units that were loyal to Kim Jong II were strong enough to resist the challenge. (2) In the next 1 year and 5 years there will be a serious attempt to overthrow Kim Jong II that succeeds. This might occur in a variety of ways. For example, senior military officers who are unhappy with the lack of resources for the military and the dangers of reform given Kim Jong Il's weak leadership might seize control of the government. Or it might result from reformist elements in the government who decide that Kim Jong II is not moving fast enough with reform and, to avoid economic collapse, seize control of the government."
87. Jack S. Levy, "Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 1 (March 1997), pp. 87-112;
88. Yaacov Y.I. Vertzberger, Risk Tiiking and Decisionmaking: Foreign Military Intervention Decisions (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998);
89. and Rose McDermott, Risk-Taking in International Politics: Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998).
90. See Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970).
91. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, p. 64.
92. Robert Jervis, American Foreign Policy in a New Era (New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 125.
93. Richard K. Herrmann, "Image Theory and Strategic Interaction in International Relations," in Sears, Huddy, and Jervis, Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, pp. 285-314;
94. and Richard K. Herrmann and Michael P. Fischerkeller, "Beyond the Enemy Image and Spiral Model: Cognitive-Strategic Research after the Cold War," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 415-450.
95. Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996).
96. For the arguments in the Korean case, see Selig S. Harrison, "Did North Korea Cheat? Weapons of Mass Destruction," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 1 (January/February 2005), pp. 99-110;
97. and Mitchell B. Reiss and Robert Gallucci, "Red-Handed: Dead to Rights," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 2 (March/April 2005), pp. 142-145.
98. Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wolhforth, "Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War: Reevaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Winter 2000/ 01), pp. 5-53;
99. and Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "Economic Constraints and the End of the Cold War," in Wohlforth, ed., Cold War Endgame: Oral History, Analysis, Debates (University Park: Penn State University Press, 2003), pp. 273-309.
100. On the military decline, see William E. Odom, The Colapse of the Soviet Military (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1998).
101. James A. Caporaso and Stephan Haggard, "Power in the International Political Economy," in Richard J. Stoll and Michael D. Ward, eds., Power in World Politics (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1989), p. 110.
102. See Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/ factbook/index.html.
103. For assessments of North Korea's economy, see Bank of Korea, "Bukhan Gyengjhe Jeongchekui Byunhwawa Hyanghoo Jeonmang - Gageyokul Jungsimuro" [Changes and prospects in the economic policy of North Koreal, Finance and Economy Research, Vol. 220 (June 2005), pp. 2-43;
104. and Suhk Sam Park, "Measuring and Assessing Economic Activity in North Korea," in Korea Economic Institute, ed., Korea's Economy, 2002 (Washington, D.C.: Korea Economic Institute, 2002).
105. For human resources, see Peter Hayes and David Von Hippel, "Ecological Crisis and the Quality of Life in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)," in Chung-in Moon, ed., Understanding Regime Dynamics in North Korea (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1998), p. 143;
106. and Andrei Lankov, "North Korean Refugees in Northeast China," Asian Survey, Vol. 44, No. 6 (November/ December 2004), pp. 856-873.
107. For an argument that the two identities are not the same, see Roy Richard Grinker, Korea and Its Futures: Unification and the Unfinished War (New York: St. Martin's, 1998);
108. and Roland Bleiker, "Identity and Security in Korea," Pacific Review, Vol. 14, No. 1 (March 2001), pp. 121-148.
109. For other ideas about nationalism in the North and South, see Chae Sung Chun, "The Cold War and Its Transition for Koreans: Their Meaning from a Constructivist Viewpoint," in Chung-in Moon, Odd Arne Westad, and Gyoo-hyoung Kahng, Ending the Cold War in Korea: Theoretical and Historical Perspective (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2001), pp. 115-145;
110. Gi-Wook Shin, James Freda, and Gihong Yi, "The Politics of Ethnic Nationalism in Divided Korea," Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 5, No. 4 (October 1999), pp. 465-484;
111. and Gi-Wook Shin and Paul Y. Chang, "The Politics of Nationalism in U.S.-Korean Relations," Asian Perspective, Vol. 28, No. 4 (December 2004), pp. 119-145.
112. For South Korean perspectives on the ideology of juche and the popularity of the first Kim regime in North Korea, see Dae-Sook Suh, Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988);
113. Song-Ji Choi, Kim Jong-Il gwa Hyundae Pukhan Jeongchisa [Kim Jong Il and North Korean thought] (Seoul: Sahoe Pyongon, 1997);
114. and Sung Chul Kim, North Korea in Crisis: An Assessment of Regime Sustainability (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 1997), pp. 29-40.
115. How to estimate the potential for mobilization has been a perennial problem for other analysts as well. A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler provide one of the few strategies in this regard. They divide the revenues actually extracted through direct and indirect taxes by their estimate of the expected revenues extracted based on a series of economic factors they say enhance or complicate government extraction. See Organski and Kugler, The War ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
116. Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton. N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004).
117. On power as leverage, see Richard W. Cottam, Competitive Interference and 20th-century Diplomacy (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967), pp. 78-116.
118. See also David A. Baldwin, "Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies," World Politics, Vol. 31, No. 2 (January 1979), pp. 163, 175-180;
119. and Andrew M. Scott, The Revolution in Statecraft: Informal Penetration (New York: Random House, 1968).
120. Chung Min Lee, "Rethinking Future Paths on the Korean Peninsula," Pacific Review, Vol. 17, No. 2 (June 2004), pp. 249-270;
121. and L. Gordon Flake, "The Coming Crisis in Korea: A Rubicon Crossed," Asia Pacific Review, Vol. 10, No. 2 (November 2003), pp. 2-18.
122. For interpretations of the recent North Korean decision to pursue a nuclear weapons capability as a way to force the issue, see Cha and Kang, Nuclear North Korea, pp. 81-86;
123. Jung-Hoon Lee and Chung-in Moon, "The North Korean Nuclear Crisis Revisited: The Case for a Negotiated Settlement," Security Dialogue, Vol. 34, No. 2 (June 2003), pp. 135-151;
124. Howard W. French, "North Korea's Admission: Sign of a Desperate Leader?" New York Times, October 22, 2002;
125. Kong Dan Oh, "North Korea's Engagement: Implications for South Korea," in National Intelligence Council, North Korea's Engagement: Perspectives, Outlook, and Implications, Conference Report (Washington, D.C.: National Intelligence Council, February 23, 2001);
126. David C. Kang, "Rethinking North Korea," Asian Survey, Vol. 35, No. 3 (March 1995), pp. 253-267;
127. and Chung-in Moon and Jong-Yun Bae, "The Bush Doctrine and the North Korean Nuclear Crisis," Asian Perspective, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Winter 2003), pp. 9-45.
128. David Baldwin, "Power and International Relations," in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons, eds., Handbook of International Relations (London: Sage, 2002), pp. 177-191, at pp. 178-179.
129. For claims that the U.S. war on terror makes it more likely that the United States will provoke conflict in Korea, see Chung-in Moon, "Changing South Korean Perception of the United States since September 11," Aziya Kenkyu, Vol. 50, No. 2 (April 2004), pp. 2-14;
130. Sang Soo Lee, "Bukhan Ingwonbup ae Natanan Miguk Dongbuka Ahnbojeongchek Byunhwa" [U.S. policy toward Northeast Asia according to North Korea human rights bill], Gukga Jeolyak, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Winter 2004), pp. 5-31;
131. and Amitav Acharya, "The Bush Doctrine and Asian Regional Order: The Pitfalls of Preemption," Asian Perspective, Vol. 27, No. 4 (December 2003), pp. 217-247.
132. For South Korean perspectives on China's role in the North Korean nuclear crisis, see Jae Ho Chung, "South Korea between Eagle and Dragon: Perceptual Ambivalence and Strategic Dilemma," Asian Survey, Vol. 41, No. 5 (September-October 2001), pp. 777-796;
133. and Samuel S. Kim, "China's New Role in the Nuclear Confrontation," Asian Perspective, Vol. 28, No. 4 (December 2004), pp. 147-184.
134. See Anne Wu, "What China Whispers to North Korea," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Spring 2005), pp. 35-48.
135. For U.S. analyses of Chinese nationalism, see Peter Hays Gries, China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004).
136. G. John Ikenberry, "American Hegemony and East Asian Order," Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 3 (September 2004), pp. 353-367;
137. and Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/ 94), pp. 5-33.
138. For the argument that China reassures other states by joining international institutions, see David Shambaugh, "China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order," International Security, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Winter 2004/05), pp. 64-99.
139. For emphasis on neo-Confucian cultural norms, see David C. Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytic Frameworks," International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Spring 2003), pp. 57-85.
140. For emphasis on Westphalian sovereignty, see Amitav Acharya, "Will Asia's Past Be Its Future?" International Security, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Winter 2003/04), pp. 149-164.
141. For South Korean perspectives that Washington will see China as a threat and contain it, see Dal Joong Chang and Soo Ho Lim, "Bush Hengjeongbu Paegwonjeolyakgwa Dongasiaui Ahnbo Dilemma" [Bush administration's hegemonic strategy and the security dilemma in East Asia], Gukga Jeolyak, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Summer 2004), pp. 5-33;
142. and Jin Young Seo, "Buganghan Jungkukul Dengjangkwa Jungkuk Wehyupron, Gurego Hanbando" [A rising China, China threat perspective, and the Korean Peninsula], Hankukgwa Gukjejeongchi, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Summer 2002), pp. 1-28.
143. See Elise Boulding, "Futuristics and the Imagining Capacity of the West," in Magoroh Maruyama and Arthur M. Harkin, eds., Cultures of the Future (The Hague: Mouton, 1978), pp. 7-31;
144. Paul Halpern, The Pursuit of Destiny: A History of Prediction (Cambridge, Mass.: Perseus, 2000);
145. Bertrand de Jouvenel, The Art of Conjecture (New York: Basic Books, 1967);
146. Daniel Bell, "Introduction," in Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener, eds., The Year 2000: A Framework for Speculation on the Next Thirty-three Years (New York: Macmillan, 1967);
147. and Nicholas Rescher, Predicting the Future: An Introduction to the Theory of Forecasting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998).
148. See Peter Schwartz, The Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future in an Uncertain World (New York: Doubleday, 1996).
149. Herbert A. Simon, "Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science," American Political Science Review, Vol. 79, No. 2 (June 1985), pp. 293-304.
150. For a notable recent exception, see Alastair lain Johnston, "Is China a Status Quo Power?" International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Spring 2003), pp. 5-56.
151. For an older and broader effort, see Richard W. Cottam, Foreign Policy Motivation: A General Theory and a Case Study (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977).
152. On actor-specific theory more generally, see George, Bridging the Gap, pp. 125-131;
153. and Richard K. Herrmann, "Policy-Relevant Theory and the Challenge of Diagnosis: The End of the Cold War as a Case Study," Political Psychology, Vol. 15, No. 1 (March 1994), pp. 111-142.
154. The Correlates of War project, for instance, compiles a linear index of total population, urban population, energy consumption, iron and steel production, military expenditures, and troops under arms. For a review of this measure and others, see Richard L. Merritt and Dina A. Zinnes, "Alternative Indexes of National Power," in Stoll and Ward, Power in World Politics, pp. 11-28.
155. Ray S. Cline adds size of population and territory to gross national product and military troops under arms and multiplies this total by the sum of strategic purpose and will. How to measure these two multipliers is not well developed. Cline, The Power of Nations in the 1990s: A Strategic Assessment (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1995).
156. Klaus Knorr measured gross national product, mineral resources (giving special credit for oil), and man-made capital and technology, including spending on research and development. Knorr, The Power of Nations: The Political Economy of International Relations (New York: Basic Books, 1975), pp. 52-55. Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth emphasize a number of interfirm alliances, geographic dispersion of production, and direct foreign investment, while paying special attention to eight industries: microelectronics, computers, aerospace, telecommunications, transportation, new materials, biotechnology, and chemicals. They do not explain how to reach a net assessment. Brooks and Wohlforth, "Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War."
157. For the case in favor of using this strategy, see Ward Edwards, "Hailfinder: Tools for and Experiences with Bayesian Normative Modeling," American Psychologist, Vol. 53, No. 4 (April 1998), pp. 416-428.
158. George, Bridging the Gap, pp. 120-125.
159. See Nathaniel Beck, Gary King, and Langche Zeng, "Improving Quantitative Studies in International Conflict: A Conjecture," American Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 1 (March 2000), pp. 21-35.