Contours of the Tutin era

New Left Review

Volumn , Issue 44, 2007, Pages 53-68

  Wood, Tony ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 34248357239     PISSN: 00286060     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Note

References (34)

1. Federal'naia sluzhba gosudarstvennoi statistiki (RosStat, www.gks.ru) and UN Human Development Reports, 2002 and 2006. The official poverty line in 2004 was 2,376 roubles per month (then around $85).
2. UN Human Development Report 2006; Economist Intelligence Unit, Russia Country Profile 2006 (henceforth EIU), p. 45. The latter drily notes: 'since it is generally assumed that in Russia income and the ability to evade taxes are positively correlated, actual income distribution is probably more unequal still.'
3. Elu, p. 45. It should be noted, however, that many Russian companies have their headquarters in Moscow, which inflates the city's figure substantially; nevertheless, this statistical bulge itself illustrates the capital's dominant role in the national economy.
4. Figures from RosStat website.
5. Figures from RosStat website.
6. Simon Clarke, 'A Very Soviet Form of Capitalism? The Management of Holding Companies in Russia', Post-Communist Economies, vol. 16, no. 4 (2004), p. 420.
7. EIU, p. 43.
8. Elena Lebedinskaia, 'Stabfond: segodnia, zavtra,.. navsegda?', Neprikosnovennyi zapas, no. 50 (2006); figures from Ministerstvo Finansov, www.minfin.ru.
9. Popov, 'Russia Redux?', NLR 44, March-April 2007, p. 43.
10. Financial Times, 9 June 2006;
11. figures from Ministerstvo Finansov and EIU, Russia Country Report, September 2006, p. 39.
12. EIU, p. 24.
13. Economist, 10 November 2005.
14. EIU, pp. 66, 39.
15. Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White, 'Putin's Militocracy', Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 19, no. 4 (2003), pp. 289-306.
16. have cited the figures for the most tightly defined groups, rather than the much higher aggregate figure calculated by Kryshtanovskaya and White; for important methodological qualifications to their data, see Sharon Werning Rivera and David Rivera, "The Russian Elite under Putin: Militocratic or Bourgeois?', Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 22, no. 2 (2006), pp. 125-44.
17. Kryshtanovskaya and White, "The rise of the Russian business elite', Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 38 (2005), p. 300.
18. Andrew Barnes, 'Russia's New Business Groups and State Power', Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 19, no. 2 (2003), p. 180.
19. Kryshtanovskaya and White, 'Rise of the Russian business elite', p. 295.
20. Financial Times, 19 June 2006;
21. and William Tompson, 'Putin and the "Oligarchs": A Two-Sided Commitment Problem', in Alex Pravda, ed., Leading Russia: Putin in Perspective, Oxford 2005, p. 193.
22. Tompson, 'Putin and the "Oligarchs'", p. 182.
23. Tompson, 'Putin and the "Oligarchs'", p. 188.
24. Vadim Volkov has concluded that in the period since 2000, 'the major instruments of aggressive enterprise takeovers are corrupt state organizations that have judicial and coercive power.' Volkov, "The Selective Use of State Capacity in Russia's Economy: Property Disputes and Enterprise Takeovers After 2000', PONARS Policy Memo no. 273, October 2002.
25. Volkov, 'Selective Use of State Capacity'.
26. EIU, p. 9.
27. Cited in Leonid Kosais, 'Klanovyi kapitalizm v Rossii', Neprikosnovennyi zapas, 50 (2006), p. 196.
28. Kosals, 'Klanovyi kapitalizm', p. 191.
29. Georgi Derluguian, 'Under Fond Western Eyes', NLR 24, November-December 2003, p. 138.
30. Alena Ledeneva, How Russia Really Works: The Informal Practices that Shaped Post-Soviet Politics and Business, Ithaca, NY 2006, p. 188.
31. Popov, 'Russia Redux?', p. 44; Kosals, 'Klanovyi kapitalizm', p. 184.
32. Ledeneva, How Russia Really Works, p. 118.
33. 3o Popov, 'Russia Redux?', pp. 46, 49.
34. Popov, 'Russia Redux?', p. 50; poll data from Levada Centre, www.levada.ru.