Teacher labor markets in developing countries

Future of Children

Volumn 17, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 219-232

  Vegas, Emiliana ^a  

^a WORLD BANK   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT; ARTICLE; CERTIFICATION; COMPENSATION; DECISION MAKING; DEVELOPING COUNTRY; EDUCATION; FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT; HUMAN; JOB PERFORMANCE; MARKET; PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT; QUALITY CONTROL; SALARY; SCHOOL; STUDENT; TEACHER; UNITED STATES; URBAN AREA;

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES; HUMANS; SALARIES AND FRINGE BENEFITS; TEACHING;

EID: 34248326475     PISSN: 10548289     EISSN: 15501558     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1353/foc.2007.0011     Document Type: Article

References (45)

1. In this article, "developing countries" are low- and middle-income countries with high inequality or high poverty, or both.
2. United Nations Population Fund, State of the World's Population 2005 (New York, 2005).
3. The Millennium Development Goals grew out of the agreements and resolutions of world conferences organized by the United Nations during the 1990s. The goals were accepted as a framework for measuring development progress. The eight goals are to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; to achieve universal primary education; to promote gender equality and empower women; to reduce child mortality; to improve maternal health; to combat AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; to ensure environmental sustainability; and to build a global partnership for development. For most countries, the self-imposed deadline for achieving these goals is 2015. World Bank, "Achieving the Millennium Development Goals," available at www.web.worldbank.org.
4. For example, though 93 percent of children in East Asia are enrolled in school, only 56 percent have progressed through grades at the expected pace.
5. As an example, while the share of students deemed to have low skills in the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) is only 0.9 percent in Korea, 4.2 percent in France, and 6.8 percent in the United States, it is 23 percent in Brazil and 54 percent in Peru. Some countries do not participate in such assessments, however, and these findings do not reflect their outcomes. India, for instance, has not participated in the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study or PISA.
6. Mary H. Futrell, presidential speech delivered to Fourth World Congress of Education International, Porto Alegre, Brazil, July 22, 2004.
7. Donald Warwick and Fernando Reimers, Hope or Despair? Learning in Pakistan's Primary Schools (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1995);
8. Ya Ping Wang and Alan Murie, "Social and Spatial Implications of Housing Reform in China," International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 24, no. 2 (2000): 397-417;
9. P. J. McEwan, "Recruitment of Rural Teachers in Developing Countries: An Economic Analysis," Teaching and Teacher Education 15 (1999): 849-59.
10. Tahir Andrabi, Jishnu Das, and Asim Ijaz Khwaja, "Students Today, Teachers Tomorrow? The Rise of Affordable Private Schools in Pakistan," mimeo (World Bank, 2005).
11. D. Boyd and others, "Explaining the Short Careers of High-Achieving Teachers in Schools with Low-Performing Students," American Economic Review 95, no. 2 (2005): 166-71.
12. Werner Hernani-Limarino, "Are Teachers Well Paid in Latin America and the Caribbean? Relative Wage and Structure of Returns of Teachers," in Incentives to Improve Teaching: Lessons from Latin America, edited by E. Vegas (Washington: World Bank Press, 2005).
13. Lucrecia Santibáñez, "¿Están mal pagados los maestros en México? Estimando de los salarios relativos del magisterio," Revista latinoamericana de estudios educativos 32, no. 2 (2002): 9-41.
14. A. Mulcahi-Dunn and G. Arcia, "An Overview of Teacher's Salaries and Living Standards in Ecuador. Center for International Development," mimeo (North Carolina: Research Triangle Institute, 1996).
15. C. Piras and W. D. Savedoff, "How Much Do Teachers Earn?" Working Paper 375 (Washington: Inter-American Development Bank, 1998).
16. D. W. Chapman and others, "The Search for Quality: A Five-Country Study of National Strategies to Improve Educational Quality in Central Asia," International Journal of Educational Development 25, no. 5 (2005): 514-30.
17. Juan Carlos Navarro and Aimee Verdisco, "Teacher Training in Latin America: Innovations and Trends," Sustainable Development Department Technical Paper Series (Washington: Inter-American Development Bank, 2000).
18. Santosh Mehrotra and Peter Buckland, "Managing Teacher Costs for Access and Quality," Staff Working Paper EPP-EVL-98-004 (UNICEF, 1998).
19. Joost De Laat and Emiliana Vegas, "Do Differences in Teacher Contracts Affect Student Performance? Evidence from Togo," mimeo, 2005, Harvard University and The World Bank.
20. Abhijit Banerjee and others, "Remedying Education: Evidence from Two Randomized Experiments in India," Working Paper 11904 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2005).
21. Cristián Cox, "Las políticas educacionales de Chile en las últimas dos décadas del siglo XX," in Políticas educacionales en el cambio de siglo: la reforma del sistema escolar en Chile, edited by Cristián Cox (Santiago, Chile: Editorial Universitaria, 2003).
22. Nora Gordon and Emiliana Vegas, "Educational Finance Equalization, Spending, Teacher Quality, and Student Outcomes: The Case of Brazil's FUNDEF," in Incentives to Improve Teaching: Lessons from Latin America, edited by Vegas (see note 10).
23. The study used an instrumental variables approach to estimate the causal effect of FUNDEF.
24. For example, David Card and A. Abigail Payne, "School Finance Reform, the Distribution of School Spending, and the Distribution of Student Test Scores," Journal of Public Economics 83 (2002): 49-82, find evidence that equalization of educational expenditures across U.S. school districts led to less dispersion in SAT test scores among children of diverse socioeconomic backgrounds.
25. But Melissa A. Clark, "Education Reform, Redistribution, and Student Achievement: Evidence from the Kentucky Education Reform Act" (Princeton, N.J.: Mathematica Policy Research, 2003), finds no evidence that the education expenditure equalization resulting from the Kentucky Education Reform Act narrowed the gap in test scores between rich and poor districts.
26. Alejandra Mizala and Pilar Romaguera, "Teachers' Salary Structure and Incentives in Chile," in Incentives to Improve Teaching: Lessons from Latin America, edited by Vegas (see note 10).
27. Patrick McEwan and Lucrecia Santibáñez, "Teacher and Principal Incentives in Mexico," in Incentives to Improve Teaching: Lessons from Latin America, edited by Vegas (see note 10).
28. Ibid. and Mizala and Romaguera, "Teachers' Salary Structure and Incentives in Chile" (see note 23).
29. Esther C. Duflo and Rema Hanna, "Monitoring Works: Getting Teachers to Come to School," Working Paper 11880 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2005).
30. Paula Pogre and Graciela Lombardi, Schools That Show How to Think: Teaching to Understand, A Theoretical Mark for Action (Argentina: Consorcio de Editores, 2004).
31. Denise Vaillant, "Reforma Del Sistema Formación Inicial De Docentes En Uruguay," paper presented at Los Maestros en América Latina: Nueva Perspectivas Sobre su Desarrollo y Desempeño, San Jose, Costa Rica, 1999.
32. Bih-Jen Fwu and Hsiou-Huai Wang, "The Social Status of Teachers in Taiwan," Comparative Education 38, no. 2 (2002): 211-24.
33. Yasuyuki Sawada and Andrew Ragatz, "Decentralization of Education, Teacher Behavior, and Outcomes: The Case of El Salvador's EDUCO," in Incentives to Improve Teaching: Lessons from Latin America, edited by Vegas (see note 10).
34. Jeffrey Marshall and Emanuela Di Gropello, "Teacher Effort and Schooling Outcomes in Rural Honduras," in Incentives to Improve Teaching: Lessons from Latin America, edited by Vegas (see note 10).
35. Caroline E. Parker, "Teacher Incentives and Student Achievement in Nicaraguan Autonomous Schools," in Incentives to Improve Teaching: Lessons from Latin America, edited by Vegas (see note 10).
36. Mizala and Romaguera, "Teachers' Salary Structure and Incentives in Chile" (see note 23).
37. Gordon and Vegas, "Educational Finance Equalization, Spending, Teacher Quality, and Student Outcomes" (see note 20).
38. Mizala and Romaguera, "Teachers' Salary Structure and Incentives in Chile" (see note 23).
39. Ibid.;
40. McEwan and Santibáñez, "Teacher and Principal Incentives in Mexico" (see note 24).
41. See, for example Paul Glewwe, Nauman Ilias, and Michael Kremer, "Teacher Incentives," Working Paper 9671 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2003);
42. Charles T. Clotfelter and others, "Do School Accountability Systems Make It More Difficult for Low Performing Schools to Attract and Retain High Quality Teachers?" Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 23 (2004): 251-71.
43. Brian A. Jacob and Steven D. Levitt, "Rotten Apples: An Investigation of the Prevalence and Predictors of Teacher Cheating," Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, no. 3 (2003): 843-78, present some evidence of the behavioral reactions to teacher incentive mechanisms in the United States.
44. Miguel Urquiola and Emiliana Vegas, "Arbitrary Variation in Teacher Salaries," in Incentives to Improve Teaching: Lessons from Latin America, edited by Vegas (see note 10).
45. McEwan and Santibáñez, "Teacher and Principal Incentives in Mexico" (see note 24).