The impact of institutional ownership on corporate operating performance

Journal of Banking and Finance

Volumn 31, Issue 6, 2007, Pages 1771-1794

  Cornett, Marcia Millon ^a   Marcus, Alan J ^b   Saunders, Anthony ^c   Tehranian, Hassan ^b  

^a SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b BOSTON COLLEGE   (United States)

^c NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Corporate governance; Financial performance; Institutional ownership

Indexed keywords

EID: 34248136957     PISSN: 03784266     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2006.08.006     Document Type: Article

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