Once more unto the breach: Britain's guarantee to Poland, March 1939

Journal of Contemporary History

Volumn 31, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 721-752

  Strong, G Bruce ^a  

^a MCMASTER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

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EID: 34248131220     PISSN: 00220094     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/002200949603100406     Document Type: Review

References (111)

1. Historians have often complicated the debate by failing to define the word appeasement. Chamberlain's own definition of his policy wedded moderate rearmament to the pacific settlement of European and colonial disputes, with a marked emphasis on the latter aspect. Another definition sees appeasement as the 'shameful and bankrupt policy of surrender to the dictator states' owing to the moral cowardice of governments unwilling to face their responsibilities. Paul Kennedy, 'Appeasement' in Gordon Martel (ed.), The Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered: The A.J.P. Taylor debate after Twenty-Five Years (Boston 1986), 156. In this paper, I shall use the former definition
2. Simon Newman, March 1939: The British Guarantee to Poland. (Oxford 1976) 5-6.
3. Anna Cienciala, Poland and the Western Powers 1938-1939: A Study in the Interdependence of Eastern and Western Europe (London 1976), 223.
4. For a view similar to Cienciala's, see Alan J. Foster, 'An Unequivocal Guarantee? Fleet Street and the British Guarantee to Poland', Journal of Contemporary History, 26, 1 (January 1993), 44.
5. Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott, The Appeasers (London 1967), 241-2, 248.
6. Anita Prazmowska, Britain, Poland and the Eastern Front, 1939 (Cambridge 1987), 57
7. See also idem, 'War over Danzig? The Dilemma of Anglo-Polish Relations in the Months Preceding the Outbreak of the Second World War', Historical Journal, 26, 1 (1983), 177-8
8. and idem, 'The East Front and the British Guarantee to Poland of March 1939', European History Quarterly, 14, 1 (1984), 183-209.
9. Donald Cameron Watt, How War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938-1939 (London 1989), 186.
10. Andrew Roberts, The Holy Fox: A Biography of Lord Halifax (London 1991), 149.
11. Wesley Wark, 'Something Very Stern: British Political Intelligence, Moralism and Strategy in 1939', Intelligence and National Security 5, 1 (January 1990), 164, 162.
12. Maurice Cowling, The Impact of Hitler: British Politics and British Policy 1933-1939 (Cambridge 1975), 9
13. Newman, op. cit., 136, 172. Keith Middlemas, The Diplomacy of Illusion: The British Government and Germany, 1937-1939 (London 1972), 441
14. Prazmowska, Britain, Poland and the Eastern Front, 1939, op. cit., 56
15. See, for example, Watt, How War Came, op. cit., 162-87
16. Sydney Aster, 1939: The Making of the Second World War, (London 1973), 61-114
17. John Harvey (ed.), The Diplomatic Diaries of Oliver Harvey 1937-1940 [hereafter Harvey Diaries] (London 1970), 18 March 1939, 263.
18. For the text of Chamberlain's speech, see Neville Chamberlain, The Struggle for Peace (Toronto 1939), 419
19. David Dilks (ed.), The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, O.M. 1938-1945 [hereafter Cadogan Diaries] (London 1971), 19 March 1939, 161
20. Neville Chamberlain Papers [hereafter NC], University of Birmingham Library, used with permission of the University of Birmingham Library, NC 18/1/1090, Neville Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 19 March 1939
21. Public Record Office [hereafter PRO], Foreign Office [hereafter FO], 371 22967 C3858/15/18, Cabinet Paper 14/7/7(i), 19 March 1993
22. Cadogan Diaries, 20 March 1939, 161
23. FO 371 23062 C4086/3356/18, Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Kennard, 24 March 1939. See Documents on British Foreign Policy [hereafter DBFP], Series III, Volume 4 (London 1949-1957), #518, 500-3
24. PRO, Prime Ministers' Series [hereafter PREM] 1/321, 25 March 1939
25. See also Cadogan Diaries, s.d., 163; and Harvey Diaries, 26 March 1939, 267-8
26. PRO, Cabinet Minutes [hereafter CAB] 23/98, 31 March 1939
27. John Charmley, Chamberlain and the Lost Peace (London 1989), 174-5
28. The Earl of Birkenhead, Halifax: The Life of Lord Halifax (London 1965), 419
29. R.A. Butler, The Art of Memory (London 1982), 30
30. See, for example, NC 18/1/1072, Neville Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 15 October 1938
31. The Times, 16 March 1939, 16, 17 March 1939, 16, 17, and 20 March 1939, 15. For a useful summary of Britain's press coverage of nazi Germany, see Franklin Reid Gannon, The British Press and Germany 1936-1939 (Oxford 1971)
32. Daily Telegraph, 20 March 1939, 12
33. News Chronicle, 17 March 1939, 10, and 20 March 1939, 10
34. Official Reports, Fifth Series, Parliamentary Debates: Commons, 1938-39, Volume 345 [hereafter 345 HC, Deb. 5s.] (London 1939), 15 March 1939: Col. Wedgewood, col. 462; Ellen Wilkenson, col. 470
35. NC 18/1/1087, Neville Chamberlain to Ida Chamberlain, 26 February 1939
36. Nigel Nicolson (ed.), Harold Nicolson: Diaries and Letters (London 1966), 9 November 1939, 377-8. The loose association of MPs eschewed even as formal a title as 'group'. Nicolson listed as members himself, Eden, Leo Amery, Sidney Herbert, Harold MacMillan, Sir Edward Spears, Derrick Gunston, Paul Emrys-Evans, Anthony Crossly, Hubert Duggan, and Duff Cooper. Others included Dudley Joel, Col. Lancaster, Richard Law, Ronald Law, and Lord Wolmer. Newman, op. cit., 101, n6
37. FO 800/315, H/XV/142, Lord De La Warr to Viscount Halifax, 25 March 1939
38. Nicolson Diaries, 17 March 1939, 393
39. Robert Sheppard, A Class Divided: Appeasement and the Road to Munich (London 1988), 291, 78-9, 292
40. FO 800/315 H/XV/140, Salisbury to Viscount Halifax, 23 March 1939, emphasis in original. Halifax read Salisbury's letter on 24 March 1939, and sent a reply on 25 March 1939. FO 800/315 H/XV/141, Viscount Halifax to the Marquess of Salisbury, 25 March 1939
41. Ritchie Ovendale, Appeasement and the English-Speaking World (Cardiff 1975), 220-1, 223-6. Watt, How War Came, op. cit., 167
42. idem, 'Misinformation, Misconception, Mistrust: Episodes in British Policy and the Approach of War' in Michael Bentley and John Stevenson (eds), High and Low Politics in Modern Britain (Oxford 1983), 236
43. Watt, 'Misinformation, Misconception, Mistrust', op. cit., 229
44. DBFP III/4, #394, Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Lindsay, 17 March 1939, 364-6
45. FO 371 23062 C4084/3356/18, Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Lindsay, 24 March 1939
46. FO 371 23015 C4505/54/18, Minute by Sir O. Sargent, 28 March 1939
47. CAB 27/624 F.(36), 36th meeting, 27 March 1939
48. Watt, How War Came, op. cit., 101. Aster, op. cit., 43-4. For an assessment of the Berlin embassy's role in the reports of future German expansion see Bruce Strang, 'Two Unequal Tempers: Sir George Ogilvie-Forbes, Sir Nevile Henderson, and British Foreign Policy, 1938-1939', Diplomacy and Statecraft, 5, 1 (March 1994), 107-37 and Wesley Wark, 'Three Military Attaches at Berlin in the 1930s: Soldier Statesmen and the Limits of Ambiguity', International History Review, 94 (November 1987), 586-611
49. F0 371 22960 C15/15/18, Col. Mason-MacFarlane to Sir G.Ogilvie-Forbes, 29 December 1938; FO 371 22961 C528/15/18, Mr Vereker to Viscount Halifax, 10 January 1939; FO 371 22962 C1053/15/18, Sir G. Ogilvie-Forbes to Viscount Halifax, 26 January 1939
50. FO 371 22958 C3565/13/18, Minute by Mr Jebb, 21 March 1939
51. FO 371 22958 C2882/13/18, Minute by Col. Mason-MacFarlane, 3 March 1939
52. NC 18/1/1092, Neville Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 2 April 1939
53. CAB 53/10, Minutes of Chiefs of Staff Committee Meeting #286, 30 March 1939, and PREM 1/331A, Germany's intentions regarding Danzig, Brig.-Gen. Beaumont-Nesbitt to Gen. Ismay, 31 March 1939
54. FO 371 22968 C4621/15/18, Memorandum by Mr Kirkpatrick, 20 March 1939
55. See also a later summary of the various mid-March reports regarding possible dates for German military action, FO 371 22971 C6143/15/18, Minute by Mr Roberts, 24 April 1939
56. CAB 27/624 F. (36), 40th meeting, 31 March 1939
57. NC 18/1/1091, Neville Chamberlain to Ida Chamberlain, 26 March 1939
58. CAB 27/624 F.(36), 38th meeting, 27 March 1939
59. CAB 23/98 13(39), 20 March 1939
60. CAB 23/98 16(39), 30 March 1939. This emphasis on deterrence completely undermines the conclusion of Simon Newman's monograph on the guarantee. He assumes that the following speech made by Halifax at the Foreign Policy Committee meeting of 27 March implies a deliberate Great Power challenge to Germany. 'We were faced with the dilemma of doing nothing or entering into a devastating war. If we did nothing this in itself would mean a great accession to Germany's strength and a great loss to ourselves of sympathy and support in the United States, in the Balkan countries and in other parts of the world. In those circumstances if we had to choose between two great evils he favoured our going to war.' This speech was made in the context first, that the deterrent value of the guarantee already would have failed, thus forcing war on Britain, and second, that Germany aimed to 'smash the British Empire' (see, for example, Cadogan Diary, 26 February 1939, 152). As Chamberlain said at the same meeting, the object of the eastern front 'was to check and defeat Germany's attempt at world domination'. CAB 27/624 F.(36), 38th meeting, 27 March 1939. Britain was preparing to fight for its existence, not for reasons of Great Power prestige. It is both strange and unfortunate that Newman, in an otherwise well-researched book that emphasizes context and continuity, has leapt to a conclusion so removed from the context of the time that the evidence he adduces cannot support it
61. FO 371 22968 C4417/15/18, Viscount Halifax to Sir E. Phipps, 30 March 1939
62. Robert J. Young, In Command of France: French Foreign Policy and Military Planning, 1933-1940 (Cambridge 1978), 216
63. FO 371 21673 C12819/85/18, Viscount Halifax to Sir E. Phipps, 1 November 1938
64. FO 371 21809 C14878/2688/55, Minute by Mr Strang, 28 November 1938
65. FO 371 22922 C358/281/17, Minute by Sir R. Vansittart, 19 December 1938. FO 371 21597 C16018/36/17, Col. Fraser to Sir E. Phipps, 22 December 1938 (enclosed in Sir E. Phipps to Viscount Halifax, 2 January 1939). See Minutes by Mr Strang, Sir O. Sargent, Sir A. Cadogan, 5/6/7 January 1939
66. These initiatives are covered in more detail in Roberts, op. cit., 127-30
67. Brian Bond, British Military Policy between Two Wars (Oxford 1980), 300-2
68. See also CAB 23/97 2(39), 3(39), 4(39), 5(39), 25 and 30 January 1939, and 1 and 2 February 1939; Cab 27/624 F. (36) 36th meeting, 26 January 1939
69. FO 371 22922 C940/281/17, Minute by Sir R. Vansittart, 21 January 1939
70. FO 371 22922 C355/281/17, Col. Fraser to Sir E. Phipps, 4 January 1939 (enclosed in Sir E. Phipps to Viscount Halifax, 7 January 1939), and Minute by Mr Strang, 17 January 1939
71. See also British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II [hereafter Confidential Print] (Lanham, MD 1993), Series F, Volume 23, #93, 229-30
72. FO 371 22922 C1983/281/17, Mr Sellar (CID) to Mr Jebb, 27 January 1939, emphasis in original
73. See also Brian Bond (ed.), Chief of Staff: The Diaries of Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Pownall, Volume I, 1933-1940 (London 1972), 20 February 1939, 187. Pownall wrote that Halifax was instrumental in securing the continental commitment, and that 'the French pressure on him had the required effect'
74. FO 371 22912 C3378/90/17, Sir E. Phipps to Viscount Halifax, 18 March 1939. DBFP III/4, #484, Record of an Anglo-French Conversation, 22 March 1939, 457-63
75. FO 371 23794 R2012/7/22, Viscount Halifax to Sir E. Phipps, 28 March 1939. The entire list of British approaches to France in this vein is too long to list here
76. but see also PREM 1/329, entire
77. FO 371 23794 R1939/7/22, Minutes by Mr Jebb, 21/22 March 1939. FO 371 23793 R1491/7/22, Mr Campbell to Sir O. Sargent, 3 March 1939, Minute by Sir O. Sargent, 7 March 1939
78. FO 371 23794 R2193/7/22, Mr de Courcy to Neville Chamberlain, 27 March 1939, Minute by Mr Jebb, 27 March 1939, Minute by Sir A. Cadogan, 28 March 1939
79. See also 26 March 1939, 164
80. CAB 53/10 C.O.S. 282nd meeting, 283rd meeting, 18 March 1939
81. FO 371 23061 C3735/3356/18, Sir O. Sargent conversation with M. Cambon, 20 March 1939
82. FO 371 22996 C3986/19/18, Viscount Halifax conversations with M. Bonnet, 21/22/23 March 1939
83. See also DBFP III/4, #458, 422-7
84. Confidential Print, Series A, Vol. 15, #39, Mr Snow to Viscount Halifax, 22 March 1939, 69-70
85. FO 371 23061 C3907/3356/18, Lord Perth to Viscount Halifax, 23 March
86. See also DBFP III/4, #509, 492
87. FO 371 23061 C3942/3356/18, Minute by Mr Kirkpatrick, 23 March 1939
88. FO 371 23061 C3727/3356/18, Sir H. Kennard to Viscount Halifax, 21 March 1939
89. FO 371 23061 C3968/3356/18, Sir W. Seeds to Viscount Halifax, 21 March 1939
90. FO 371 23061 C3849/3356/18, Minute by Mr Lascelles, 27 March 1939. Neville Chamberlain shared these views. He confessed to his sister Ida his 'profound distrust of Russia. ... I distrust her motives which seem to me to have little connection with our ideas of liberty and to be concerned only with getting everyone else by the ears.' NC 18/1/1091, Neville Chamberlain to Ida Chamberlain, 26 March 1939. Nor should one necessarily consider these views perverse. From the British perspective, the Soviet government had abandoned its allies in February 1918, had published embarrassing British and French diplomatic documents from the Tsarist records, and had reneged on Tsarist debts. It had created the Comintern, which was at least theoretically intended to foment revolution in the western democracies, while at the same time the Soviet Union demanded normal diplomatic relations with its intended victims. The Soviet Union, though in a different manner from Germany, was openly revisionist regarding its borders and the international order in general. While this view of the Soviet Union's highly irregular foreign policy is one-sided, it underlay the hope of some British statesmen to avoid an open association with the Soviet Union and the risk of possible betrayal. Robert Manne, 'Some British Light on the Nazi-Soviet Pact', European Studies Review, 11, 1 (January 1981), 96-7. It is also important to note that Chamberlain was not present at the meeting in the Foreign Office on 25 March when the decision to drop the four-power pact was taken; his personal predilections did not decide British policy in this case, as some have alleged. PREM 1/321, Mr Mallet to Mr Rootham, 26 March 1939
91. DBFP III/4, #555, Col. Fraser to Sir E. Phipps, 27 March 1939 (enclosure in Sir E. Phipps to Viscount Halifax, 28 March 1939), 535
92. Confidential Print, Series A, Vol. 15, #33, Memorandum by Commander Hallawell, 6 March 1939, 63-4, #32, Col. Firebrace, s.d., 62-3
93. FO 371 23061 C3968/3356/18, Minute by Sir L. Oliphant, 29 March 1939
94. Young, In Command of France, op. cit., 234. These views were confirmed, or perhaps even shown to be optimistic, after the Red Army's dismal performance in its early campaigns against Finland and Germany. Michael Howard, The Continental Commitment: The Dilemma of British Defense Policy between the Wars (London 1972), 132
95. PREM 1/321, Mr Mallet to Mr Rootham, 26 March 1939
96. Harvey Diary, 26 March 1939, 267-8
97. FO 371 22967 C4207/15/18, Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Kennard, 27 March 1939
98. FO 371 23062 C4692/3356/18, Minute by Sir A. Cadogan, 29 March 1939. Maisky also told a delegation of Labour Members of Parliament that the Soviet Union welcomed the guarantee. W.N. Medlicott, British Foreign Policy Since Versailles, 1919-1963 (London 1968), 204
99. Henri Michel, 'France, Grande-Bretagne et Pologne (Mars-Août 1939)' in Les Relations Franco-Britanniques de 1935 à 1939 (Paris 1975), 385-6
100. FO 371 23060 C3455/3356/18, Sir E. Phipps to Viscount Halifax, 18 March 1939
101. CAB 27/624 F. (36) 38th meeting, 27 March 1939
102. This memorandum was not distributed to the entire Cabinet until 4 April 1939. Bond, op. cit., 307
103. CAB 53/47 C.O.S. 872, 3 April 1939
104. and idem, 'La Guerre de longue durée: Some reflections on French Strategy and Diplomacy in the 1930s' in Adrian Preston (ed.), General Staffs and Diplomacy before the Second World War (London 1978), 41-64
105. Wesley Wark, 'British Military and Economic Intelligence Assessments of Nazi Germany Before the Second World War' in David Dilks and Christopher Andrew (eds), The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century (London 1984), 87-8
106. See also idem, The Ultimate Enemy (Ithaca 1985), 113-14
107. FO 371 23061 C4042/3356/18, Sir G. Ogilvie-Forbes to Viscount Halifax, 25 March 1939, emphasis in original. In one memorandum, Mason-MacFarlane went as far as urging a preventive war, but Cadogan called this screed 'a rather hysterical outpouring'. FO 371 22958 C4760/13/18, Sir G. Ogilvie-Forbes to Mr Strang, 29 March 1939, Minute by Sir A. Cadogan, 31 March 1939
108. FO 371 22967 C4319/15/18, Foreign Office Memorandum, 29 March 1939
109. Ben Pimlott (ed.), The Political Diaries of Hugh Dalton, 1918-1940 (London 1986), 26 May-2 June 1939, 270
110. P.M.H. Bell, The Origins of World War Two (London 1986), 261-2
111. Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-73 (New York 1974), 275