'An amateur learns his job'? Special operations executive in Portugal, 1940-42

Journal of Contemporary History

Volumn 36, Issue 3, 2001, Pages

  Wylie, Neville ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34248068795     PISSN: 00220094     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/002200940103600303     Document Type: Article

References (48)

1. See G.C. McKay, From Information to Intrigue. Studies in Secret Service based on the Swedish Experience (London 1993);
2. David A. Messenger, 'Fighting for Relevance. Economic Intelligence and Special Operations Executive in Spain, 1943-1945', Intelligence & National Security, 15, 3 (2000), 33-54;
3. Eunan O'Halpin, '"Toys" and "Whispers" in "16-land": SOE and Ireland, 1940-42', Intelligence & National Security, 15, 4 (2000), 1-18
4. J.G. Beevor, S.O.E. Recollections and Reflections 1940-1945 (London 1980)
5. 'Subversive Activities in Relation to Strategy', 25 November 1940. COS(40)27(0). Public Record Office (hereafter PRO). CAB80/56
6. M.R.D. Foot, S.O.E.: An Outline History of the Special Operations Executive, 1940-1946 (London 1990), 250
7. David Stafford, Britain and European Resistance 1940-194.5. A Survey of the Special Operations Executive with Documents (Toronto 1980), 55-6;
8. Philip Johns, Within Two Cloaks. Missions with S.I.S. and S.O.E. (London 1979), 91
9. Denis Smyth, Diplomacy and Strategy of Survival. British Policy and Franco's Spain, 1940-1941 (Cambridge 1986), esp. 217-41;
10. Glyn Stone, The Oldest Ally. Britain and the Portuguese Connection 1936-1941 (Woodbridge 1994), 163-81
11. Winston Churchill to Lord Halifax, 24 July 1940. PRO. F0371/24515 C7429
12. For Salazar's diplomacy in Madrid see Fernando Rosas, 'O Pacto Ibérico e a neutralizacao da Península na Segunda Guerra Mundial', História, 57 (1983), 1-17,
13. and Charles R. Halstead, 'Consistent and Total Peril from Every Side: Portugal and its 1940 Protocol with Spain', Iberian Studies, 3, 1 (1974), 15-29
14. Denis Smyth, 'The Dispatch of the Spanish Blue Division to the Russian Front: Reasons and Repercussions', European History Quarterly, 24 (1994), 537-53.
15. Intelligence estimates: F.H. Hinsley et al. (eds), British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol. 2 (London 1981), 80-3. During December 1941 there were rumours of German troop withdrawals from Russia, in preparation for an attack on Spain, but these were quashed in mid-January 1942. Ibid., 92
16. The staff discussions and Anglo-Portuguese relations over the Azores are treated in Stone, op. cit., 166-81, and Felicitas von Peter, 'British Policy towards Portugal during the Second World War' (PhD thesis, University of Cambridge 1996), 59-77, 137-45
17. Minute by Beevor, 12 October 1942. PRO. HS6/991
18. See David Stafford, 'SOE and British Involvement in the Belgrade Coup d'Etat of March 1941', Slavic Review, 36, 3 (1977), 399-419
19. and Glyn A. Stone, 'The Official British Attitude to the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, 1910-1945', Journal of Contemporary History, 10, 4 (October 1975), 729-46
20. Campbell to Eden, 23 January. PRO. FO371/31730 F1162. For Britain's scepticism of the benefits in replacing Franco with a military junta, see Smyth, Diplomacy and Strategy of Survival, op. cit., 208-16
21. Imperial War Museum. SOE Sound Archive. J.G. Beevor interview, 1986. 4 Reels, Reel 3
22. On Anglo-Portuguese economic difficulties, see Fernando Rosas, Portugal entre a paz e a guerra, 1939-1945 (Lisbon 1990), esp. 49-75
23. Sir Ronald Campbell to Foreign Office, 2 July 1941. PRO. F0371/26795 C7570. Portuguese Legation to State Department, 30 May 1941, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, vol. 2 (Washington 1959), 844-6. For Lisbon's attitude towards the Azores see Antonio Telo, Os Açores e o controlo do Atlãntico 1898-1948 (Oporto 1993), 289-349
24. Minute by Roger Makins (FO), 8 January 1942. PRO. F0371/31124 C202. David Dilks, The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 1938-1945 (London 1983), 425 (31 December 1941).
25. For the Timor incident, see Carlos Teixeira da Motta, O Caso de Timor na II Guerra Mundial (Lisbon 1999), esp. 54-103
26. Douglas L. Wheeler, 'The Price of Neutrality: Portugal, The Wolfram Question, and World War IF, Luso-Brazilian Review, 23, 1 (1986), 107-22; 23, 2 (1986), 97-111,
27. and Christian Leitz, Economic Relations between Nazi Germany and Franco's Spain, 1936-1945 (Oxford 1996), 170-99
28. For British difficulties with German influence see Robert Cole, Britain and the War of Words in Neutral Europe, 1939-1945 (London 1990), 88-92
29. On the importance of the Portuguese police see Douglas L. Wheeler, 'In the Service of Order: The Portuguese Political Police and the British, German and Spanish Intelligence, 1932-1945', Journal of Contemporary History, 18, 1 (January 1983), 1-25
30. SOE requested a further 90,000 to use to suborn junior officials. Their counterparts in Madrid had greater success, at least in distributing the allocated funds. PRO. HS6/933. Denis Smyth, 'Les Chevaliers de Saint-George: la Grande-Bretagne et la corruption des généraux espagnols (1940-1942)', Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains, 162 (1991), 29-54
31. The disturbances, orchestrated by the Portuguese communist party, were the first serious outbreak of unrest since the early 1930s. Tom Gallagher, 'Controlled Repression in Salazar's Portugal', Journal of Contemporary History, 14, 3 (July 1979), 385-402
32. Telo, Propaganda e guerra secreta em Portugal 1939-1945 (Lisbon 1990), 104-7.
33. O Caso Shell: a rede espionagem anglo-portuguesa (1940-1942)
34. Lord Gladwyn, The Gladwyn Memoirs (London 1972), 103.
35. Leo Marks, Between Silk and Cyanide. A Codemaker's War (London 1998)
36. SOE (HA) to Beevor, 5 April 1942. PRO. HS6/989. Beevor's exasperation is clear: 'How can we make official collaboration if we behave like small boys caught in the kitchen cupboard just before official Christmas dinner.' Beevor to SOE, 7 April 1942. Ibid. See also SOE's war diary, HS7/230, 3439-10
37. Cited in Bickham Sweet-Escott, Baker Street Irregular (London 1965), 60
38. Kenneth Benton, 'The ISOS Years: Madrid 1941-1943', Journal of Contemporary History, 30,3 (July 1995), 359-410
39. Charles B. Burdick, '"Moro": The Resupply of German Submarines in Spain, 1939-1942', Central European History, 111, 3 (1970), 256-84. Johns, op. cit., 75-6, 98
40. Sweet-Escott, op. cit., 99. Telo, Propaganda e guerra secreta, op. cit., 85-8. Nigel West, MIS: British Secret Intelligence Operations, 1909-45 (London 1983), 83. Johns, op. cit., 63-4, 82
41. Minute by Gladwyn Jebb, 19 March 1942. Minutes of meeting with DMI and DDMI, 30 March 1942. PRO. HS6/987
42. SOE War Diary, vol. 33, Iberian Section, PRO. HS7/254
43. For Garbo, see Michael Howard, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol. 5. Strategic Deception (London 1990), 18, 231-41
44. and Mark Seaman (ed.), GARBO. The Spy Who Saved D-Day (London 2000)
45. M.R.D. Foot and J.M. Langley, MI9. Escape and Evasion, 1939-1945 (London 1979), 44
46. Sir Ronald Campbell to Foreign Office, 1 April 1942. PRO. HS6/987
47. Roger Makins (FO) to Col. G.T. Taylor (SOE), 30 April 1942. PRO. HS6/991