Communicative power in habermas's theory of democracy

European Journal of Political Theory

Volumn 3, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 433-454

  Flynn, Jeffrey ^a  

^a MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

Communicative power; Democracy; Discourse theory; J rgen Habermas; Public sphere

Indexed keywords

EID: 34248058705     PISSN: 14748851     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1474885104045914     Document Type: Article

References (74)

1. Jürgen Habermas (1984) The Theory of Communicative Action, tr. Thomas McCarthy. Boston: Beacon Press.
2. Jürgen Habermas (1996) Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, tr. William Rehg. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
3. See also the articles in Jürgen Habermas (1998) The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory, ed. Ciaran Cronin and Pablo De Greiff. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
4. Habermas (1996, in n. 1), p. 136.
5. Jürgen Habermas. The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory, Ibid. p. 170, emphasis added.
6. Hannah Arendt (1970) On Violence, p. 44. New York: Harcourt Brace & Co.
7. Hannah Arendt (1958) The Human Condition, p. 200. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
8. Habermas (1996, in n. 1), p. 147. See also Habermas (1977) 'Hannah Arendt's Communications Concept of Power', Social Research 44(1): 3-24;
9. reprinted as Habermas (1983) 'Hannah Arendt: On the Concept of Power', in Philosophical-Political Profiles, tr. Frederick Lawrence, pp. 171-88. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
10. Arendt (n. 4), p. 41.
11. Habermas (1996, in n. 1), p. 150.
12. Habermas. Philosophical-Political Profiles, Ibid. p. 148.
13. See Habermas (1984, in n. 1). See also Habermas (1996, in n. 1), esp. pp. 3-6, 17-19.
14. Jürgen Habermas (1990) 'Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Justification', in Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, tr. Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholson, pp. 89-90. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
15. Habermas (1996, in n. 1), p. 107. The discourse principle and its role are altered slightly here from earlier formulations. In Between Facts and Norms Habermas attempts to emphasize the applicability of D to action norms in general without bias toward moral or legal norms in particular.
16. For a recent and illuminating critical account of the role of the discourse principle in Between Facts and Norms,
17. see Matthias Kettner (2002) 'The Disappearance of Discourse Ethics in Habermas's Between Facts and Norms', in Rene von Schomberg and Kenneth Baynes (eds) Discourse and Democracy, pp. 201-18. Albany: State University of New York Press.
18. Habermas (1996, in n. 1) p. 110.
19. Habermas first developed this expansion beyond just moral discourse in (1993) 'On the Pragmatic, the Ethical, and the Moral Employments of Practical Reason', in Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics, tr. Ciaran Cronin, pp. 1-17. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. See Habermas (1996, in n. 1), pp. 158-68, esp. 162ff., where Habermas develops an 'abstract process model' of discursive opinion- and will-formation within a legislature, culminating in judicial review.
20. Habermas gives a somewhat stylized version of both liberalism and republicanism in order to present his own model as a third way. I simply restate that contrast here since I am not primarily concerned with those disputes in this article. For Habermas's account, see also (1998) 'Three Normative Models of Democracy', in The Inclusion of the Other, tr. Ciaran Cronin and Pablo DeGreiff, pp. 239-252. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. See Habermas (1996, in n. 1) pp. 267-86, 295-302. For another, more detailed comparison of liberal and communitarian models of deliberative democracy and a proposed alternative based on the 'rule of reasons',
21. see Rainer Forst (2001) 'The Rule of Reasons: Three Models of Deliberative Democracy', Ratio Juris 14(4): 345-78.
22. Habermas (1996, in n. 1), pp. 296-7.
23. Rainer Forst. Ratio Juris, Ibid. p. 283.
24. Klaus Günther (1998) 'Communicative Freedom, Communicative Power, and Jurisgenesis', in Michel Rosenfeld and Andrew Arato (eds) Habermas on Law and Democracy: Critical Exchanges, pp. 234-254, p. 235. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. This is one of the few articles to have dealt systematically with the concept of communicative power.
25. Habermas (1996, in n. 1), 'Postscript', p. 450.
26. Habermas (1996) 'Popular Sovereignty as Procedure', appendix 1 to between Facts and Norms, tr. William Rehg, pp. 463-90, p. 486, emphasis added. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
27. For an account that is critical of Habermas's appropriations from systems theory see Thomas McCarthy (1991) 'Complexity and Democracy: The Seducements of Systems Theory', in Ideals and Illusions: On the Reconstruction and Reconstruction in Contemporary Critical Theory, pp. 152-80. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Specifically, McCarthy argues that the terms of the pact with systems theory are unclear and that Habermas has ceded too much ground to systems theory, thereby leaving critical theory in an unnecessarily defensive position. The continuing legacy of these ambiguities in the pact with systems theory may be contributing to the ambiguities I discuss communicative power insofar as Habermas may be unclear about the position of legislative bodies as part of the public sphere of the lifeworld or the political system.
28. Habermas's earlier remarks about the 'democratic dam' are from (1992) 'Further Reflections on the Public Sphere', in Craig Calhoun (ed.) Habermas and the Public Sphere, pp. 421-61, p. 444. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
29. Habermas (1996, in n. 1), p. 81.
30. Habermas is elaborating here on the distinction made by Nancy Fraser, between 'strong' (formal) and 'weak' (informal) publics in her article (1992) 'Rethinking the Public Sphere', in Craig Calhoun (ed.) Habermas and the Public Sphere, pp. 109-42. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Fraser also raises 'the possibility for a proliferation of strong publics in the form of self-managing institutions, . . . in self-managed workplaces, child-care centers, or residential communities', and in 'hybrid publics' that have some decisionmaking authority
31. Habermas and the Public Sphere (ibid. p. 135). For a criticism of Habermas for neglecting such possibilities and thereby failing to 'identify democracy's most attractive possibilities',
32. see Joshua Cohen (1999) 'Reflections on Habermas on Democracy', Ratio Juris 12(4): 385-416, esp. 408ff. Cohen favors an account that institutionalizes direct problemsolving by citizens. It is not clear that Habermas would object to any such arrangements, but he does emphasize the value of a public sphere under no pressure to decide. Whether this could be well balanced with some authority to make binding decisions is perhaps anempirical matter, but I will return to this point in the final section in relation to the generation of communicative power.
33. Habermas (1996, in n. 1), p. 308.
34. Joshua Cohen. Ratio Juris, Ibid. p. 361.
35. In his review of Between Facts and Norms, William Forbath writes: Popular sovereignty popularly understood means citizens governing themselves. But in Habermas's world of law as popular sovereignty, citizens merely talk and argue, forming opinions and kibitzing and contesting officialdom in the informal public sphere of 'civil society.' This is essential democratic work, but not quite the same as law-making. A 'collectively acting citizenry' has no role in the latter enterprise;
36. Habermas's citizenry must always rely instead on the sway that informal 'opinion formation' exerts over institutionalized 'will formation.' (1998) 'Habermas's Constitution: A History, Guide, and Critique', Law and Social Inquiry 23(4): 969-1016, p. 996. While Forbath is correct in his assessment of the direct role of a 'collectively acting citizenry' in lawmaking in Habermas's account, he seems to underestimate the normative requirements placed on the public sphere. In particular, that the legitimacy of deliberative politics depends on a process of rational opinion-formation in the public sphere and the fact that the political system is always dependent upon the normative reasons generated by the public sphere for its legitimacy.
37. Habermas (1996, in n. 1), p. 360.
38. Law and Social Inquiry, Ibid. p. 361.
39. Law and Social Inquiry, Ibid. pp. 366-7.
40. Law and Social Inquiry, Ibid. p. 369.
41. Law and Social Inquiry, Ibid. p. 369.
42. Law and Social Inquiry, Ibid. p. 359.
43. Law and Social Inquiry, Ibid. p. 362.
44. Law and Social Inquiry, Ibid. p. 304.
45. For an account that criticizes Habermas for failing to adequately theorize the 'democratic ethos' presupposed by his proceduralism, see Richard J. Bernstein (1998) 'The Retrieval of the Democratic Ethos', in Michel Rosenfeld and Andrew Arato (eds) Habermas on Law and Democracy: Critical Exchanges, pp. 287-305. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
46. Axel Honneth also criticizes Habermas for similar reasons and presents Dewey's theory of democracy as a 'third avenue between the false options of an overethicized republicanism and empty proceduralism' in (1998) 'Democracy as Reflexive Cooperation: John Dewey and the Theory of Democracy Today', Political Theory 26(6): 763-83. In response to such criticisms, Habermas seems only to emphasize that the normative requirements for legitimacy cannot take the form of a legal compulsion to participate: An orientation to the common good may be called for, but it cannot be made into a legal duty. . . . I oppose the republican tradition only insofar as I shift the burden of justifying the effectiveness of practical reason from the mentality of citizens to the deliberative form of politics.
47. Habermas (1998) 'Reply to Symposium Participants', in Michel Rosenfeld and Andrew Arato (eds) Habermas on Law and Democracy: Critical Exchanges, p. 385. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
48. Habermas (1996, in n. 1), p. 363.
49. Habermas. Habermas on Law and Democracy: Critical Exchanges, Ibid. p. 170.
50. Habermas. Habermas on Law and Democracy: Critical Exchanges, Ibid. p. 148.
51. Habermas. Habermas on Law and Democracy: Critical Exchanges, Ibid. p. 147.
52. Habermas. Habermas on Law and Democracy: Critical Exchanges, Ibid. p. 119.
53. Habermas (1984, in n. 1), vol. 2, p. 74 (emphasis added): The critical character of this saying 'no' [to a speech-act offer] distinguishes taking a position in this way from a reaction based solely on caprice. A hearer can be 'bound' by speech-act offers because he is not permitted arbitrarily to refuse them but only to say 'no' to them, that is, to reject them for reasons.
54. Habermas (1996, in n. 1), p. 147.
55. Habermas. Habermas on Law and Democracy: Critical Exchanges, Ibid. p. 157.
56. Habermas (1996, in n. 20), p. 486, emphasis added.
57. Habermas (1996, in n. 1), p. 385.
58. Habermas. Habermas on Law and Democracy: Critical Exchanges, Ibid. p. 170.
59. Habermas. Habermas on Law and Democracy: Critical Exchanges, Ibid. pp. 171-2.
60. Habermas. Habermas on Law and Democracy: Critical Exchanges, Ibid. pp. 371-2.
61. Habermas. Habermas on Law and Democracy: Critical Exchanges, Ibid. p. 442.
62. Habermas. Habermas on Law and Democracy: Critical Exchanges, Ibid. p. 301.
63. Habermas himself has indicated that he actually intended to explain communicative power in terms of what I call the narrow reading. In fact, he associated it primarily with the exercise of voting. We can see that in the following: 'Passing through the channels of general elections and various forms of participation, public opinions are converted into a communicative power that authorizes the legislature and legitimates regulatory agencies' (Habermas. Habermas on Law and Democracy: Critical Exchanges, ibid. p. 442). But he has also acknowledged that the wider reading has merit because of the connection of communicative power to communicative action in face-to-face interaction (personal communication, 11 Oct. 2000). Whether all of this can be reconciled within a single concept remains to be seen.
64. Habermas (1996, in n. 1), p. 363.
65. Habermas. Habermas on Law and Democracy: Critical Exchanges, Ibid. p. xliii.
66. Habermas. Habermas on Law and Democracy: Critical Exchanges, Ibid. p. 148.
67. See William Scheuerman (1999) 'Between Radicalism and Resignation: Democratic Theory in Habermas's Between Facts and Norms', in Peter Dews (ed.) Habermas: A Critical Reader, pp. 153-77. Oxford: Blackwell. I would argue, however, that Scheuerman tends to overemphasize the divergent sources from which Habermas draws (Nancy Eraser's 'socialist-feminist' model and Bernhard Peter's 'realist-inspired' model), and does not fully account for Habermas's reconstructive appropriation of those sources.
68. See Habermas (1996, in n. 1), pp. 186-93, 440-1.
69. William Scheuerman. Habermas: A Critical Reader, Ibid. p. 193.
70. William Scheuerman. Habermas: A Critical Reader, Ibid. p. 440.
71. William Scheuerman. Habermas: A Critical Reader, Ibid. pp. 174-6.
72. William Scheuerman. Habermas: A Critical Reader, Ibid. p. 175. Habermas uses the term 'social power' as a 'measure for the possibilities an actor has in social relationships to assert his own will and interests, even against the opposition of others' (p.175).
73. For an account that does develop this idea and follows on Habermas and Arendt as well, see Hauke Brunkhorst (2002) Solidarität: Von der Bürgerfreundschaft zur globalen Rechtsgenossenschaft. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp; English tr. forthcoming from MIT Press.
74. See especially the section on 'Constitutional Questions' (pp. 203-17). Moreover, Brunkhorst argues, in contrast to the narrow reading of communicative power, that 'the most flexible element of politics is the communicative power that is not to be found in the formal decision-making that juridifies and transforms communicative power into administrative power' (p. 203).