Political Obligation and Military Service in Three Countries

Politics, Philosophy & Economics

Volumn 2, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 37-62

  Klosko, George ^a   Keren, Michael ^b   Nyikos, Stacy ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY   (Canada)

^c UNIVERSITY OF TULSA   (United States)

Author keywords

fairness; liberalism; military service; political obligation; principle of fairness; state

Indexed keywords

EID: 34248056890     PISSN: 1470594X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1470594X03002001423     Document Type: Article

References (50)

1. We treat the question of political obligation as basically interchangeable with why people should obey the law. We also generally use the terms ‘obligation’ and ‘duty’ interchangeably; for discussion of these concepts, see Richard Brandt, ‘The Concepts of Obligation and Duty’, Mind 73 (1964): 374-93; James Mish'Alanai, ‘“Duty,” “Obligation,” and “Ought”’, Analysis 30 (1969): 33-41; Herbert L.A. Hart, ‘Legal and Moral Obligation’, in Essays in Moral Philosophy, edited by A.I. Melden (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958). Because we do not construe political obligations as necessarily grounded in voluntary actions, we view strong moral reasons to obey the law as constituting an adequate theory of political obligation, whether or not these reasons stem from ‘obligations’ in the strict sense. For discussion, see A. John Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), Chs 1-2; George Klosko, The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation (Savage, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1992), Ch. 1.
2. Michael Walzer, Obligations: Essays on War, Disobedience, and Citizenship (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), Ch. 4.
3. Leslie Green, The Authority of the State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), Ch. 3.
4. See Simmons, Moral Principles; Klosko, Principle of Fairness; John T. Sanders and Jan Narveson, eds, For and Against the State (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996).
5. On considered judgments, see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 19–20, 47-8. On reflective equilibrium, see Rawls, Theory of Justice, pp. 19–21, 46-53, 578-86; Rawls, ‘Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics’, Philosophical Review 60 (1951): 177-97; Norman Daniels, ‘Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics’, Journal of Philosophy 76 (1979): 256-82. For criticisms of reflective equilibrium, see Richard M. Hare, ‘Rawls's Theory of Justice’, in Reading Rawls, edited by N. Daniels (New York: Basic Books, 1974); David Lyons, ‘Nature and Soundness of the Contract and Coherence Arguments’, in Reading Rawls; Peter Singer, ‘Sidgwick and Reflective Equilibrium’, Monist 58 (1974): 490-517. For the resemblances between judicial decision-making and reflective equilibrium, see Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), Chs 4 and 6.
6. Rawls, Theory of Justice, p. 49.
7. Daniels, ‘Wide Reflective Equilibrium’, p. 258.
8. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 54–8. It is worth noting that, in one respect, the judgments of philosophers may not approximate Rawlsian considered judgments. Philosophers, invested in their own favored theories, may not be disinterested reasoners. We should also note, however, that in other respects (and for other reasons) individual judges are likely not to be disinterested moral reasoners either. Accordingly, in addition to particular judicial decisions, we are interested in how their reasoning stands up over time and is viewed by subsequent courts. We recognize, however, that desires to abide by precedent can complicate matters in this regard (but see note 15, below).
9. Hugo Grotius, Prolegomena to the Law of War and Peace, translated by Francis Kelsey (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957), para. 46.
10. Mark Hall and George Klosko, ‘Political Obligation and the United States Supreme Court’, Journal of Politics 60 (1998): 462-80.
11. Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz, Introduction to Comparative Law, second revised edition, translated by Tony Weir (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). The Israeli legal system inherited its basics from the Mandatory legal system. Since the establishment of the state of Israel, a system has evolved which combines common law as well as some Continental basics and Israeli heritage. See Aharon Barak, ‘The Israeli Legal System: Heritage and Culture’, Hapraklit 40 (1992): 197-217. The German BverG often follows previous case law, but is not bound by its previous decisions in the same manner as the US Supreme Court. Accordingly, the repetition of and use by the Court of previous decisions stresses the importance of their arguments. See Hans Boldt, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte, 2 Bde. (München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1990).
12. Amos Shapira, ‘Judicial Review Without a Constitution: the Israeli Paradox’, Temple Law Quarterly 56 (1983): 425.
13. For Israel, see Michael Keren, ‘Justifications of Conscientious Objection: An Israeli Case Study’, International Journal of the Sociology of Law 26 (1998): 121-37; Yoram Peri, ‘Israel: Conscientious Objection in a Democracy under Siege’, in The New Conscientious Objection: From Sacred to Secular Resistance, edited by C. Moskos and J.C. Whiteclay (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
14. Simmons, Moral Principles; Robert P. Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism (New York: Harper and Row, 1970); and also Green, Authority of the State.
15. See especially Simmons, Moral Principles, for an excellent discussion of all these theories, though from a highly critical perspective. For a theory based on reciprocity as well, see Lawrence Becker, Reciprocity (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986); but see Hall and Klosko, ‘Political Obligation’, pp. 466–68.
16. See David Lyons, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), Ch. 5; Klosko, Principle of Fairness, Ch. 6; for paradoxical cases, see George Klosko, ‘Parfit's Moral Arithmetic and the Obligation to Obey the Law’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 20 (1990): 191-214.
17. Herbert L.A. Hart, ‘Are There Any Natural Rights?’, Philosophical Review 64 (1955): 186.
18. The main discussions of the principle of fairness and political obligation are Simmons, Moral Principles, Ch. 5; Klosko, Principle of Fairness; and Richard Dagger, ‘Playing Fair with Punishment’, Ethics 103 (1993): 473-88. The main criticisms of fairness theories have concerned difficulties in ‘accepting’ public goods; see Rawls, Theory of Justice, pp. 113–6; Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), pp. 93–5; Simmons, Moral Principles, Ch. 5; Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), pp.192–3; this objection is dealt with in Klosko, Principle of Fairness, Ch. 2. For additional criticisms, see A. John Simmons, On the Edge of Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), Ch. 8.
19. Hall and Klosko, ‘Political Obligation’.
20. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875), pp. 165–6.
21. Hall and Klosko, ‘Political Obligation’, pp. 474–7.
22. Arver v. U.S., 245 U.S. 366 (1918), p. 380.
23. Massachusetts Bill of Rights, 1780, Art. 10. Similar language is found in the constitutions of New Hampshire and Vermont; White also cites New York, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, and Georgia, but we do not find similar language in their constitutions.
24. For discussion of other cases that rely on fairness, see Hall and Klosko, ‘Political Obligation’, p. 477.
25. Theodor Maunz and Reinhold Zippelius, Deutsches Staatsrecht, twenty-seventh edition (München: C.H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1988). For background on German laws concerning military service, see Reinhold Zippelius, Allgemeine Staatslehre, eleventh edition (München: C.H. Beck'sche Pub., 1991); Günter Wollstein, ‘Die preußische Reformzeit-Das Landwehrkonzept’, in Tradition als Last? Legitimitätsprobleme der Bundeswehr, edited by Klaus M. Kodalle (Köln: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1981); Donald Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989).
26. BVerGE 12 (1960) 50-1. All translations of German and Israeli decisions are by the authors of this article.
27. BVerGE 38 (1974) 154.
28. BVerGE 48 (1978) 143.
29. ‘Mit anderen Worten: Individueller grundrechtlicher Schutzanspruch und gemeinschaftsbezongene Pflicht der Bürger eines demokratisch verfassten Staates, zur Sicherung dieser Verfassungsordnung beizutragen, entsprechen einander (vgl. BVerGE 12, 45 [51]; 38, 154 [167]).’
30. BVerGE (1978)
31. BVerGE 69 (1985) 1-3.
32. BVerGE 69 (1985) 22: ‘In der demokratischen Verfassungsordnung des Grundgesetzes entsprechen einander der individuelle grundrechtliche Schutzanspruch und die gemeinschaftsbezogene Pflicht der Bürger, zur Sicherung dieser Verfassungsordnung beizutragen (vgl. BVerGE 48, 127 [161]). Die allgemeine Wehrpflicht ist Ausdruck des allgemeinen Gleichheitsgedankens. Ihre Durchführung steht unter der Herrschaft des Art. 3 Abs. 1 GG (BVerGE 48,127 [162]); ihre Erfülllung ist demokratische Normalität.’
33. BVerGE 69 (1985) 30: ‘Das normative Ziel des Art. 12a Abs. 2 Satz 2 GG besteht darin, ein Gleichgewicht der Belastung von Wehr- und Ersatzdienstleistenden sicherzustellen.’
34. BVerGE 69 (1985) 47.
35. BVerGE 78 (1988) 367: ‘§22 Satz 1 ZDG verstoße gegen das Verfassungsgebot der staatsbürgerlichen Pflichtengleichheit in Gestalt der Wehrgerechtigkeit (Art. 3 Abs. 1 GG), weil er dazu führe, daß gediente Kriegsdienstverweigerer stärker belastet würden als ungediente.’
36. Defense Service Law (1949), paragraphs 11, 12.
37. Section 30 of the law exempts from service the mother of a child, a pregnant woman, a married woman, and allows women exemption for reasons of conscience or religious lifestyle. Defense Service Law (Consolidated Version) 1986.
38. Defense Service Law (Consolidated Version) 1986.
39. Steinberg v. Attorney General of the State of Israel, criminal appeal 5, 1951.
40. Two less important cases which reached the Supreme Court were Alexander Epstein v. Minister of Defense and Others, 1995, and Sergei Baranowski v. Minister of Defense, 1996.
41. Yoram Shachar, ‘The Elgazi Trials-Selective Conscientious Objection in Israel’, in Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 12 (1982): 214-58.
42. Elagazi v. Minister of Defense and Others, High Court of Justice 470/80, p. 5.
43. Yaacov Shain and the Israeli Association for Civil Rights v. The Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff, High Court of Justice 734/83, p. 399.
44. Judith, Karp, ‘Finding an Equilibrium’, in Israeli Democracy (1990), pp. 29–31.
45. See Michael Keren, Zichroni v. State of Israel: The Biography of a Civil Rights Lawyer (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002), Ch. 6: ‘Politics, Religion and Civil Rights’.
46. Amnon Rubinstein and Others; Major (Res.) Yehuda Ressler and Others v. Minister of Defense, High Court of Justice 3267\97; 715\98, 9 December 1998.
47. Poraz v. The Tel-Aviv-Jaffa Municipality, H.C. 953/87, 42 P.D. (2) 309. Poraz, a member of the Tel-Aviv-Jaffa city council, challenged a decision, forced on the city by the Minister of Religious Affairs, not to include women in the selection committee selecting the city's Religious Council. Barak ruled in favor of Poraz and referred to the need to maintain equality between men and women.
48. Amnon Rubinstein and Others; Major (Res.) Yehuda Ressler and Others v. Minister of Defense, High Court of Justice 3267\97; 715\98, 9 December 1998.
49. For the ‘service conception’ of authority, see Joseph Raz, ‘Authority and Justification’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 14 (1985): 3-29.
50. See Hall and Klosko, ‘Political Obligation’.