Finanzpolitik als nachahmungswettbewerb: Empirische ergebnisse zu budgetinterdependenzen unter den schweizer kantonen

Swiss Political Science Review

Volumn 10, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 61-85

  Schaltegger, Christoph A ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ST GALLEN   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Budgetary interdependency; Budgetary policy; Federalism; System competition

Indexed keywords

EID: 34248051732     PISSN: 14247755     EISSN: 16626370     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/j.1662-6370.2004.tb00022.x     Document Type: Article

References (60)

1. Anselin, Luc (1988). Spatial Econometrics: Methods and Models. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
2. Baldwin, Richard undPaul Krugman (2000). Agglomeration, Integration and Tax Harmonization, mimeo, Universität Genf.
3. Baumol, William J.; John C. Panzar und Robert D. Willig (1982). Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
4. Berry, Frances S. und William D. Berry (1999). “Innovation and Diffusion Models in Policy Reserach”, in P.A. Sabatier (Hrsg.). Theories of the Policy Process. Boulder: Westview Press, S. 169–200.
5. Besley, Timothy J. und Anne C. Case (1995). “Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax- Setting, and Yardstick Competition”, American Economic Review 85: 25–45.
6. Besley, Timothy J. und Harvey S. Rosen (1998). “Vertical Externalities in Tax Setting: Evidence from Gasoline and Cigarettes”, Journal of Public Economics 70: 383–398.
7. Black, Duncan (1948). “On the Rationale of Group Decision-Making”, Journal of Political Economy 56: 133–146.
8. Blais, André, Donald E. Blake und Stéphane Dion (1993). “Do Parties Make a Difference? Parties and the Size of Government in Liberal Democracies”, American Journal of Political Science 37: 40–62.
9. Bohn, Henning undRobert P. Inman (1996). “Balanced-Budget Rules and Public Deficits: Evidence from the U.S. States”, Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 45: 13–76.
10. Bradford, David F. und Wallace E. Oates (1974). “Suburban Exploitation of Central Cities and Governmental Structure”, in: Harold Hochman and George Peterson (Hrsg.). Redistribution Through Public Choice, Columbia: University Press, 43–90.
11. Brecht, Arnold (1927). Internationaler Vergleich der öffentlichen Ausgaben, Grundfragen der internationalen Politik. Leipzig: Wintersche Verlagshandlung.
12. Brennan, Geoffrey undJames M. Buchanan (1977). “Towards a Tax Constitution for Leviathan”, Journal of Public Economics 8: 255–273.
13. Brennan, Geoffrey undJames M. Buchanan (1978). “Tax Instruments as Constraints on the Disposition of Public Revenues”, Journal of Public Economics 9: 301–318.
14. Brennan, Geoffrey undJames M. Buchanan (1980). The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution. Cambridge: University Press.
15. Brueckner, Jan K. und Luz A. Saavedra (2001). “Do Local Governments Engage in Strategic Property-Tax Competition?”, National Tax Journal 54: 203–229.
16. Bundesamt FÜR Statistik (1999). Die Grossregionen der Schweiz. Neuchâtel: BFS.
17. BÜttner, Thiess (1999). “Determinants of Tax Rates in Local Capital Income Taxation: A Theoretical Model and Evidence from Germany”, Finanzarchiv 56: 363–388.
18. BÜttner, Thiess (2001). “Local Business Taxation and Competition for Capital: The Choice of the Tax Rate”, Regional Science and Urban Economics 31: 215–245.
19. Carlsen, Fredrik (1998). “Rational Partisan Theory: Empirical Evidence for the United States”, Southern Economic Journal 65: 64–82.
20. Carlsen, Fredrik undElin F. Pedersen (1999). “Rational Partisan Theory: Evidence for Seven OECD Economies”, Economics and Politics 11: 13–32.
21. Case, Anne C., Harvey S. Rosen und James R. Hines (1993). “Budget Spillovers and Fiscal Policy Interdependence – Evidence from the States”, Journal of Public Economics 52: 285–307.
22. Feld, Lars P. und Gebhard Kirchgässner (2001). “The Political Economy of Direct Legislation: Is There a Role of Direct Democracy in EU Decision-Making?”, Economic Policy 33: 329–367.
23. Frey, René L. (1985). “Die These von der Ausbeutung der Kernstädte: eine Überprüfung für die Schweiz”, Schweizerisches Jahrbuch für Politische Wissenschaft, 81–93.
24. Frey, René L. (1996). Stadt: Lebens- und Wirtschaftsraum. Eine ökonomische Analyse. Zürich. vdf.
25. Hettich, Walter undStanley L. Winer (1988). “Economic and Political Foundations of Tax Structure”, American Economic Review 78: 701–712.
26. Hettich, Walter undStanley L. Winer (1997). “The Political economy of Taxation”, in Dennis Mueller (Ed.), Perspectives on Public Choice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 481–505.
27. Heyndels, Bruno undJeff Vuchelen (1998). “Tax Mimicking among Belgian Municipalities”, National Tax Journal 51: 89–101.
28. Hibbs, Douglass A. (1977). “Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy”, American Political Science Review 71: 1467–1487.
29. Hibbs, Douglass A. (1986). “Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policies and Outcomes in the United States”, American Economic Review 76: 66–70.
30. Hibbs, Douglass A. (1994). “The Partisan Model of Macroeconomic Cycles: More Theory and Evidence for the United States”, Economics and Politics 6: 1–23.
31. Hines, James R. und Richard H. Thaler (1995). “Anomalies: The Flypaper Effect”, Journal of Economic Perspectives 9: 217–226.
32. Hirschman, Albert O. (1970). Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press.
33. Inman, Robert P. (1988). “Markets, Government, and the “new” Political Economy”, in Alan J. Auerbach and Martin Feldstein (Hrsg.). Handbook of Public Economics, Amsterdam: North-Holland.
34. Keen, Michael J. and Christos Kotsogiannis (2002). “Does Federalism Lead to Excessively High Taxes?”, American Economic Review 92: 363–369.
35. Kirchgässner, Gebhard (2001). “The Effects of Fiscal Institutions on Public Finance: A Survey of the Empirical Evidence”, CESifo Working Paper No. 617.
36. Ladd, Helen F. (1992). “Mimicking of Local Tax Burdens Among Neighboring Counties”, Public Finance Quarterly 20: 450–467.
37. Matsusaka, John G. (1995). “Fiscal Effects of the Voter Initiative: Evidence from the Last 30 Years”, Journal of Political Economy 103: 587–623.
38. Oates, Wallace E. (1999). “An Essay on Fiscal Federalism”, Journal of Economic Literature 37: 1120–1149.
39. Oates, Wallace E. (1972). Fiscal Federalism. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
40. Pauly, Mark V. (1973). Income Redistribution as a Local Public Good, Journal of Public Economics 2: 35–58.
41. Revelli, Federico (2001). Spatial Patterns in Local Taxation: Tax Mimicking or Error Mimicking?, Applied Economics 33: 1101–1107.
42. Rodden, Jonathan (2002). The Dilemma of Fiscal Federalism: Grants and Fiscal Performance Around the World, American Journal of Political Science 46: 670–687.
43. Schaltegger, Chistoph A. (2001). The Effects of Federalism and Democracy on the Size of Government, ifo-Studien, Zeitschrift für empirische Wirtschaftsforschung 47: 145–162.
44. Schaltegger, Christoph A. (2002). “Budgetregeln und ihre Wirkung auf die öffentlichen Haushalte: Empirische Ergebnisse aus den US-Bundesstaaten und den Schweizer Kantonen”, Schmollers Jahrbuch 122: 369–413.
45. Schaltegger, Christoph A. (2003). “Zum Problem räumlicher Nutzen-Spillovers zentralörtlicher Leistungen: Einige empirische Ergebnisse aus dem Schweizer Föderalismus”, Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik 223: 159–175.
46. Schaltegger, Christoph A. und Simon Zemp (2004). “Spatial Spillovers in Metropolitan Areas: Evidence form Swiss Communes”, Crema Working-Paper, Crema Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts.
47. Shadbegian, Ronald J. (1999). “Fiscal Federalism, Collusion, and Government Size: Evidence from the States”, Public Finance Review 27: 262–281.
48. Stutzer, Alois undBruno S. Frey (2000). “Stärkere Volksrechte - Zufriedenere Bürger: eine mikroökonometrische Untersuchung für die Schweiz”, Swiss Political Science Review 6: 1–30.
49. Trechsel, Alexandre undUwe Serdült (1999). Kaleidoskop Volksrechte: Die Institutionen der direkten Demokratie in den schweizerischen Kantonen (1970–1996). Basel.
50. Tsebelis, George (2002). Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton: University Press.
51. Vatter, Adrian undMarkus Freitag (2002). “Die Janusköpfigkeit von Verhandlungsdemokratien: Zur Wirkung von Konkordanz, direkter Demokratie und dezentralen Entscheidungsstrukturen auf den öffentlichen Sektor der Schweizer Kantone”, Swiss Political Science Review 8: 1–29.
52. Vatter, Adrian undSonja WÄlti (Hrsg.) (2003). “Schweizer Föderalismus in Vergleichender Perspektive”, Sondernummer der Schweizerischen Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft 9.
53. von Hayek, Friedrich A. (1968). Der Wettbewerb als Entdeckungsverfahren, Kieler Vorträge N.F. 56. Kiel.
54. Wagner, Adolph (1892). Grundlegung der politischen Ökonomie. Leipzig: Winter'sche Verlagshandlung.
55. Wagschal, Uwe (2002). “Verfassungsbarrieren als Grenzen der Staatstätigkeit”, Swiss Political Science Review 8: 51–78.
56. Walker, Jack L. (1969). “The Diffusion of Innovation Among the American States”, American Political Science Review 63: 880–899.
57. Welch, Susan undKay Thompson (1980). “The Impact of Federal Incentives on State Policy Innovation”, American Journal of Political Science 24: 715–729.
58. Wrede, Matthias (1996). “Vertical and Horizontal Tax Competition: Will Uncoordinated Leviathans End Up on the Wrong Side of the Laffer Curve?”, Finanz Archiv 53: 461–479.
59. Wrede, Matthias (2000). “Shared Tax Sources and Public Expenditures”, International Tax and Public Finance 7: 163–175.
60. Wyckoff, Paul G. (1991). “The Elusive Flypaper Effect”, Journal of Urban Economics 30: 310–328.