Capabilities, resources, and systematic injustice: A case of gender inequality

Politics, Philosophy & Economics

Volumn 4, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 355-373

  Browne, Jude ^a   Stears, Marc ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

capability approach; Dworkin; egalitarianism; equality; gender inequalities; Sen

Indexed keywords

EID: 34248036603     PISSN: 1470594X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1470594X05056608     Document Type: Article

References (30)

1. Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (London: Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 1.
2. Elizabeth Anderson, ‘What is the Point of Equality?’ Ethics 109 (1999): 287-337.
3. For classic statements of each position, see Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue; Amartya Sen, ‘Capability and Well Being’, in The Quality of Life, edited by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 30–53; Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Amartya Sen, Rationality and Freedom (London: Harvard University Press, 2002).
4. See, for an archetypal argument along these lines, Francis Cowell, Measuring Inequality (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1995).
5. See Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, pp. 299–303; Sen, Development as Freedom, pp. 67–70.
6. See Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, pp. 65–119.
7. See Sen, Development as Freedom, pp. 53–86.
8. Matt Matravers, ‘Responsibility, Luck, and the Equality of What Debate’, Political Studies 50 (2002): 558.
9. See Sen, Development as Freedom, especially pp. 74–5. This central contribution is frequently overlooked in analyses of the capability approach, in which the focus lies much more on the notions of functionings and capabilities than on what enables them.
10. See the special edition of the Journal of Feminist Economics 2 (2003).
11. Andrew Williams, ‘Dworkin on Capability’, Ethics 113 (2002): 23-39.
12. Inequalities which are the result of preferences that are not ‘affirmed’ (that is, which people genuinely would rather not have), on the other hand, may be considered suitable subjects for reform. For a discussion of this, see Matravers, ‘Responsibility, Luck, and the Equality of What Debate’, p. 565.
13. Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, p. 303.
14. Williams, ‘Dworkin on Capability’, pp. 32–3.
15. See Catherine Hakim, Work-Lifestyle Choices in the 21st Century: Preference Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
16. Our purpose here is simply to parallel the example of Ann and Bob for comparison. Some do not share the intuition that Amanda's case for political action is entirely without justification, arguing that her dilemma is caused by potentially mutable patterns of gendered socialization, just as Ann's is. It is not our concern here, however, to examine the potential explanations for gendered differences in potential dispositions to talk, listen, or converse. Inevitably, any example in which there is a large gender split might in itself be worthy of empirical investigation. We return to the empirical dimension later and thank Anne Philips for this observation.
17. Sen, Development as Freedom, pp. 78–9.
18. Sen, Development as Freedom, p. 78. See also p. 85.
19. M. Nussbaum, ‘Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements’, Journal of Feminist Economics 9 (2003): 33-60.
20. A discussion with Andrew Williams raised the possibility that rather than turning to perfectionism as Nussbaum does, a capability theorist might seek to distinguish the case of Ann and Amanda in consequentialist terms. We might, that is, be concerned about Ann's inability to function fully in the labour market in a way that we are not concerned with Amanda's ability to find happiness at home not because their own satisfaction or the principle of absolute equality concerns us, but because we are concerned with the wider consequences that their (in)abilities have for others. It could, for example, be argued that it is important that society as a whole enables parents to share their parenting duties and workplace responsibilities in order to secure a desirable consequence such as men and women equally being able to develop the characteristics required better to perform their duties as citizens and thus to ensure the long-term sustainability of the liberal society in which they are located. If we were to adopt such a consequentialist objective, however, it is not clear to us that the capability approach serves its purpose better than that of the resourcists. As Dworkin makes clear in other contexts, resourcists are more than able to argue that citizens must be able to acquire a basic set of attributes and to perform a basic set of duties, if those attributes and duties are thought necessary to the maintenance of the liberal community itself. See Ronald Dworkin, ‘Rights as Trumps’, in Theories of Rights, edited by Jeremy Waldron (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 153–67. Moreover, Sen's version of the ‘capability approach’ explicitly eschews a consequentialist reading of the potential rankings of ‘capabilities’ in favour of a far more individually-oriented approach.
21. Ronald Dworkin, ‘Sovereign Virtue Revisited’, Ethics 113 (2003): 137.
22. Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, p. 162.
23. See, for example, his discussion on Sen himself in Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, p. 302.
24. As in the case of ‘adaptive preferences’, for which, see Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1957).
25. This link between ‘adaptive preferences’ and perfectionism is well traced in Nussbaum. See Nussbaum, ‘Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements’.
26. See Dworkin's own comments on the roots and origins of preferences. Dworkin, ‘Sovereign Virtue Revisited’, p. 118.
27. A classic example would be public policy towards childcare, where the provision of ‘maternity’ leave often outstrips ‘paternity’ or ‘parental’ leave with a direct consequence for the work-life balance choices of men and women. Such policies are often not the result of any direct desire on the part of the state to encourage women to stay at home and men to go out to work, but remain rather as the legacy of earlier generations’ attitudes to the distribution of work and life opportunities.
28. ‘Systemic’ refers simply to a patterned distribution, rather than to an intended consequence.
29. For an example of such an empirical account, see Jude Browne, Gender Equality and Sex Segregation in the Modern Labour Market (Bristol: The Policy Press, forthcoming 2006).
30. Such a view we might associate with Cass Sunstein, Free Markets and Social Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 162–4.