Lifeworld, Discourse, and Realism: On Jürgen Habermas's Theory of Truth

Philosophy & Social Criticism

Volumn 30, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 503-514

  Seemann, Axel ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

bivalence; discourse; Habermas; lifeworld; pragmatism; realism; truth

Indexed keywords

EID: 34247658310     PISSN: 01914537     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0191453704044041     Document Type: Article

References (9)

1. Jürgen Habermas, ‘Richard Rorty's Pragmatic Turn’, in Robert B. Brandom (ed.) Rorty and His Critics (Oxford: 2000), pp. 31–55.
2. He also expands on his recent thought on truth in Jürgen Habermas, ‘On the Cognitive Content of Morality’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society XCVI(3) (1996/2): 335–58;
3. Jürgen Habermas, ‘Richtigkeit vs. Wahrheit: Zum Sinn der Sollgeltung moralischer Urteile und Normen’, Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 46(2) (1998): 179–208, 44, 43, 45.
4. The notion of a ‘direction of fit’ is obviously borrowed from John Searle: e.g. Intentionality (Cambridge: 1983), p. 96f.
5. Habermas (1998: 206; translation mine).
6. Habermas (2000: 39), 49, 47.
7. Habermas (2000: 46f).
8. Habermas (1998: 192).
9. E.g. Hilary Putnam, Representation and Reality (Cambridge, MA: 1988), p. 113f. My talk of a ‘presupposition of an independent reality’ is not meant to suggest that Putnam conceives of reality as existing independently of conceptual schemes; on the contrary, he insists that this conception is false.