The consensus value: A new solution concept for cooperative games

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 28, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 685-703

  Ju, Yuan ^a   Borm, Peter ^b   Ruys, Pieter ^b  

^a KEELE UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

^b TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34247619937     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-006-0192-1     Document Type: Article

References (17)

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