Do local Governments maximize access rates to public services across areas?. A test based on marginal benefit incidence analysis

Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance

Volumn 47, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 242-260

  Ajwad, Mohamed Ihsan ^a   Wodon, Quentin ^a  

^a WORLD BANK   (United States)

Author keywords

Bolivia; Incidence analysis; Infrastructure; Poverty

Indexed keywords

EID: 34247501857     PISSN: 10629769     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.qref.2006.05.005     Document Type: Article

References (22)

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