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33947330114
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"Beyond the Harm Principle"
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Unless otherwise indicated, all page references are to this article
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Arthur Ripstein, "Beyond the Harm Principle," Philosophy & Public Affairs 34 (2006): 215-45. Unless otherwise indicated, all page references are to this article
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(2006)
Philosophy & Public Affairs
, vol.34
, pp. 215-245
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Ripstein, A.1
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33947330114
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"Beyond the Harm Principle"
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In describing Ripstein's sovereignty principle as "Kantian," I am following his own lead I am less sure than Ripstein that his proposal follows from or faithfully represents Kant's own doctrine. But whatever Kant himself would have made of it, Ripstein's general position undoubtedly reflects a dominant strand in liberal thought that (rightly or wrongly) often claims a Kantian inspiration. The contemporary exponents of this variant of liberalism postulate a highest-order moral duty to safeguard the dignity of autonomous persons. They treat that duty as prior to and independent of utilitarian considerations and directly derive from it categorical limits on the legitimate scope of state power. Ripstein's view clearly exemplifies "Kantian liberalism" in this weaker sense, and this is how I use that term here
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In describing Ripstein's sovereignty principle as "Kantian," I am following his own lead (p. 216, n. 1). I am less sure than Ripstein that his proposal follows from or faithfully represents Kant's own doctrine. But whatever Kant himself would have made of it, Ripstein's general position undoubtedly reflects a dominant strand in liberal thought that (rightly or wrongly) often claims a Kantian inspiration. The contemporary exponents of this variant of liberalism postulate a highest-order moral duty to safeguard the dignity of autonomous persons. They treat that duty as prior to and independent of utilitarian considerations and directly derive from it categorical limits on the legitimate scope of state power. Ripstein's view clearly exemplifies "Kantian liberalism" in this weaker sense, and this is how I use that term here.
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(2006)
Philosophy & Public Affairs
, vol.34
, pp. 216
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Ripstein, A.1
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34247496534
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Note that in these cases it is the right to roam freely across privately owned land that is at issue, not merely the legal definition and provision of easements or public rights of way
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Note that in these cases it is the right to roam freely across privately owned land that is at issue, not merely the legal definition and provision of easements or public rights of way.
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7
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34247513651
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I am grateful to George Klosko and an Editor of Philosophy & Public Affairs for pressing this objection
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I am grateful to George Klosko and an Editor of Philosophy & Public Affairs for pressing this objection.
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8
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34247547148
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Ripstein does sometimes speak of the entitlement to personal sovereignty as an "interest" (e.g.). But he clearly does not conceive it as the kind of interest that is subject to "harm" in a utilitarian sense. Rather, he construes it as a Kantian-style interest that cannot (strictly speaking) be promoted or harmed but only categorically respected or violated by responsible others. The fact that both arguments sometimes use superficially similar language and reach overlapping conclusions about domestic trespass should therefore not obscure their fundamentally different character
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Ripstein does sometimes speak of the entitlement to personal sovereignty as an "interest" (e.g., p. 219). But he clearly does not conceive it as the kind of interest that is subject to "harm" in a utilitarian sense. Rather, he construes it as a Kantian-style interest that cannot (strictly speaking) be promoted or harmed but only categorically respected or violated by responsible others. The fact that both arguments sometimes use superficially similar language and reach overlapping conclusions about domestic trespass should therefore not obscure their fundamentally different character.
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34247491774
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Mill was quite clear about this, arguing explicitly that many actions that should not be criminalized are nevertheless serious moral wrongs. See
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Mill was quite clear about this, arguing explicitly that many actions that should not be criminalized are nevertheless serious moral wrongs. See Mill, p. 147.
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Mill, J.S.1
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