Of wild and cultivated politics: Conflict and democracy in Argentina

International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society

Volumn 16, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 99-132

  Anderson, Leslie F ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA   (United States)

Author keywords

Argentina; Conflict theory; Culture; Democratization; Humanrights

Indexed keywords

EID: 34247443257     PISSN: 08914486     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1016534528525     Document Type: Article

References (107)

1. I am grateful to the following scholars who have read and commented on this manuscript: Larry Dodd, John Samuel Fitch, Fani Godfried, Daniel Levine, Guillermo O'Donnell, Marc Howard Ross, Kathryn Sikkink, Guillermina Seri, and several anonymous reviewers for the Internationaljournal of Politics, Culture and Society.
2. Simone Chambers, Reasonable Democracy, (Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1996) and "Contract or Conversation? Theoretical Lessons from the Canadian Constitutional Crisis," Politics and Society, 26, no. 1 (March, 1998), pp 143-172; Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions To A Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, translated by William Rehg, (Cambridge, MA. MIT Press, 1996).
3. The Culture of Conflict: Interpretations and Interests in Comparative Perspective, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1993). Ross' study combines socio-structural study of conflict with psychocultural explanations. See also his essays, "A Cross-Cultural Theory of Political Conflict and Violence," Political Psychology, 1 no. 3, (September, 1986) pp 427469 and "Internal and External Conflict and Violence: Cross-Cultural Evidence and a New Analysis," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 29, no. 4, (December, 1985), pp 547-579.
4. "Religion as a Cultural System" in Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, (New York, Basic Books, Harper Torchbooks, 1973) p 89.
5. Marc Howard Ross, "Culture and Identity in Comparative Political Analysis," in Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure, (Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, 1997).
6. Ross, The Culture of Conflict, 1993.
7. Cross-cutting ties theory has been used and explored by many authors. For an early description of it, contrasting it with other theories of conflict see Robert A. Levine and Donald T Campbell, Ethnocentrism: Theories of Conflict, Ethnic Attitudes, and Group Behavior, (New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1972). Levine and Campbell contrast cross-cutting ties methods of describing social divisions with "pyramidal segmentation," arrangements where social members are segmented into separate divisions in hierarchical order. Levine and Campbell note that pyramidal segmentation is related to higher levels of conflict than are cross-cutting ties. See esp chap 4. See also Dean G. Pruitt and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate and Settlement, (New York, Random House, 1986) p 68.
8. For an earlier study of the role of loyalty in creating social bonds see Harold Guetzkow, Multiple Loyalties: Theoretical Approaches to a Problem in International Organization, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1955).
9. Studies from political science that are not oriented toward conflict but, rather, concentrate on the maintenance of democratic stability make a related argument. Douglas W. Rae and Michael Taylor, for example, argue that societies where there are "cross-cutting cleavages" (the inverse of cross-cutting ties) are those more likely to retain democratic stability. Similarly, where cleavages are not cross-cutting, democracy will be unstable and conflict more likely. See The Analysis of Political Cleavages, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1970), esp chap 4. Relatedly, Robert A. Dahl argues that cross-cutting social contacts and checks are essential in making democracy possible. See A Preface to Democratic Theory, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1956).
10. Ross, The Culture of Conflict, 1993.
11. Rosemary Harris, Prejudice and Tolerance in Ulster: A Study of Neighbors and Strangers in a Border Community, (Manchester, Manchester Press, 1972).
12. Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1983).
13. Tulio Halperin Donghi has also explored a comparison between these two periods. See "El Présente Transforma el Pasado: El Impacto del Reciente Terror en la Imogen de la Historia Argentina" in Daniel Balderston, Ficcion y politica: la narrativa argentina durante el proceso militar, (Buenos Aires: Alianza Editorial, 1987) translated and published in English (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota, Institute for the Study of Ideologies and Literature, 1987).
14. Argentina's National Commission on Disappeared People, Nunca Mas, (London, Faber and Faber, 1986).
15. Argentina's National Commission on Disappeared People, 1986; Gary Wynia, Argentina, Illusions and Realities, (New York, Holmes and Meier, 1986);
16. Mauricio Cohen Salama, Tumbas Anonimas: Informe Sobre la Identificacion de Restas de Victimas de la Represion Ilegal, (Buenos Aires, Catalogos Editora,1992);
17. Simon Lazara, Poder Militar: Origin, Apogeo y Transicion, (Buenos Aires, Legasa, 1988);
18. Donald Hodges, Argentina 's "Dirty War:" An Intellectual Biography, (Austin, University of Texas Press, 1991).
19. John Lynch, Argentine Dictator, Juan Manuel de Rosas, 1829-1852, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1981);
20. Fleur Coweles, Bloody Precedent, (New York, Random House, 1952).
21. Juan Ba'jarlea, Rosas y los Asesinatos de su Epoca, (Buenos Aires, Editorial Araujo, 1942); Jose De Espana, Psicologia de Rosas, (Buenos Aires, Editor M. Gleizer, 1926); Eduardo Gutierrez, Juan Manuel de Rosas: Los Dramas del Terror, (Buenos Aires, Harpon 1993); Carlos Ibarguren, Juan Manuel de Rosas: Su Vida -Su Tiempo -Su Drama, (Buenos Aires, Libreria La Facultad de Juan Roldan y Cia, 1931); José Maria Ramos Mejia, Rosas y su Tiempo, (Buenos Aires, Editorial Cientifica y Literaria Argentina, 1927). For a novel on the Rosas era see Jose Marmol, Amalia, Tomo I y II, (Buenos Aires, Centro Editor de America Latina, 1967). For a consideration of the impact of Rosas on Argentine literature generally see Anastasio Martinez, Projection del Rosismo en la Literatura Argentina, Seminario del Instituto de Letras, (Rosario, Santa Fe, Argentina, Universidad Nacional del Litoral. Instituto de Letras, 1959).
22. Robert D. Crassweller maintains that this divide between urban Buenos Aires and the rural rest of Argentina constitutes one of the most fundamental and influential divisions in the nation's history and one that plays itself out politically, socially, and economically. See Peron and the Enigmas of Argentina, (New York, W. W. Norton, 1987).
23. Jeremy Adelman, Republic of Capital: Buenos Aires and the Legal Transformation of the Atlantic World, (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1999).
24. Argentina's National Commission on Disappeared People, 1986; Jo Fisher, Mothers of the Disappeared, (Boston, South End Press, 1989). Rodolfo Walsh reports on military violence just before the Proceso took power. See Operation Masacre. (Buenos Aires, Ediciones delà Flor, 1984).
25. La Nation, 1977-1979.
26. Fisher, 1989, pp 60-66; interview with Rosa Roisinblit, Buenos Aires, 1992, interview with Estela Carloto, Buenos Aires, 1992.
27. Like the Rosas period, the Proceso has been considered from a literary perspective as well as from social science. The term "misty" comes from Lawrence Thornton, Imagining Argentina, (New York, Bantam Books, 1987).
28. La Nation, 1977-1979. La Opinion, June 1977-June, 1978. La Opinion, edited by internationally-renowned author and journalist, Jacobo Timmerman, had been one of the most visible opposition newspapers in the months immediately after the 1976 military coup. In June 1977, however, the newspaper was confiscated by the military and thereafter published the junta's perspective on political events. La Opinion staff were murdered or forced into exile, interview with Jacobo Timerman, Buenos Aires, 1992.
29. Lynch, 1981:201,209; Gutierrez, 1944:33. The nocturnal activity of the gangs increased their power to terrorize, even to the point that it became the subject of novels on the epoch. See, for example, the opening to the most famous novel of the period, Jose Marmol's Amalia, as well as Gutierrez, 1944.
30. Gutierrez, 1944:36.
31. Ramos Mejia, 1927:31.
32. Lynch, 1981;
33. Gutierrez, 1944;
34. Ramos Mejia, 1927.
35. Lynch claims that the Mazorca death squads were actually on the government payroll. (1981:216)
36. The junta reiterated this position repeatedly in the major newspapers after 1978. In particular, see La Nacion and La Prensa, Buenos Aires.
37. Lynch, 1981:117, 222,237.
38. A reaction to crisis that eschews democratic solutions in favor of authoritarian ones and a failure to retain confidence in democracy's ability to solve crisis is not confined to Argentina. A similar nondemocratic response to crisis emerged between the World Wars in the nations that ultimately embraced fascism. For the German case, see Hans Mommsen, The Rise and Fall of the Weimar Republic, (Frankfurt, Propyläen, Verlag im Verlag Ullstein CumbH, 1986) translated and published in English, (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1989) and Stanley G. Payne, A History of Fascism 1914-1945, (Madison, The University of Wisconsin Press, 1995), esp chaps 4,6. For the Italian case see Frank Snowden, The Fascist Revolution in Tuscany, 1919-1926, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989).
39. Guillermo O'Donnell has conducted a soul-searching study into individual silence during the Proceso years. See his "Democracia en la Argentina: micro y macro," Working Paper # 2, (Notre Dame, IN., The Hellen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, December, 1983).
40. The impact of such policies was greater since Argentine universities are centralized under federal control, as in Britain, rather than being separately financed and overseen by state governments, as in the United States. Such centralism, of course, began with Rosas.
41. Interviews with Jorge Sabato, Minister of Education under the first democratic administration, Raul Alfonsin's, Buenos Aires, 1993 and with Jacobo Timmerman, Buenos Aires, 1992.
42. During the Alfonsin years the new democratic government tried to recover the former academic strength of Argentina's universities. Some progress began but was later halted by hyperinflation during the later Alfonsin years. Interview with Jörge Sabato, Buenos Aires, 1993.
43. Ramos Mejia, 1927:67, 88, 91, 133.
44. Interviews with Rosa Roisinblit and Estela Carloto, Buenos Aires, 1992.
45. Perhaps the most famous exile was Domingo Faustino Sarmiento who waged a war of words from Chile throughout most of the Rosas years. He was quite conscious of his role as the bearer of ideas standing against a dictatorship opposed to ideas. Upon fleeing the Argentine border with Rosas' troops hard on his heels Sarmiento is said to have called back from the Chilean side "On ne tue pas les idées!" Rosas vowed to arrest Sarmiento and demanded his extradition from Chile. Chile refused. Tulio Halperin Donghi, Ivan Jaksic, Gwen Kirkpatrick, and Francine Masiello, Sarmiento: Author of a Nation, (Berkeley, University of California Press 1994), esp. chapters 2, 5.
46. (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1987). See also Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, (Cambridge, MA, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 1996).
47. Emilio F. Mignone, Iglesia y Dictadura: elpapel de la iglesia en la luz de sus relaciones con el regimen militar, (Buenos Aires, Ediciones del Pensamiento Nacional, 1986), pp 109132, 167-210. There were also dissident clerics in each epoch opposed to the regime and to church support for it. Emilio Mignone, a former priest, encouraged clerical opposition during the Proceso and Camila O'Gorman married a priest who came to symbolize clerical opposition to Rosas and the dictator's ruthless response to it.
48. An important study of crime from a cross-national perspective finds that violence by the state often produces increased domestic crime in its aftermath. In a sense, citizens learn violence by watching it practiced by their own government. Such findings would appear to support the contention that extreme violence by the Argentine state during one epoch would serve to heighten the chances of violence, including by future leaders, in another epoch. See Dane Archer and Rosemary Gärtner, Violence and Crime in Cross-National Perspective, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1989), esp chap 4.
49. One important exception to this generalization is the recent edited collection by Halperin Donghi, et al, Sarmiento 1994.
50. Botana, Natalio, "Sarmiento and Political Order," in Halperin Donghi et al, Sarmiento, 1994:110.
51. Katra, William, "Rereading Viajes: Race, Identity and National Destiny," in Tulio Halperin Donghi, et al, Sarmiento, 1994: 95.
52. Katra, 1994:81-83.
53. Crassweller, The Enigmas, 1987:43.
54. Mustapic, 1984:99.
55. Rock, 1975; Felix Luna, Alvear, (Buenos Aires, Hyspanamerica 1958).
56. Rock, 1975:51,55.
57. Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully, Introduction: Party Systems in Latin America, Ch 1, in Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully, Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America, (Stanford, Stanford University Press 1995).
58. Luna, 1958.
59. Crassweller, 1987:59; Ana Maria Mustapic, "Conflictos Institucionales Durante el Primer Gobierno Radical: 1916-1922" Desarollo Economico, 24, no. 94, abril-junio, 1984, pp 85108.
60. Mustapic, 1984:98-99.
61. The Transcript of Sessions (Diario de Sessiones) from the Argentine Congress between 1916 and 1922 contains numerous examples of dismissive messages sent from Yrigoyen to the Congress. For a particularly antagonistic example see June 24, 1918, Diario de Sesiones de Diputados, Tomo 11, p 455. On that date the lower chamber was questioning one of Yrigoyen's interventions into one of the interior provinces (Cordoba), including his takeover of the University of Cordoba and his imposition of an "overseer" to manage that institution. Drawing upon its constitutional privilege of appellation (somewhat like the British Parliamentary weekly Question and Answer session) the Chamber of Deputies had summoned the Minister of Instruction, a member of Yrigoyen's cabinet. Despite constitutional rules to the contrary, the Minister refused to appear. Instead Yrigoyen sent a curt message to the Congress saying that the Cordoba situation was none of their concern and that the Congress had no standing to challenge the President or his administration in any way. Yrigoyen informed the Congress that if it wished to ask the President's instructions, he (Yrigoyen) would be happy to oblige but that he had no intention of giving the Congress any explanations of any kind. In response to Yrigoyen's treatment of the Congress thus, Deputy Juan Justa, (Conservative) concluded that Yrigoyen did not understand the Constitution. See Justo's speech on the floor of the lower chamber, Diario de Sesiones, Camara de Diputados, Tomo I, July 24,1918, pp 475-479.
62. Rock, 1975.
63. César Teach, Sabattinismo y Peronism: Partidos Polüicos en Cordoba, 1943-55, (Buenos Aires, Editorial Sudamericana, 1991).
64. Interview with Raul Alfonsin, Buenos Aires, 1992.
65. James McGuire, Peronism Without Peron, (Stanford, Stanford University Press 1997).
66. See, for example, transcripts for 1946-1948, Diario de Sesiones, Camara de Diputados, Congreso de la Nacion.
67. One of the most visible victim's of Peronism's crushing of academic freedom and intellectual opposition was its treatment of Emiliano Ravignani. Ravignani was both a scholar and a member of the Chamber of Deputies (lower house) during the early years of Peronism. He was repeatedly ridiculed and humiliated publicly until he left politics entirely. Interview with Eduardo Horacio Passalaqua, Buenos Aires, 1997.
68. Robert Potash, 1980, The Army and Politics in Argentina, 1945-1962: Peron to Frondizi, (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1980), pp 141-142. At times, the rhetoric of Eva Peron moved even closer to sanctioning violence, as seen, for example, in her May Day speech of 1952, Otelo Bononi and Roberto Vacca, La Vida de Eva Peron, (Buenos Aires, Editorial Galerna, 1979), pp 278.
69. McGuire, 1997.
70. Argentina Under Peron 1973-1976, (London, Macmillan, 1983), pp 18-21, 207; Wynia, 1978:75-80.
71. For examples of Peronist political positions that exhibited this type of intransigence, see the transcripts for 1946-1948, Diario de Sesiones, Camara de Diputados, Congreso de la Nacion.
72. Enrique Peruzzotti, "Civil Society and the Modern Constitutional Complex: The Argentine Experience," Constellations, 4, no. 1, (January, 1997), pp 94-104.
73. Domingo F. Sarmiento, Life in the Argentine Republic in the Days of the Tyrants, (New York, Hafner Press Translation of Facundo, originally published 1848), p 14.
74. Ronaldo Munck illustrates that, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as many as half of Buenos Aires residents were foreign-born. See his work, with Ricardo Falcon and Bernardo Galitelli, Argentina From Anarchism to Peronism: Workers, Unions, and Politics, 1855-1985, (London, Zed Books, 1987), esp chaps 1-3.
75. La Inmigracion en La Argentina, (Tucuman, Argentina, Universidad Nacional de Tucuman, Facultad de Filosofia y Letras, Centro de Historial y Pensamiento Argentinos, 1979).
76. McGuire, 1997.
77. While arrivals from Southern Europe were often Catholic, like Argentina's earlier population, immigrants from Slavic countries were not. Some East Europeans were Christian but many were Jewish.
78. Some students of conflict have argued that ethnic divisions or mutual hostility manifested along ethnic lines is the principal cause of warfare in the modern world. Such a perspective draws particularly upon examples drawn from Africa. See R. Paul Shaw and Yuwa Wong, Genetic Seeds of Warfare: Evolution, Nationalism, and Patriotism, (Boston, Unwin Hyman, 1989).
79. In each case, those on the receiving end of the oppression may also experience it in exaggerated fashion, leading them to retaliate with even harsher oppression than they originally received.
80. Ross, 1993, Albert Bandura, Aggression: A Social Learning Analysis, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice Hall 1993).
81. Although the opposition within the legislature certainly tried to use the institution to place a brake on Peron or to check his powers, they lacked the votes to succeed.
82. For a study of the centrality of leadership in conflict development and escalation, see David J. Finlay, Öle R. Holsti and Richard R. Fagen. Enemies in Politics, (Chicago, Rand McNally, 1967).
83. Pruitt and Rubin, Social Conflict: 68 This work shows that Argentina also shares characteristics with many other social settings prone to conflict. These include a lack of identification across groups, (p 70), a lack of confidence in the opposition (p 71) and the lack of a common, external enemy (p 73).
84. Although it made serious compromises in due process of law in trying military officers for human rights violations.
85. J. Samuel Fitch, The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America: Context, Ideology and Institutions, (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), esp Chap 5. See also Andres Fontana, "La politica militar en un contexto de transicion: Argentina 19831989," paper presented to the CEDES-Schell Center for Human Rights conference on "Transicion a la Democracia en Argentina," Yale University, March 1990.
86. Adrian Escribano, MA Thesis, University of Catamarca, 1998.
87. Personal observation and interviews with Radical leaders, 1992-1995, Buenos Aires, Argentina. In an interview in 1993 Alfonsin gave as a reason for opposing the presidential candidacy of a Radical leader "Because he moved against me, against me!"
88. The electoral defeat of Masacessi in 1995 was the poorest electoral showing of the Radical Party since the return of democracy in 1983.
89. Interviews with Radical leaders and Congressional Deputies, 1992-1995, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
90. Disregard for the law by an elected president is not confined either to Menem or to Argentina. In fact, a weak rule of law, particularly as regards civil rights, is characteristic of developing Latin American democracies and constitutes one of the principal problems such nations need to solve to deepen democracy and make it more real. See Guillermo O'Donnell, "Polyarchies and the (Un)Rule of Law in Latin America: A Partial Conclusion," in eds., Juan Mendez, Guillermo O'Donnell, and Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, The (Un)Rule of Law and the Underprivileged in Latin America, (Notre Dame, IN, University of Notre Dame Press, 1999).
91. At one point Menem used a presidential decree to authorize selling cement to Bolivia. The sale hardly seemed to warrant such strong presidential involvement and was evidence of the president's willingness to rule single-handedly in small matters as well as large.
92. Ana Maria Mustapic and Natalia Ferretti, "El Veto Presidencial bajo Alfonsin y Menem, 1983-1995," in process.
93. For a discussion of Peron's efforts to play new and emerging leaders off against one another, weakening any alternative leader in the process, see McGuire, 1997, esp chaps 4 and 5.
94. lan Budge has argued that a range within which disagreement confines itself is essential to stable democracy. Thus politicians may disagree with each other over specifics of policy but fundamentally agree with each other that adherence to democratic procedure is desirable and that policies far outside the range of disagreement are unacceptable. See Agreement and the Stability of Democracy, (Chicago, Markham Publishing Company, 1970), esp pp 171-2, 175, 178.
95. The democratic role of politicians is essential here since they have been the leaders most central in spearheading the movement toward political alliances. Robert A. Dahl has argued that politicians are frequently the group most likely to play the role of upholding democratic procedures. In Argentina, they have been the group most central in establishing cross-cutting ties that support democratic procedures. Moreover, says Dahl, politicians, by virtue of the nature of their job, are the persons most capable of undertaking this task. See Who Governs?, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1961), pp 321-24. Pruitt and Rubin also suggest that if societies can establish more social bonds and broad group membership, conflict will decrease. See Social Conflict, 1986:68-73.
96. See, for example, The Economist, Feb 5-11th, 2000, p 29;
97. The Economist, May 6-12th, 2000, Survey Insert, p 16.
98. Interviews with legislators, Buenos Aires, 1997,1999.
99. Pruitt and Rubin, 1986:68.
100. In an important experimental study of intergroup cooperation and conflict where conflict could be deliberately constructed and reduced Shérif et al found that groups which had been in conflict could begin to cooperate when they were given a joint, intergroup task to accomplish that clearly benefited all the groups. See Muzafer Shérif, O.J.
101. Harvey, B. Jack White, William R. Hood, Carolyn W Shérif, The Robbers Cave Experiment: Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation, (Middletown, CT, Wesleyan University Press, 1988).
102. Pruitt and Rubin, Social Conflict, p 65.
103. The Politics of Human Rights in Argentina: Protest, Change and Démocratisation, (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1993). For an excellent study of the international influence of social activism see Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, (Ithaca, N.Y. Cornell University Press, 1997).
104. The Economist, June 2-9, 2000.
105. La Nadon, October 19, 1999 p A13.
106. In examining the relationship between democracy in society broadly defined, or culture, and institutions, Harry Eckstein argues that a key element in stable democracy is "congruence of authority," namely that the rule of law be followed at all points of authority within society, as well as within state authority itself. See his Division and Cohesion in Democracy: A Study of Norway, Princeton, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966), esp. Appendix B: A Theory of Stable Democracy.
107. Reasonable Democracy, 1996.