The judiciary and indigenous rights in Guatemala

International Journal of Constitutional Law

Volumn 5, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 211-241

  Sieder, Rachel ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LONDON   (United Kingdom)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 34247236153     PISSN: 14742640     EISSN: 14742659     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/icon/mom007     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (143)

1. Indigenous people now number approximately 40 million people in Latin America - roughly 8 to 10 percent of the region's overall population. The vast majority, some 85 percent, are concentrated in Mesoamerica and the central Andes. In Bolivia and Guatemala, indigenous people constitute over 50 percent of the population; in Ecuador and Peru between 30 and 40 percent; and in Mexico between 10 and 15 percent. Absent a single commonly accepted definition of "indigenous" in international law, the international community generally recognizes three broad criteria for defining who is indigenous: Self-definition as a member of an indigenous community; subordination to a dominant society; and historical continuity with precolonial societies. See, e.g., the Inter-American Development Bank's Strategy for Indigenous Development (extrapolating these criteria from the provisions of the ILO Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries), available at http://http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/ getdocument.aspx?docnum=691275 (last visited Jan. 21,2007).
2. A number of petitions signaled in this paper have been taken before the Inter-American human rights bodies. See notes 83-85, infra
3. Reforms included: The recruitment and training of court interpreters for indigenous languages; creation of five indigenous community courts ( juzgados de paz comunitarios) mandated to use customary law in the resolution of certain conflicts; creation of an indigenous defense office within the public prosecutors service; the establishment of the office of the ombudsman of indigenous women (Acuerdo Gubernativo No. 525-1999); the creation of a department of indigenous peoples within the Ministry of Labor (Acuerdo Ministerial No. 364-2003); the creation of a presidential advisory commission on indigenous peoples and plurality (Acuerdo Gubernativo No.96-2005); and reforming the Penal Code in 2002 to make discrimination on the basis of race or ethnicity a criminal offense (Decree No. 57-2002). For more detail see GUATEMALA COUNTRY REPORT (Inter-American Commission for Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/ II.111, doc. 21 rev. (2001) (especially ch. XI), and RAQUEL YRIGOYEN FAJARDO & VICTOR FERRIGNO, ACCESO A LA JUSTICIA EN GUATEMALA: SITUACION Y PROPUESTAS [ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN GUATEMALA: SITUATION AND PROPOSALS] (Swedish International Development Agency 2003).
4. Epp defined a "rights revolution" as "a sustained, developmental process that produced or expanded the new civil rights and liberties. That process has had three main components: Judicial attention to the new rights, judicial support for the new rights, and implementation of the new rights." CHARLES EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS AND SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 7 (Univ. Chicago Press 1998).
5. While a detailed comparison of these reforms is beyond the scope of this paper, they included recognition of the official and public nature of indigenous customary law and the jurisdiction of indigenous authorities over internal community affairs in Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Peru. Six constitutions in Latin America explicitly guarantee rights to bilingual education (other countries provide some provision without an explicit constitutional mandate). New constitutions containing specific provision for indigenous rights included Nicaragua (1987), Brazil (1988), Colombia (1991), Peru (1993), Bolivia (1994), Ecuador (1998) and Venezuela (1999). Other constitutions (such as those of Mexico and Guatemala) were modified to take greater account of indigenous claims. For an overview,see Donna Lee Van Cott, Latin Arnerica: Constitutional Reform and Ethnic Rights, 53 PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS 41 (2000). The nature and extent of the constitutional rights extended to indigenous peoples through this first round of "multicultural reforms" continues to be a matter of controversy across the region.
6. For example, reforms to facilitate bilingual education or more culturally appropriate health care provisions in indigenous areas, and administrative decentralization reforms, which provided a greater role for indigenous community authorities in the provision and regulation oflocal services. See THE CHALLENGE OF DIVERSITY: INDIGENOUS PEOPLE AND REFORM OF THE STATE IN LATIN AMERICA (Willem Assies, Gemma van der Haar & André Hoekema eds., Purdue Univ. Press 2000); MULTICULTURALISM IN LATIN AMERICA: INDIGENOUS RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY AND DIVERSITY (Rachel Sieder ed., Palgrave 2002).
7. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION CONVENTION (No. 169) CONCERNING INDIGENOUS AND TRIBAL PEOPLES IN INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES, Sept. 5, 1991, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/ html/menu3/b/62.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2007) (hereinafter ILO 169).
8. ILO 169 has been ratified by more states in Latin America than in any other region of the world. This perhaps indicates the relative acceptance of the concept of indigenous peoples in Latin America, compared to Africa and Asia, where the term is more problematic. It can also be explained as part of the "rights cascade" that followed the region's return to constitutional democracy in the 1980s and 1990s, which involved the ratification of numerous human rights treaties. On the expansion of human rights norms in Latin America, see Ellen Lutz & Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: The Evolution and Impact of Human Rights Trials in Latin America, 2 CHICAGO J. INT'L L. 1 (2001).
9. A draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People (U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/ Sub.2/1994/2/Add.1 (1994)) has been working its way through the United Nations legislative process for over a decade and in June 2006 was approved by the newly formed UN Human Rights Council. In November 2006, however, the UN General Assembly voted to delay its adoption. Meanwhile, in the Organization of American States, negotiations continue at the time of writing on a proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (OEA/Ser/L/V/.II.95 Doc. 6 (1997).
10. See Charles R. Hale, Rethinking Indigenous Politics in the Age of the 'Indio Permitido,' 38 NORTH AMERICAN CONGRESS ON LATIN AMERICA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS (2004)
11. PATRICIA RICHARDS, POBLADORAS, INDÍGENAS AND THE STATE: CONFLICTS OVER WOMEN's RIGHTS IN CHILE (Rutgers Univ. Press 2004)
12. Shannon Speed, Dangerous Discourses: Human Rights and Multiculturalism in Mexico, POL. & LEG. ANTHRO. REV. (PoLAR) 29-51 (2005).
13. Catherine Walsh, Interculturalidad, reformas constitucionales y piuralismo jurídico [Interculturality, Constitutional Reforms, and Legal Pluralism], 36 INSTITUTO CIENTÍFICO DE CULTURAS INDÍGENAS (2002) (Ecuador).
14. The term "Washington Consensus," originally coined by economist John Williamson, is used to refer to a package of reforms including trade liberalization and structural adjustment. See John Williamson, What Should the World Bank Think About the Washington Consensus? 15 THE WORLD BANK RESEARCH OBSERVER 251-264 (2000), available at http://www.worldbank.org/research/journals/wbro/obsaugOO/ pdf/(6)Williamson.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2007).
15. Some judicial reform initiatives have involved a greater role for multilateral agencies than others. For example, in the 1990s, judicial reforms in Venezuela and Peru were promoted by the World Bank, whereas reforms in Brazil were much less driven by external factors. See HALFWAY TO REFORM: THE WORLD BANK AND THE VENEZUELAN JUSTICE SYSTEM (Lawyers Committee for Human Rights & Programa Venezolano 1996)
16. BUILDING ON QUICKSAND: THE COLLAPSE OF TIE WORLD BANK's JUDICIAL REFORM PROJECT IN PERU (Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 1998).
17. For an excellent regional overview of recent judicial reform processes see EN BUSCA DE UNA JUSTICIA DISTINTA: EXPERIENCIAS DE REFORMA EN AMERICA LATINA [IN SEARCH OF A DIFFERENT JUSTICE: REFORM EXPERIENCES IN LATIN AMERICA] (Luis Pásara ed., Consorcio Justicia Viva 2004), available at http://www.bibliojuridica.org/libros/ libro.htm?=1509 (last visited Jan. 23, 2007).
18. The most notable cases in the region are Colombia, where the 1991 Constitution created a new constitutional court, and Costa Rica, where a constitutional chamber of the Supreme Court was created in 1989: see Bruce Wilson, Claiming Individual Rights Through a Constitutional Court: The Example of Gays in Costa Rica, 5 INTL J. CONST. L. (I-CON) 242 (in this issue). Constitutional courts also exist in other Latin American countries, including Bolivia, Ecuador, and Guatemala. For a detailed comparative analysis of judicial review provisions across the region, see Patricio Navia & Julio Rios-Figueroa, The Constitutional Adjudication Mosaic of Latin America, 38 COMP. POL. STUD. 189 (2000).
19. For further detail, see Margaret Popkin, Efforts To Enhance Judicial Independence in Latin America: A Comparative Perspective (Due Process of Law Foundation 2001), available at http://www.dplf.org/JIT/ eng/la_jit01/la_jit01_comparative.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2007).
20. However, provision remains acutely inadequate and court proceedings continue to be carried out exclusively in Spanish. See Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People in Guatemala, U.N.Doc.E/CN.4/ 2003/90/Add.2 (Feb. 24, 2003), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/ doc/UNDOC/GEN/G03/111/33/PDF/G0311133.pdf?OpenElement (last visited Jan. 23, 2007).
21. To my knowledge, no longitudinal studies have been carried out to explore the impact of improved court provision on indigenous peoples' recourse to the courts, but anecdotal evidence from Guatemala and Mexico suggests that the increased presence of small claims courts in indigenous regions may be one factor encouraging indigenous women to take cases of intrafamilial violence to court. On the impact of the introduction of small claims courts in Brazil on domestic violence cases see Fiona Macaulay, Private Conflicts, Public Powers: Domestic Violence and the Courts in Latin America, in THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA 2 11 (Rachel Sieder, Line Schjolden & Alan Angell eds., Palgrave 2005).
22. See THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS, id.
23. Rodrigo Uprimny & Mauricio García Villegas, The Constitutional Court and Social Emancipation in Colombia, in DEMOCRATIZING DEMOCRACY: BEYOND THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC CANON 66-100 (Boaventura de Sousa Santos ed., Verso 2005).
24. See THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS, supra note 17.
25. See, e.g., on Brazil, Peter Houtzager, The Brazilian Movement of the Landless and Legal Change, in LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW: TOWARDS A COSMOPOLITAN LEGALITY 218 (Boaventura de Sousa Santos & César A. Rodríguez-Garavito eds., Cambridge Univ. Press, 2005)
26. on El Salvador, Richard F. Klawiter, !La Tierra Es Nuestra! The Campesino Struggle in El Salvador and a Vision of Community-Based Lawyering, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1625 (1990).
27. See Cesar A. Rodriguez & Luis Carlos Arenas, Indigenous Rights, Transnational Activism and Legal Mobilization: The Struggle ofthe U'wa People in Colombia, in LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW, supra note 20, at 241
28. Omar Arach, Ambientalismo, desarrollo y transnacionalidad: Las protestas en torno a la represa de Yacyretá [Environmentalism, Development, and Transnationalism: The Protests Around the Yacyretá Dam], in MAS ALLÁ DE LA NACÍON: LAS ESCALAS MÚLTIPLES DE LOS MOVIMIENTOS SOCIALES [BEYOND THE NATION: THE MULTIPLE SCALES OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS] 105 (Elizabeth Jelin ed., Libros del Zorzal 2003).
29. See ALISON BRYSK, FROM TRIBAL VILLAGE TO GLOBAL VILLAGE: INDIAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA (Stanford Univ. Press 2000).
30. See SUSANNE JONAS, OF CENTAURS AND DOVEs: GUATEMALA'S PEACE PROCESS (Westview Press 2000)
31. and NEGOTIATING RIGHTS: THE GUATEMALAN PEACE PROCESS (Jeremy Armon, Rachel Sieder & Richard Wilson eds., Conciliation Resources 1997).
32. See the report of the UN truth commission for Guatemala established under the 1994 Oslo Accords (Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico, or CEH, GUATEMALA MEMORY OF SILENCE: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION FOR HISTORICAL CLARIFICATION (Feb. 1999), available at http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english/ toc.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2007).
33. Agreement on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Mar. 31, 1995, Guat.-URNG, UN Doc. A/49/882 - S/1995/256, 36 ILM 285 (1997), available at http://www.usip.org/library/pa.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2007).
34. Reformas a la Constitución Política de la República de Guatemala [Reforms to the Political Constitution of the Republic of Guatemala], Acuerdo Legislativo No. 41-98 (Oct. 16, 1998). For full text (in Spanish) see http://www.congreso.gob.gt/gt/ mostrar_acuerdo.asp?id=3461 (last visited Jan. 23, 2007).
35. A series of paid advertisements were placed in the national press urging a "no" vote. For more detail on the ethnic dimensions of the referendum, see Kay Warren, Voting Against Indigenous Rights in Guatemala: Lessons from the 1999 Referendum, in INDIGENOUS MOVEMENTS, SELF-REPRESENTATION, AND THE STATE IN LATIN AMERICA 149 (Kay Warren & Jean Jackson eds., Univ. Texas Press 2002).
36. See id. and Jonas, supra note 23, at ch. 8.
37. GUAT. CONST. art 203 (1985) states, inter alia, that "[t]he jurisdictional function is to be exercised, with absolute exclusivity, by the Supreme Court of Justice and by the other courts established by law. No other authority may intervene in the administration of justice."
38. The constitutions refer to indigenous law in different ways: "costumbres" ["customs"] or "procedimientos" ["procedures"], "autoridades" ["authorities"] or "normas indígenas" ["indigenous norms"]; some refer specifically to territorial jurisdictions or competencies, while others recognize norms and procedures but not the authorities who exercise them. The subject of recognition also varies from "pueblos indigenas" ["indigenous peoples"], "comunidades indígenas" ["indigenous communities"], or, in the case of Peru, "comunidades campesinas" ["campesino communities"]. See Raquel Yrigoyen Fajardo, Legal Pluralism, Indigenous Law and the Special Jurisdiction in the Andean Countries, 27 BEYOND LAW: INFORMAL JUSTICE AND LEGAL PLURALISM IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH 32 (2004).
39. For example, the General Directorate of Bilingual Intercultural Education (La Dirección General de Educación Bilingüe Intercultural, or DIGEBI) was established as an administrative technical wing of the Ministry of Education, by Acuerdo Gubernativo No. 726-95 (Dec. 21, 1995). DIGEBI is the government agency charged with effecting curriculum change to advance the commitments to bilingual bicultural education set out in the peace accords.
40. GUAT. CONST. art. 58 provides: "Identidad Cultural. Se reconoce el derecho de las personas y de las comunidades a su identidad cultural de acuerdo a sus valores, su lengua y sus costumbres."
41. GUAT. CONST. art. 66 provides: "Protección a grupos étnicos. Guatemala está formada por diversos grupos étnicos entre los que figuran los grupos indígenas de ascendencia maya. El estado reconoce, respeta y promueve sus formas de vida, costumbres, tradiciones, formas de organización social, el uso del traje indígena en hombres y mujeres, idiomas y dialectos."
42. Author's interviews with Amilcar Pop and Guillermo Padilla, Defensoría Indígena del Instituto de Defensa Penal Público, Guatemala City, April 2005 (both were employed within the special section of the public defenders' office charged with advancing coordination between indigenous law and state law and ensuring government compliance with ILO 169).
43. For a list of ratifications, see http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/ ratifce.pl?C169 (last visited Jan. 23, 2007).
44. In applying national laws and regulations to the peoples concerned, due regard shall be had to their customs or customary law. These peoples shall have the right to retain their own customs and institutions, where these are not incompatible with fundamental rights defined by the national legal system and with internationally recognized human rights. Procedures shall be established, wherever necessary, to resolve conflicts which may arise in the application of this principle." ILO 169, art. 8.
45. To the extent compatible with the national legal system and internationally recognized human rights, the methods customarily practiced by the peoples concerned for dealing with offenses committed by their members shall be respected. The customs of these peoples in regard to penal matters shall be taken into consideration by the authorities and courts dealing with such cases." ILO 169, art. 9.
46. In imposing penalties laid down by general law on members of these peoples account shall be taken of their economic, social and cultural characteristics. Preference shall be given to methods of punishment other than confinement in prison." ILO 169, art. 10.
47. In its opinion the Court stated that no incompatibility existed between the 1985 constitution and ILO 169: "As is evident, there are no dispositions within Convention 169 of the International Labour Organization that could be considered incompatible with the constitutional text. [Indeed] if those norms are considered within the general framework of flexibility within which [the constitution] was conceived, the aforementioned Convention can only produce the favorable consequences foreseen to promote respect for the culture, religion, social and economic organization and identity of the indigenous peoples of Guatemala, as well as their participation in the process of planning, discussion and decision making about the affairs of their own community." Opinión consultiva relativa at Convenio 169 (Case file 199-1995) (Constitutional Court of Guatemala).
48. For a more extended discussion of the constitutional position of indigenous law, see GUILLERMO PADILLA, EL ESTADO DE DERECHO Y EL SISTEMA JURÍDICO PROPIO DE LOS PUEBLOS INDÍGENAS EN GUATEMALA [THE RULE OF LAW AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN GUATEMALA] (2005) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
49. Tutela appeals can be heard by any court and presented by any person without the need for a lawyer or written documentation. On the Colombian experience, see Mauricio García Villegas & Rodrigo Uprimny, La acción de tutela [The Tutela Writ], in EL CALEIDOSCOPIO DE LAS JUSTICIAS EN COLOMBIA [THE KALEIDOSCOPE OF JUSTICES IN COLOMBIA] 423 (Boaventura Santos & Mauricio García Villegas eds., Univ. de los Andes 2004)
50. Uprimny & García Villegas, supra note 18)
51. Willem Assies, Indian Justice in the Andes: Re-Rooting or Re-Routing? in STUDYING THE ANDES: SHIFTING MARGINS OF A MARGINAL WORLD? 167 (Ton Salman & Annelies Zoomers eds., Centre for Latin American Research and Documentation (CEDLA) 2003)
52. Esther Sanchez, The Tutela-System as a Means of Transforming the Relations Between the State and the Indigenous Peoples of Colombia, in THE CHALLENGE OF DIVERSITY supra note 6, at 223
53. Donna Lee Van Cott, A Political Analysis of Legal Pluralism in Bolivia and Colombia, 32 J. LAT. AMER. STUD. 207 (2000).
54. On indigenous autonomy and due process requirements, see, e.g., case no. ST-349/1996; on indigenous autonomy, sanctions and intercultural definitions of torture see, inter alia, case no. ST-523/1997.
55. Case no. ST-523/1997 provides a particularly clear statement: "In the view of the court, the limits that indigenous authorities should respect in the exercise of their jurisdictional functions with respect to human rights correspond to an intercultural consensus about what is really intolerable because it threatens the most precious things of man, that is, the right to life and the prohibition against slavery and - by express constitutional requirement - the legality of criminal and civil procedures, this [last] to be understood to mean that all judgments should be carried out in accordance with the norms and procedures of the indigenous community, in line with the specificity of the social and political organization in question, as well as the characteristics of their juridical order... what is required is for the accused to be able to predict [the indigenous authorities'] actions and that [those actions be] close to the traditional practices that provide for the basis for social cohesion." See also the opinions of the court expressed in, for example, case nos. ST380/1993, SC-058/1994, ST-254/1994, SC-139/1996, ST-349/1996, ST 380/1993, ST496/1996, and ST-523/1997.
56. On Peru, see Raquel Yrigoyen Fajardo, Peru: Pluralist Constitution, Monist Judiciary - A Post-Reform Assessment, in MULTICULTURALISM IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 6, at 157.
57. Cesar Rodriguez, Mauricio García Villegas & Rodrigo Uprimny, Justice and Society in Colombia: A Sociolegal Analysis of Colombian Courts, in LEGAL CULTURE IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION: LATIN AMERICA AND LATIN EUROPE 157 (Laurence M. Friedman & Rogelio Pérez-Perdomo eds., Stanford Univ. Press 2003).
58. Interviews with Otto Marroquin and Oscar Pacay, Magistrates of the Guatemalan Supreme Court, Guatemala City (April/May 2005).
59. Id.
60. See generally the reports of the UN observer mission for Guatemala (MINUGUA) (U.N. docs. A/49/856 and Corr.1, A/49/929, and A/50/482). For a critical appraisal of international involvement in the Guatemalan peace process, see LUIS PASARA, PAZ, ILUSIÓN Y CAMBIO EN GUATEMALA: EL PROCESO DE PAZ, SUS ACTORES, LOGROS Y LÍMITES [PEACE, HOPE AND CHANGE IN GUATEMALA: THE PEACE PROCESS, ITS ACTORS, ACHIEVEMENTS AND LIMITATIONS] (Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas 2003).
61. Author's interviews with personnel, United Nations Development Programme and Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in Guatemala, Guatemala City (May 2005) (anonymity requested).
62. Author's interviews with personnel, Instituto de Detensa Penal Público, Guatemala City, Cobán, and Totonicapán (March-May 2005).
63. Id. Not all detentions of indigenous authorities result in charges being brought, much less convictions, making it difficult to obtain precise documentation of the number of cases involved. As far as could be ascertained, no national records were kept of incidents of this type.
64. Id.
65. GUAT. CONST. arts. 268 & 272 (1985) and Law of Amparo, Habeas Corpus and Constitutionality (National Constituent Assembly Decree 1-86/1984). Together these define the Court's essential function as the defense of the constitutional order and specify the circumstances in which it can exercise abstract and concrete review.
66. When, Serrano, facing gridlock and extensive opposition in Congress, attempted to dismiss the legislature, the Supreme Court, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the Human Rights Ombudsman, and the Constitutional Court and to suspend more than forty constitutional norms via executive decree, the Constitutional Court declared the presidential decrees unconstitutional.
67. General Rios Montt was de facto military ruler of Guatemala between 1982 and 1983. He had attempted to stand for presidential office since 1989, but the Supreme Court had held he was prohibited from so doing by GUAT. CONST. art. 186 (1985), which explicitly states that those who have mounted a coup d'état cannot run for the presidency. In July 2003, a new ruling by the Constitutional Court, in response to an amparo writ presented by Montt, overturned the previous Supreme Court ruling, thus permitting his presidential candidacy for the November 2003 presidential elections. See Supreme Court resolution 0121-2003.
68. For example, on increases in fuel taxes (Supreme Court resolution 361-2003), on increases in social security contributions (resolutions 1632-2003 and 1597-2004), on increases to the age for eligibility for state pensions (resolution 2765-2004), on medical provision for minors (resolution 123-2004), and on energy tariffs (resolution 2287-2004). These actions of unconstitutionality were lodged by the human rights ombudsman. Details can be found in the ombudsman's annual reports. See, e.g., INFORME ANUAL CIRCUNSTANCIADO AL CONGRESO DE LA REPÚBLICA DE LAS ACTIVIDADES Y SITUACIÓN DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS EN GUATEMALA DURANTE EL AÑO 2004 [ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS OMBUDSMAN IN GUATEMALA DURING 2004], available at http://www.pdh.org.gt/html/Informes/anuales/Informe2004.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2007).
69. See Acuerdo Gubernativo No. 525-1999 (on the office of the ombudsman of indigenous women); Acuerdo Ministerial No. 364-2003 (creating a department of indigenous peoples within the Ministry of Labor); Acuerdo Gubernativo No. 96-2005 (creating a presidential advisory commission on indigenous peoples and pluralism).
70. Decree Law 32-1987, Ley del Procurador de los Derechos Humanos y la comisión de derechos humanos del congreso de la república [Law of the Human Rights Ombudsman and Human Rights Commission of the Congress of the Republic], approved May 1987, art. 275.
71. Author's interviews with personnel, United Nations Development Programme and Office of the UN High Commissioner tor Human Rights in Guatemala, Guatemala City (May 2005) (anonymity requested).
72. Author's interviews with members of the Mayan Lawyer's Association (Asociación de Abogados Mayas) and the Mayan legal services NGO Waxaqib Noj, Guatemala City (May 2005).
73. DEMI's institutional goals include: Protecting indigenous women; promoting and developing initiatives to counter violence and discrimination against them; identifying violations of their rights; and proposing programs and initiatives to promote their rights. See Acuerdo Gubernativo No. 525-1999. Its social unit addresses issues related to conflict resolution and mediation. See DEFENSORÍA DE LA MUJER INDÍGENA, SITUACIONES Y DERECHOS DE LAS MUJERES INDÍGENAS EN GUATEMALA [INDIGENOUS WOMEN'S DEFENSE OFFICE, SITUATION AND RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS WOMEN IN GUATEMALA] (DEMI, Guatemala 2005).
74. See, e.g., Acuerdo Gubernativo No. 79-1997 (creating five indigenous justice-of-the-peace courts). See also RAQUEL YRIGOYEN FAJARDO, JUSTICIA Y MULTILINGÜISMO: PAUTAS PARA ALCANZAR UNA JUSTICIA MULTILINGÜE EN GUATEMALA [JUSTICE AND MULTILINGUISM: GUIDELINES TO ACHIEVE MULTILINGUAL JUSTICE IN GUATEMALA] (Programa de Justicia Checci/USAID, Guatemala 2001)
75. JORGE MURGA ARMAS, ANÁLISIS DEL FUNCIONAMIENTO DE LOS JUZGADOS DE PAZ COMUNITARIOS [ANALYSIS OF THE FUNCTIONING OF THE INDIGENOUS JUSTICE-OF-THE-PEACE COURTS] (UNDP, Guatemala 1999).
76. LUIS PÁSARA, Reforma judicial: El caso de Guatemala [Judicial Reform: The Case of Guatemala] (2002) (draft paper on file with author).
77. In 1998, a broad set of reform proposals was published by a multisectorial commission, the Comisión para el Fortalecimento de la Justicia, charged with developing measures to strengthen the justice system on the basis of the commitments set out in the peace agreements. See UNA NUEVA JUSTICIA PARA LA PAZ, RESUMEN EJECUTIVO DEL INFORME FINAL DE LA COMISIÓN DE FORTALECIMIENTO DE LA JUSTICIA EN GUATEMALA [A NEW JUSTICE FOR PEACE, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION FOR STRENGTHENING JUSTICE IN GUATEMALA] (PDH 1998).
78. On UN peace missions and "institutional strengthening," see STEPHEN BARANYI, THE CHALLENGE IN GUATEMALA: VERIFYING HUMAN RIGHTS, STRENGTHENING NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND ENHANCING AN INTEGRATED UN APPROACH TO PEACE (Centre for the Study of Global Governance, London School of Economics 1995).
79. There were 242 justice-of-the-peace courts (juzgados de paz) in 1977 and 353 by 2003. See COMISIÓN DE MODERNIZACIÓN DEL ORGANISMO JUDICIAL: PLAN DE MODERNIZACIÓN DEL ORGANISMO JUDICIAL 1997-2002 [JUDICIAL MODERNIZATION COMMISSION: PLAN FOR THE MODERNIZATION OF THE JUDICIARY 1997-2002] (Organismo Judicial 1997)
80. MINUGUA, INFORME FINAL, AREA JURÍDICA [FINAL REPORT, JUDICIAL AREA] (MINUGUA 2001)
81. Fajardo & Ferrigno, supra note 3.
82. See Fajardo, supra note 62
83. Fajardo & Ferrigno, supra note 3, at annexes 22-23.
84. ILO 169, arts. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, & 10.
85. Author's interviews with indigenous authorities, El Quiché and Totonicapán (May 2005). See, e.g., Case No. 587-2003, Juzgado de Primera Instancia Penal, Totonicapán (a case of aggravated robbery where the judge ruled in favor of indigenous authorities' right to resolve, citing ILO 169), and Velasquez, Case No. 218-2003, infra (case of aggravated robbery in El Quiché province which led to a test case before the Supreme Court ).
86. Between 1996 and 2002, some 482 lynchings and attempted lynchings occurred, involving 913 victims and leaving 240 people dead: see MINUGUA, LOS LINCHAMIENTOS: UN FLAGELO QUE PERSISTE [LYNCHINGS: A SCOURGE THAT PERSISTS] (MINUGUA 2002)
87. and GUATEMALA COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 3.
88. In 2005 newspapers reported thirteen deaths due to lynchings between January and May: EL PERIÓDICO, Guatemala, May 24, 2005, available at http://www.elperiodico.com.gt/look/article.
89. As far as can be ascertained, there are no nationally collated figures to illustrate trends on this matter (see also footnote 51 and text thereto). However, anecdotal evidence and interviews with representatives from the different defensorías indígenas [indigenous defenders' offices] seemed to suggest that such accusations against indigenous authorities and activists were on the increase in 2004 and 2005.
90. See, e.g., discussion of the Panaxit case in GUILLERMO PADILLA, EL ESTADO DE DERECHO Y EL SISTEMA JURÍDICO PROPIO DE LOS PUEBLOS INDÍGENAS EN GUATEMALA [THE RULE OF LAW AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN GUATEMALA] (2005) (draft document on file with author).
91. Id. Author's interviews with indigenous authorities (Alcaldía Indígena), Totonicapán (May 2005); with Juan Zapeta López & Juan Tipaz, Defensoría K'iché, Santa Cruz del Quiché, (May 2005).
92. Case 218-2003, Francisco Velásquez López, Oct. 7, 2004 (Supreme Court of Guatemala (Penal Chamber)).
93. The other gang members, who did not openly confess to participation in the robbery, were not tried. However, following the intervention of the Indigenous Defenders Office of the state criminal defense service and Defensoría K'iché, a local Mayan rights NGO, and extended negotiations with the local public prosecutor, an informal mediation occurred in the public prosecutor's office between those accused, the victim, and the indigenous authorities. The other individuals accused admitted their culpability and promised to compensate the victim. See Padilla, supra note 72.
94. Author's interviews with personnel of Defensoría Indígena, Instituto de la Defensa Penal Pública (May 2005).
95. Case No. 199-1995. GUAT. CONST. art. 46 states: "[t]he general principle is established that in human rights materials, the treaties and conventions accepted and ratified by Guatemala have preeminence over domestic law." The court held that "the Constitution should be interpreted as a harmonious whole, in which each part is interpreted in line with the rest, no disposition should be considered in an isolated manner, and those conclusions [that] harmonize and [that] do not set different constitutional precepts at odds with each other should be favored." It further stated that ILO 169 "does not contradict the Constitution, as it does not regulate any matters which are in conflict with [the Constitution] but rather, to the contrary, deals with aspects which have been considered in constitutional terms in order that they be developed through ordinary legislation."
96. This case was important as it went beyond a mediation under the "criterio de oportunidad" provided for in art. 25 of the penal procedures code (allowing mediation when the maximum penalty for the crime charged does not exceed five years). The maximum sentence for aggravated robbery is fifteen years. See Penal Procedures Code, Decree No, 51-1992.
97. Author's interviews with Consejo de las alcaldías
98. A particularly controversial case concerns the U'wa indigenous groups in Colombia, Case No. SU-039/1997 (Constitutional Court of Colombia), which for more than fifteen years fought a complex legal battle against oil exploration in their territories, involving complaints before the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, and the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights. In each case, the key issue was whether the government had undertaken adequate consultation with indigenous groups prior to granting licenses for exploration. In the face of continued protests by U'wa groups, in January 2006 a decision by the Council of State (Consejo de Estado) held that the government had met its legal obligations with respect to prior consultation, that the lack of agreement between the government and the affected communities and the latter's refusal to take part in a consultation process, did not affect the legality of the initiation of oil exploration. For full text of the decision, see http://www.ramajudicial.gov.co/csj_portal/assets/ consejoestado/l708.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2007).
99. Id.
100. Oil Exploration Case, Case No. 2019/2000. For background see http://www.elaw.org/partners/elaw-cr/oil%20exploration%20article.asp (last visited Jan. 23, 2007).
101. Federación Independiente del Pueblo Shuar del Ecuador [Independent Federation of the Shuar People of Ecuador] (FIPSE) c. Arco Oriente s/ Amparo; for an account of the case see http://www.escr-net.org/caselaw/ caselaw_show.htm?doc_id=406016 (last visited Jan. 23, 2007).
102. Case 11.754, Inter-Am. C.H.R no. 83 (2005). Report not available; for an account of the case, see http://www.escr-net.org/caselaw/ caselaw_show.htm?doc_id=414389 (last visited Jan. 21, 2007).
103. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Case 11.555, Inter-Am. C.H.R no. 79 (2001), available at http://www.worldlii.org/int/cases/IACHR/2001/9.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2007).
104. Id., note 25, paras. 143-148.
105. An extensive bibliography exists about this case. See particularly Claudio Nash Rojas, Los derechos humanos de los indígenas en la jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos [Indigenous Peoples' Human Rights and the Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights],
106. and Luis Rodríguez-Pinero Royo, El caso Awas Tingni y el régimen de derechos territoriales indígenas en la Costa Atlántica de Nicaragua Nicaragua [The Case of Awas Tingni and the Indigenous Territorial Rights Regime on the Nicaraguan Atlantic Coast] in DERECHOS HUMANOS Y PUEBLOS INDÍGENAS: TENDENCIAS INTERNACIONALES Y CONTEXTO CHILENO [HUMAN RIGHTS AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: INTERNATIONAL TENDENCIES AND THE CHILEAN CONTEXT] 29-43, 218-233 (José Aylwin O. ed., Instituto de Estudios Indígenas/Universidad de la Frontera 2004).
107. See also S. James Anaya & Todd Crider, Indigenous Peoples, The Environment and Commercial Forestry in Developing Countries: The Case of Awas Tingni, Nicaragua 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 345-367 (1996).
108. When interviewed by author in April 2005, representatives of the Consejo de los 48 cantones de Totonicapán said they aimed to build a regional Consejo de Autoridades Indígenas in the western departments of the country, with the aim of coordinating lobbying on mining, environmental, and other issues affecting the communities. They were seeking support from the Asociación de Abogados Mayas to help them refine their legal arguments.
109. The Marlin project has received some $35 million in loans and $10 million in equity investment from the World Bank via its International Financial Corporation. See IFC FACT SHEET ON MARLIN PROJECT, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTOGMC/Resources/ marlinfactsheetenglish.pdf.
110. See, e.g., Alberto Ramírez, Sin consulta en Rio Hondo y Sipacapa [Without Consultation in Rio Hondo and Sipacapa PRENSA LIBRE (Guatemala), June 16, 2005, available at http://www.prensalibre.com/pl/2005/junio/16/116742.html
111. Sonia Pérez, Habitantes de Sipacapa tiene vía libre para consulta [Inhabitants of Sipacapa Have Way Free for Consultation], PRENSA LIBRE (Guatemala), June 17, 2005, available at http://www.prensalibre.com/pl/2005/junio/17/116815.html
112. Carolina Escobar Sarti, Aleph. Sipacapa hizo historia [Aleph. Sipacapa Made History], PRENSA LIBRE (Guatemala), June 23, 2005, available at http://www.prensalibre.com.gt/pl/2005/junio/23/ 117211.html
113. Marielos Monzón, Punto de encuentro: En defensa de Sipacapa ["Meeting Point: In Defense of Sipacapa"], PRENSA LIBRE (Guatemala), June 28, 2005, available at http://www.prensalibre.com/pl/2005/junio/28/117578.html (all visited last on Jan. 23, 2007).
114. The Constitutional Court revoked the provisional suspension of the consultation by the lower court and dismissed Montana's amparo claim that the villagers' consultation was unconstitutional. In affirming the right of the villagers to organize such a vote, the Court relied on arts. 6-15 of ILO 169, arts. 65 and 66 of the Guatemalan Municipal Code, and art. 2 of the Law of Urban and Rural Development Councils (Ley de Consejos de Desarrollo Urbano y Rural). It also cited arts. 66, 97, 140, 141 and 253 of the Constitution (referring to municipal autonomy), and art. 18 of the Law of Decentralization.
115. For background see Sonia Pérez, CC valida consultas ambientales: Declara improcedentes tres recursos de minera e hidroeléctrica, PRENSA LIBRE (Guatemala), Apr. 5, 2006, available at http://www.prensalibre.com/pl/2006/abril/05/ 138643.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2007).
116. See COMPLIANCE ADVISOR/OMBUDSMAN, ASSESSMENT OF A COMPLAINT SUBMITTED TO CAO IN RELATION TO THE MARLIN MINING PROJECT IN GUATEMALA (Office of the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman International Finance Corporation/Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, Sept. 7, 2005), available at http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/pdfs/ CAO-Marlin-assessment-English-7Sep05.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2007).
117. The results of the consultation were presented to the Guatemalan Congress in June 2005. Congress promised to investigate whether or not the results are binding, a process which could take months or even years. As far as could be ascertained, no congressional response has been published to date. In the meantime construction of the mine and plant for cyanide processing of the ore continues.
118. In August 2006 five municipalities in the San Marcos province rejected proposed opencast mining operations in a popular plebiscite, CENTRAL AMERICA REPORT, Oct. 13, 2006; similar consultations were reportedly planned over proposed hydroelectric projects in the Ixcán province, CENTRAL AMERICA REPORT, Nov. 17, 2006. In March 2006 the International Labour Organization upheld a complaint lodged by a trade union federation alleging the Guatemalan government's failure to ensure consultation, as stipulated by ILO 169, over nickel mining operations in El Estor, in the department of Izabal. CENTRAL AMERICA REPORT, March 31, 2006. See http://www.inforpressca.com/CAR/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2007).
119. Author's interviews, Asociación de Abogados Mayas de Guatemala (May 2005).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Three indigenous delegates were elected to the Constituent Assembly out of seventy elected from lists presented by parties and social movements. For discussion of their influence in the assembly, see DONNA LEE VAN COTT, THE FRIENDLY LIQUIDATION OF THE PAST 67-68 (Univ. of Pittsburgh Press 2000).
123. See KAY WARREN, INDIGENOUS MOVEMENTS AND THEIR CRITICS: PAN-MAYAN ACTIVISM IN GUATEMALA ch. 2 (Princeton Univ. Press 1998).
124. COLOM. CONST. art. 86.
125. García Villegas & Uprimny, supra note 41. See, e.g., children's fundamental right to health (Case No. SU-043/1995); rights to minimum subsistence income (Case No. T-426/1992); labor union rights (Case No. SU-342/1995); personal appearance (Case No. SU-642/1998); homosexual couples (Case No. SU-623/1997); right to education (Case No. SU-624/1999); equality of religions (Case No. C-027/1993); abortion (Case No. C-647/2001); euthanasia (Case No. C-239/1997).
126. For an excellent discussion of the Court's most controversial decisions, see Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa, The Judicialization of Politics in Colombia: The Old and the New, in THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS, supra note 17, at 67-103, esp. 80-88.
127. Id. In Guatemala the total number of claims of unconstitutionality filed with the Constitutional Court between 1996 and 2004 was 13,463. See http://www.cc.gob.gt/docs/expedientes.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2007).
128. Colom. Const. art. 272; Ley de Amparo, Exhibición Personal y de Constitucionalidad [Law of amparo, habeas corpus and constitutionality], Decree No. 1-86.
129. See MINUGUA, Eighth Report, para 72, U.N. docs. A/49/856 and Corr.1, A/49/929, and A/50/482 (criticizing this abuse and citing statistics from the Court for 1996 and 1997 indicating that some four out of five amparo applications were dismissed).
130. COLOM. CONST. art. 86.
131. GUATEMALA COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 3 at ch. IV, para 41.
132. Author's interview with Luis Ramírez, Instituto de Estudios Comparados en Ciencias Penales de Guatemala (April 2005). For procedural requirements, see Ley de Amparo, Exhibición Personal y de Constitucionalidad [Law of Amparo, Habeas Corpus and Constitutionality], Decree No. 1-86, arts. 33-41.
133. See Manuel José Cepeda, supra note 100
134. Uprimny & García Villegas, supra note 18.
135. The decision of the Constitutional Court in July 2003 to admit the amparo presented by Rios Montt, which opened the way to his presidential candidacy, was widely attributed to pressure from the executive branch. See supra note 55.
136. See Coralia Orantes, Eliú Higueros ofrece cambiar imagen del organismo judicial [Eliú Higueros Offers to Change the Image of the Judiciary] (interview with Eliú Higueros, president of the supreme court), PRENSA LIBRE (Guatemala), Oct. 18, 2006, available at http://www.prensalibre.com/pl/2006/octubre/18/154245.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2007).
137. Author's interviews, Asociación de Abogados Mayas de Guatemala and Instituto de Estudios Comparados en Ciencias Penales de Guatemala (May-April 2005).
138. Rodríguez, García Villegas & Uprimny, supra note 45, at 173.
139. Uprimny & García Villegas, supra note 18, at 74-75.
140. In 1999, Guatemalan Nobel Peace Prize winner Rigoberta Menchú and a group of Spanish and Guatemalan nongovernmental organizations filed a petition before the Spanish Audiencia Nacional seeking the prosecution of people involved in abuses during the armed conflict, including a 1980 military assault on the Spanish Embassy, which killed thirty-seven people. The petition was initially dismissed on grounds of nonadmissibility, but in September 2005 Spain's Constitutional Tribunal ruled that Spanish courts could exercise universal jurisdiction over war crimes committed during Guatemala's armed conflict, as universal jurisdiction outweighed national interests in cases of genocide. See Audiencia Nacional, judgment of 13 December 2000; Tribunal Supremo, judgment of 25 February 2003. Both decisions are available at http://www.derechos.org (last visited Jan. 23, 2007).
141. See also Guatemala Genocide, Judgment No. STC 237/2005 (Tribunal Constitucional Sept. 26, 2005), at http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/ jurisprudencia/Stc2005/STC2005-237.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2007). In June 2006, Spanish judge Santiago Pedraz traveled to Guatemala to interview former military rulers for their roles in suspected genocide, torture, and illegal detention. Two of eight former military officers named in the petition were subsequently arrested, although at the time of writing none has been convicted.
142. See Spain judge begins investigation in Guatemala genocide case (JURIST, June 26, 2006), available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2006/06/ spain-judge-begins-investigation-in.php (last visited Jan. 23, 2007)
143. Crimes against humanity remain unpunished in Guatemala, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Nov. 17, 2006; available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR340352006 (last visited Jan. 24, 2007).