Collusion, fluctuating demand, and price rigidity

International Economic Review

Volumn 48, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 483-515

  Hanazono, Makoto ^a   Huanxing, Yang ^b  

^a NAGOYA UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

^b OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34147150729     PISSN: 00206598     EISSN: 14682354     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2007.00435.x     Document Type: Article

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