Right to choose in oral auctions

Economics Letters

Volumn 95, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 167-173

  Burguet, Roberto ^a  

^a Barcelona)   (Spain)

Author keywords

Risk aversion; Sequential auctions

Indexed keywords

EID: 34047273775     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2006.09.028     Document Type: Article

References (8)

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3. Burguet R. The condominium problem; auctions for substitutes. Review of Economic Design 9-2 (2005) 73-90
4. Eliaz K., Offerman T., and Schotter A. Creating competition out of thin air: market thickening and right-to-choose auctions. CEPR Discussion Papers 4678 (2004)
5. Gale I., and Hausch D. Bottom-fishing and declining prices in sequential auctions. Games and Economic Behavior 7 (1994) 318-331
6. Goeree J.K., Wooders J., and Plott C.R. Bidders' choice auctions: raising revenues through the right to choose. Journal of the European Economic Association 2 (2004) 504-515
7. Maskin E., and Riley J. Optimal auctions with risk averse buyers. Econometrica 52-6 (1984) 1473-1518
8. Menezes F.M., and Monteiro P.K. Simultaneous pooled auctions. The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics 17-3 (1998) 219-232