France and the United States: Waiting for regime change

Survival

Volumn 49, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 181-197

  Bozo, Frédéric ^a   Parmentier, Guillaume ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33947640642     PISSN: 00396338     EISSN: 14682699     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00396330701254651     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (60)

1. Thomas L. Friedman,'Our War with France', New York Times, 18 September 2003.
2. David Ignatius,'Bush's New Ally: France?', Washington Post, 1 February 2006.
3. Nicolas Sarkozy,'La France doit porte les valeurs universelles, et les faire vivre', interview with Pascal Bruckner, André Glucksmann, Michaël Prazan and Yasmina Reza, Le Meilleur des Mondes, no. 2, Autumn 2006, pp. 81-93.
4. See Guillaume Parmentier,'Americans are Wrong to Vilify the French', International Herald Tribune, 20-21 September 2003.
5. For a reliable and detailed account of the Franco-American crisis of 2003 and its sequel, see Henri Vernet and Thomas Cantaloube, Chirac contre Bush. L'autre guerre (Paris: JC Lattès, 2004)
6. and, for the broader transatlantic picture, 'The Divided West', Financial Times, June 2003
7. as well as Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, Allies at War: America, Europe and the Crisis over Iraq (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004).
8. See also Stanley Hoffmann and Frédéric Bozo, Gulliver Unbound: America's Imperial Temptation and the War in Iraq (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), especially pp. 1-15.
9. For a recent assessment of the relationship, see Simon Serfaty; 'Terms of Estrangement: French-American Relations in Perspective', Survival, vol. 47, no. 3, Autumn 2005, pp. 73-91.
10. For an informed report on the post-2003 'turn' in Franco-American relations, see Sylvie Kauffmann and Natalie Nougayrède, 'France-Etats-Unis: Histoire d'un retournement', Le Monde, 6 April 2006.
11. For an overview of Franco-American relations in past decades, see Frank Costigliola, France and the United States: The Cold Alliance since World War II (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1992)
12. Charles G. Cogan, Oldest Allies, Guarded Friends: The United States and France Since 1940 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994)
13. and Pierre Melandri, 'The Troubled Friendship: France and the United States, 1945-1989', in Geir Lundestad (ed.), No End to Alliance: The United States and Western Europe, Past, Present and Future (New York: St Martin's Press, 1998).
14. On the relationship during the 1980s and 1990s, see Michael Brenner and Guillaume Parmentier, Reconcilable Differences: U.S-French Relations in the New Era (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2002).
15. On this'founding' period, see Frédéric Bozo, Two Strategies for Europe: De Gaulle, the United States and the Atlantic Alliance (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001).
16. On the Pompidou years, see Pierre Melandri, 'Une relation très spéciale: La France, les Etats-Unis et l'année de l'Europe, 1973-1974', in Association Georges Pompidou (ed.), Georges Pompidou et l'Europe (Bruxelles: Complexe, 1995)
17. and Georges-Henri Soutou, 'Georges Pompidou and U.S.-European Relations', in Marc Trachtenberg (ed.), Empire and Alliance: America and Europe during the Cold War (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003).
18. See Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, Le Pouvoir et la Vie, vol. 3, 'Choisir' (Paris: Cie 12, 2006), esp. pp. 222-7
19. Mitterand's January 1983 speech in the Bundestag calling on West Germany to accept deployment of US Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles was seen as a defining moment by Washington.
20. See Frédéric Bozo, Mitterrand, la fin de la guerre froide et l'unification allemande. De Yalta à Maastricht (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2005), esp. pp. 301-61.
21. On the France-NATO developments of 1995-97, see Brenner and Parmentier, Reconcilable Differences, esp. pp. 38-68;
22. and Frédéric Bozo, 'France', in Michael Brenner (ed.), NATO and Collective Security (London: Macmillan, 1998)
23. and La France et l'Alliance atlantique depuis la fin de la guerre froide. Le modèle gaullien en question (1989-1999) (Paris: CEHD, 2001), http://www.cehd.sga.defense.gouv.fr/publications/cahier17.pdf.
24. Quoted in Kauffmann and Nougayrède, 'France-Etats-Unis'.
25. According to a poll conducted by the Gallup Organization from 3-6 February 2003, only 59% of Americans had a favourable image of France, whereas 63% had a favourable image of Russia. In 2002, 79% of Americans had a favourable opinion of France (The Gallup Organization, www. gallup.com). And according to a poll conducted by the French-American Foundation and TNS Sofres in June 2005, 35% of Americans had a favourable opinion of France (down from 50% in 2002) while 31% of the French felt sympathetic towards the United States (as against 39% in 2002) (for a summary of results, see the French-American Foundation's website: 'France-Etats-Unis: Regards croisés', June 2005, http://www.french-american.org/upload/flb/107/ Synthese_FAF_Juin_2005_FAF_11350034231 61.pdf.
26. For detailed results, see TNS Sofres' website: Http://www.tns-sofres.com/ etudes/pol/050705_regards FrceUS_r.htm.)
27. See Vernet and Cantaloube, Chirac contre Bush, pp. 281ff.
28. The French and Americans tend to agree on the perception of threats they are faced with: In a recent poll, both Americans and French named international terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, immigration, the global spread of diseases, global warming, the growing power of China and violence and instability in Iraq as major threats (Transatlantic Trends 2006, p.8, http://www.transatlantictrends.org/doc/ 2006_TT_Key%20Findings%20FINAL.pdf).
29. Former Prime Minister Georges Pompidou typically noted after the May 1968 crisis that other nations now gaze 'with ironic satisfaction at the image of an unstable and self destructive country' and were glad that de Gaulle's France was finally 'brought down to size': Quoted in Bozo, Two Strategies, p.222.
30. An international counter-terrorism intelligence centre, 'Alliance Base', was set up in Paris by the CIA and French intelligence in 2002 and remained functioning even at the height of the French-American crisis over Iraq in 2003. Cf. Dana Priest, 'Help from France Key in Covert Operations; Paris's "Alliance Base" Targets Terrorists', Washington Post, 3 July 2005
31. and Jeff Stein: 'Meet the United States' Unlikely Ally in the Terror Wars', Congressional Quarterly Homeland Security, 28 October 2005.
32. See for example Ignatius,'Bush's New Ally'.
33. In 2003, only 39% of the French agreed with the statement that 'under some conditions, war is necessary to obtain justice', while 84% of Americans agreed (Transatlantic Trends 2003, p.14, http://www.transatlantictrends.org/doc/2003_english_key.pdf).
34. 59% of both Americans and Europeans oppose greater governmental authority to monitor citizen's telephone calls as part of the effort to prevent terrorism (Transatlantic Trends 2006, http://www.transatlantictrends.org/doc/ 2006_TT_Key%20Findings%20FINAL.pdf).
35. If there is regret in French official circles concerning this issue, it is that the United States has refused to be more engaged. This was the case at least until June 2006, when Washington announced its readiness to be involved more directly in the effort - a turn that has had little effect on Tehran but which may be partly explained by the dynamics of French-American cooperation. (Personal interviews, Washington DC, June 2006.)
36. Security Council Resolutions 1553 (2004) and 1701 (2006) are to be found on http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions.
37. Personal interviews, Brussels, June 2006.
38. See Kurt Volker, deputy assistant secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, 'NATO: Where Is It Headed?', speech at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 28 March 2006, http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/ 63860.htm.
39. Speech by Nicolas Sarkozy to The Daughters of the American Revolution, Washington DC, 12 September 2006, http://www.u-m-p.org/site/ GrandDiscours.php.
40. Nicolas Sarkozy,'La France doit porter les valeurs universelles'.
41. Indeed, as the Transatlantic Trends opinion poll commissioned by the German Marshall Fund of the United States in several European countries makes it clear, the French public is now in the mainstream of European public opinion and no longer stands out in its scepticism towards the wisdom of US foreign policy. The proportions of Europeans who view US leadership in world affairs as undesirable has reversed from 64% positive in 2002 to 37% in 2006, and from 31% negative to 57%. (Transatlantic Trends, poll commissioned by the German Marshall Fund of the United States, September 2006. The data were collected in June 2006.)
42. On the topic of the European Union and NATO, see Guillaume Parmentier, 'Europe Must play a Bigger Part in NATO', Financial Times, 17 March 2006.
43. Plans to create 'partnerships' with countries like Australia or Japan are a project which the next administration may well be willing to push further, perhaps attempting to move NATO from 'global partnership' to 'global membership'; see Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier, 'Global NATO', Foreign Affairs, September-October 2006, pp. 105-13,
44. and on an even more imaginative scale, the piece by Ronald D. Asmus and Bruce P. Jackson, 'Does Israel Belong in the EU and NATO?', Policy Review, February-March 2005.
45. See, tellingly, the French defence minister's comment on this issue: Michèle Alliot-Marie, 'L'OTAN doit rester une organisation euro-atlantique', Le Figaro, 30 October 2006.
46. On this development, see Christoph O. Meyer, 'Convergence towards a European Strategic Culture? A Constructivist Framework for Explaining Changing Norms', European Journal of International Relations, vol. 11, no. 4, 2005, pp. 523-49.
47. Guillaume Parmentier,'After the War II: France Will Have to Pay a Price', International Herald Tribune, 24 March 2003.
48. See Simon Serfaty, La France vue par les Etats-Unis: Réflexions sur la franco-phobie à Washington, CFE Policy Paper, Publications du Centre Français sur les Etats-Unis, 15 November 2002 (http://www.cfe-ifri.net)
49. Simon Serfaty, 'Querelle permanente: Réflexions sur la francophobie aux Etats-Unis', Annuaire Français des Relations Internationales, vol. 4, 2003.
50. See also Justin Vaïsse, 'Merci for the French Correction', Washington Post, 15 February 2003
51. and Justin Va⊣isse 'American Francophobia Takes a New Turn', French Politics, Culture & Society, Summer 2003.
52. In a Copernician reversal for the Quai d'Orsay's modus operandi, the embassy in Washington has opened a congressional liaison office led by a former US congressional staffer of American nationality. A French caucus was established in both Houses of the US Congress, as a result of which congressional visits to Paris have increased spectacularly in recent years. French Consulates have been encouraged to pursue their functional specialisation, and to be much more active than they had been in the past in reaching out to new elites in their respective areas. (Personal interviews with the authors, Washington DC).
53. Former Socialist Prime Minister Laurent Fabius used the word 'poodle' after Sarkozy's visit to Washington and his meeting with President Bush: 'Nous n'avons pas besoin à la tête de l'Etat de quelqu'un qui se fixe comme programme d'être le futur caniche du président des Etats-Unis'. (Laurent Fabius at a Socialist meeting in Lens, 16 September 2006.) Prime Minister de Villepin and President Chirac also criticized Sarkozy's attitude; see Chirac's interview on the French Radio Channel Europe1, on 18 September 2006, http://www.elysee.fr/elysee/elysee.fr/francais/interventions/ interviews_articles_de_presse_et_interventions_televisees./2006/ septembre/interview_du_president_de_la_republique_sur_europe1.60502.html.
54. For a useful and nuanced analysis, see Sophie Meunier, 'The Distinctiveness of French Anti-Americanism', in Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane (eds), Anti-Americanism in World Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007).
55. On French anti-Americanism, see also Richard Kuisel, Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanisation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993).
56. Although the power ratio between the two countries seemed to have stabilised in the final period of the Cold War, the gap has been widening in the past decade and half. Whereas in 1974 the ratio of population was roughly 1:4, and of gross domestic product 1:5, by 2004 they were 1:5 and 1:6 respectively. The perception of relative French, and European, stagnation compared to US dynamism over the past 15 years adds to this imbalance. OECD Factbook 2006: Economic, Demographic and Social Statistics, OECD, 2006, http://oberon.sourceoecd.org/vl=2147891/ cl=11/nw=1/rpsv/factbook.
57. On this topic, see: Guillaume Parmentier, 'Redressing NATO's Imbalances', Survival, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000, pp. 93-112.
58. This refers to what Stanley Hoffmann once described in the context of de Gaulle's policies in the 1960s as the 'elevator' device, i.e., making a quarrel with the United States a stepping stone for France's own status. Stanley Hoffmann, Decline or Renewal? France since the 1930s (New York: Viking, 1974).
59. Toast de M. Jacques Chirac,Président de la République, à l'occasion du dîner d'Etat offert par M. le Président des Etats-Unis et Madame William J. Clinton, Washington, 1 February 1996, (translated by the authors). French original text: 'Comme le disait le général de Gaulle voici 30 ans, "le meilleur allié des Etats-Unis n'est-il pas celui qui sait parfois leur dire non?" Mais nous savons, dans les moments difficiles, pouvoir compter l'un sur l'autre. Et nous savons, quand l'essentiel est en jeu, avancer de concert, exercer ensemble les responsabilités que nous confèrent l'Histoire'; http://www.elysee.fr/elysee/elysee.fr/francais/ interventions/discours_et_declarations/1996/janvier.
60. See for example Hubert Vedrine, 'Que faire avec les Etats'Unis?', Le Figaro, 16-17 October 2004.