SCOPUS 정보 검색 플랫폼

Volumn 27, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 25-28

Mixed strategies in games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets

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Indexed keywords

EID: 33947633466 PISSN: 01761714 EISSN: None Source Type: Journal
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-006-0139-6 Document Type: Article

Times cited : (17)

References (12)

1
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- The New York City high school match
- Abdulkadiroǧlu A, Pathak PA, Roth AE (2005) The New York City high school match. Am Econ Rev Pap Proc 95:364-367
- (2005) Am Econ Rev Pap Proc , vol.95 , pp. 364-367
- Abdulkadiroǧlu, A.¹ Pathak, P.A.² Roth, A.E.³

2
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- College admissions and the stability of marriage
- Gale D, Shapley L (1962) College admissions and the stability of marriage. Am Math Mon 69:9-15
- (1962) Am Math Mon , vol.69 , pp. 9-15
- Gale, D.¹ Shapley, L.²

4
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- Noncooperative games
- Nash JF (1951) Noncooperative games. Ann Math 54:286-295
- (1951) Ann Math , vol.54 , pp. 286-295
- Nash, J.F.¹

5
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- The evolution of the labor market for medical interns and residents: A case study in game theory
- Roth AE (1984a) The evolution of the labor market for medical interns and residents: a case study in game theory. J Polit Econ 92:991-1016
- (1984) J Polit Econ , vol.92 , pp. 991-1016
- Roth, A.E.¹

6
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- Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
- Roth AE (1984b) Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem. J Econ Theory 34:383-387
- (1984) J Econ Theory , vol.34 , pp. 383-387
- Roth, A.E.¹

7
- 0001828015
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- Roth AE (1985) The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem. J Econ Theory 27:75-96
- (1985) J Econ Theory , vol.27 , pp. 75-96
- Roth, A.E.¹

8
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- Roth AE (1991) A natural experiment in the organization of entry level labor markets: regional markets for new physicians and surgeons in the U. K. Am Econ Rev 81:415-440
- Roth AE (1991) A natural experiment in the organization of entry level labor markets: regional markets for new physicians and surgeons in the U. K. Am Econ Rev 81:415-440

9
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- The redesign of matching markets for American physicians: Some engineering aspects of economic design
- Roth AE, Peranson E (1999) The redesign of matching markets for American physicians: some engineering aspects of economic design. Am Econ Rev 89:748-780
- (1999) Am Econ Rev , vol.89 , pp. 748-780
- Roth, A.E.¹ Peranson, E.²

10
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- Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
- Roth AE, Sotomayor MO (1990) Two-sided matching: a study in game-theoretic modeling and analysis. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
- (1990) Two-sided matching: A study in game-theoretic modeling and analysis
- Roth, A.E.¹ Sotomayor, M.O.²

11
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- Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
- Sönmez T (1997) Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets. J Econ Theory 77:197-204
- (1997) J Econ Theory , vol.77 , pp. 197-204
- Sönmez, T.¹

12
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- Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets?
- Sönmez T (1999) Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets? J Econ Theory 86:148-156
- (1999) J Econ Theory , vol.86 , pp. 148-156
- Sönmez, T.¹

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