Relatives and relativism

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 87, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 143-157

  Jeske, Diane ^a   Fumerton, Richard ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF IOWA   (United States)

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EID: 33947621459     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1017930016138     Document Type: Article

References (24)

1. See, for example, Bernard Williams' rather cryptic suggestions about the implications of the objection at the end of his "Persons, Character, and Morality", in Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 18-19.
2. This is, of course, a definition that limits consequentialism to act consequentialism. Act consequentialism is our primary focus; however, we will briefly consider rule consequentialism in section 3.2 below.
3. See, for example, the discussion in Richard Fumerton, Reason and Morality (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990).
4. So, for example, some causal effects of Jane's running 26.2 miles are Jane's getting tired and thirsty, Jane's friends being impressed, etc. But, a logical implication of Jane's running 26.2 miles is Jane's running of a marathon, because to run 26.2 miles just is to run a marathon.
5. So G. E. Moore's view would not, given our definition, be a utilitarian view, although it is, of course, a consequentialist view. See Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903), esp. Chapters 5 and 6.
6. For discussions that attempt to flesh out what exposure to relevant facts and vivid imagining consist in, see Richard Brandt, A Theory of the Right and the Good (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979),
7. and Stephen Darwall, Impartial Reason (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). It is unlikely that a subjective relativist will straightforwardly identify x's being instrumentally valuable for S with S's valuing x. From now on, whenever we speak of "value", we mean "intrinsic value", unless we indicate otherwise.
8. We say "in part" to allow for the effects of adjusting for probability. See note 3 above.
9. See Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co, 1981), pp. 24Iff.,
10. and John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co, 1979), p. 59.
11. See David Lyons, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), Chapter 4,
12. and J.J.C. Smart, "An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics", in Utilitarianism: For and Against with Bernard Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 9-12.
13. As we have said, there are more complex alternatives. As with act utilitarianism, the relevant consequences can be actual, probable, or possible, and if one moves from actual consequences one will again need some mechanism for adjusting the values assigned to consequences. Following a rule can be construed as succeeding or as trying to succeed in following that rule.
14. Of course, a consequentialist might warn against taking any intuitions very seriously, particularly intuitions about unrealistic hypothetical cases. See, for example, R.M. Hare, "Ethical Theory and Utilitarianism", in Utilitarianism and Beyond ed. by A.K. Sen and Bernard Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982),
15. and J.J.C. Smart, "An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics", in Utilitarianism: For and Against with Bernard Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 67ff.) We leave aside such worries.
16. For examples of attempts to deal with the special obligations objection by adjustments in the theory of value, see David Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 264ff.,
17. and Peter Railton, "Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality", in Ethical Theory ed. Louis Pojman (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1995), pp. 209-226.
18. For a defense of relativistic Consequentialism, see Fumerton, Reason and Morality.
19. Not all deontological views will avoid some version of the "special obligations" objection. For example, there are obvious worries about how Kant could accommodate such obligations.
20. One may have a prima facie obligation to save one's own child, but such obligations will not always be one's all-things-considered obligation. If the consequences of not saving one's child are valuable enough, one's Prima facie obligation may be outweighed by competing considerations.
21. For a discussion of how such a deontological view can be motivated by a psychological reductionist conception of personal identity, see Diane Jeske, "Persons, Compensation, and Utilitarianism" The Philosophical Review October 1993: pp. 541-575.
22. The view developed there shares some structural features with that developed by Thomas Nagel in The View From Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).
23. 17 So the deontologist can hold that we ought to have, as one of our ends, the formation of special relationships, whereas the relativistic consequentialist will not be able to make any claims about what our final ends ought to be. Adopting a deontological view allows one the option of retaining a nonrelativistic conception of intrinsic value.
24. We would like to thank an anonymous referee for Philosophical Studies for providing very helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.