Cross-listing and legal bonding: Evidence from mergers and acquisitions

Journal of Banking and Finance

Volumn 31, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 1003-1031

  Burns, Natasha ^a   Francis, Bill B ^b   Hasan, Iftekhar ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA   (United States)

^b RENSSELAER POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE   (United States)

^c BANK OF FINLAND   (Finland)

Author keywords

Analyst coverage; Bonding; Cross listing; Mergers and acquisitions

Indexed keywords

EID: 33947495092     PISSN: 03784266     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2006.10.001     Document Type: Article

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