Turkish foreign policy since 2002: Between a 'post-Islamist' government and a Kemalist state

International Affairs

Volumn 83, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 289-304

  Robins, Philip ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 33947413135     PISSN: 00205850     EISSN: 14682346     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2007.00619.x     Document Type: Article

References (33)

1. Samuel P. Huntington, The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order (London : Touchstone Books, 1996), p. 138.
2. For the leading contemporary, overview works in English on the subject of this article, see William Hale, Turkish foreign policy, 1774-2000 (London: Cass, 2000);
3. F. Stephen Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser, Turkish foreign policy in an age of uncertainty (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003);
4. Philip Robins, Suits and uniforms: Turkish foreign policy since the Cold War (Seattle : University of Washington Press, 2003).
5. Martin Wight, International theory: the three traditions, ed. Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter (Leicester and London: Leicester University Press/Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991).
6. For an authoritative discussion of Kemalism in English, see Menter Şahinler, The origin, effect and currency of Kemalism (Huckelhoven : Verlag Anadolu, 1999).
7. The term 'post-Islamist' seems to have been coined by Ruşeen Çakir, one of Turkey's leading authorities on Islamist politics. His reasoning was to equate 'post-Islamist' parties with 'post-communist' parties in the former eastern bloc: that is to say, the term covers a multitude of sins and should be seen as a holding term until a more accurate epithet can be selected. Author's interview with Ruşen Çakir, Istanbul, 1 July 2003.
8. Dimitris Keridis, 'Foreign strategies and domestic choices : balancing between power politics and interdependence', in Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris Keridis, eds, The future of Turkish foreign policy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), p. 329.
9. Şerif Mardin, 'Centre-periphery relations: a key to Turkish politics?', Daedalus 102, Winter 1973, pp. 169-90.
10. Author's interview with Abdulkh Gül, Ankara, 23 Dec. 1994.
11. For leading works on the subject, see Mustafa Aydin and Çagri Erhan, eds, Turkish-American relations: past, present and future (London: Routledge, 2004);
12. George S. Harris, Troubled alliance: Turkish-American problems in historical perspective, 1945-1971 (Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1972).
13. For example, the WP sent its MPs to participate in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.
14. President Sezer intervened on the basis that there was no international legitimacy behind the US position.
15. For an authoritative view of the Turkish general staff, see the communiqué of the then military-dominated National Security Council on 31 Jan. 2003. It advocated the continued pursuit of peaceful means to resolve the Iraq issue (implying that it was against an invasion), and a second UN Security Council resolution on the use of force, in order to imbue a possible operation with 'international legitimacy' (implying that Turkey should not participate on any other basis). It should be noted that the military-inspired statement was one with which the JDP government could in substance agree, resulting in 'surprising unity' between Kemalists and post-Islamists. See 'MGK readies Turkey for Iraq war contingencies', Briefing, no. 1430, 3 Feb. 2003.
16. This was the message delivered publicly to Syria by Turkey's top brass. For example, the commander of the land forces, Gen. Atilla Ateş, told military units near the Syrian border in late September 1998 that 'Syria should know that our patience has limits' : see AFP report in Jordan Times, 29 Sept. 1998.
17. Turkish chief of staff Gen. Hüseyin Kivrikoǧlu was quoted a few days later as saying that 'There is a state of undeclared war between us and Syria. We are trying to be patient but that has a limit' : Reuters, quoted from Sabah and reprinted in Jordan Times, 3 Oct. 1998.
18. Author's non-attributable interview with senior member of Turkish Foreign Ministry, Ankara, 26 Sept. 2006.
19. 'US Ambassador Edelman resigns from his post and from the State Department', Briefing, no. 1537, 21 March 2005.
20. Quoted by his ministerial colleague, Ali Babacan, In a speech at Chatham House, London, 28 Nov. 2006.
21. Sencer Ayata refers to this as a period of 'psychological combat'. See his 'Changes in domestic politics and the foreign policy orientation of the AK Party', in Martin and Keridis, eds, The future of Turkish foreign policy, p. 245.
22. See 'Turkey pays price for Ecevit blunder', Briefing, no. 1389, 15 April 2002.
23. US Ambassador Eric Edelman saw the 'unacceptable rhetoric' of Erdoǧan and others, the availability of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion for sale at a Turkish international airport, and the wide availability of Hitler's Mein Kampf as symptoms of an anti-Semitism beginning to take hold in Turkey, which would be viewed in a disproportionately negative way by Turkey's most solid supporters in the United States including Washington's neo-conservatives; author's interview with Ambassador Edelman, Ankara, 15 March 2005.
24. Author's non-attributable interview with senior Turkish diplomat, Ankara, 26 Sept. 2006.
25. These aims were developed before the JDP formed the government, and were the product of the self-criticism that the party leadership undertook once it had decided to split from the political style and substance associated with the WP : author's interview with Murat Mercin, JDP vice-president for Media and Information, Ankara, 25 Sept. 2001.
26. Turkey holds the permanent presidency of the COMCEC, which was established in 1980.
27. What is interesting about Çandar is that over an involvement spanning three decades he has consistently taken the Middle East and the Islamic world seriously as a field of study. With good contacts in the Arab world and Iran, Çandar is well placed to come to such a conclusion. See Turkish Daily News, 11 Jan. 1993.
28. See www.oic-oci.org, accessed 3 January 2007.
29. In April 2006 the Parliamentary Union of the ICO followed the 2004 decision of the OIC foreign ministers to change its formal designation of northern Cyprus from "The Cyprus Muslim Turkish Society' to the 'Cyprus Turkish State', a formulation used in the 2004 Annau Plan. Though Ankara would like formal recognition of the north as the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus', given that Turkey is the only state that confers full recognition even such a measured outcome is a useful victory.
30. A good example of JDP rhetorical diplomacy in action at the ICO is Abdullah Gül's 'Statement' at the 31st Session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers in Istanbul, 14 June 2004, when he referred to 'the Islamic heritage of justice, tolerance, affection and solidarity'. He said that it should 'strengthen our inspiration for more democratic, transparent, open societies' and that 'only well-governed and functioning societies can ensure efficient and fair distribution of resources and economic-social stability'. He warned that 'unless we take the initiative to put our own house in order, outer pressure would be felt'. See www.mfa.gov.tr, accessed 15 Nov. 2006.
31. Turkey and the Arab League concluded a memorandum of understanding in Sept. 2004, in the margins of the UN General Assembly, to develop political, cultural and economic relations. 'Permanent guest' status was designated because the Arab League does not have the formal 'observer' status that the JDP government had sought.
32. Subsequently, for example, the Turkish airline, THY, established three scheduled flights a week to Khartoum.
33. In October 1996 Prime Minister Erbakan insisted on making a trip to Egypt, Libya and Nigeria, all three countries ruled by regimes that were military in origin, in spite of warnings from the Turkish Foreign Ministry. The latter two had been identified as potential members of a group of eight predominantly Islamic developing countries, which subsequently joined together in the D-8, an organization that has met intermittently over the last decade, and which the JDP government has sought to revive. For Erbakan, the trip was a disaster, mainly because of Colonel Qadhafi's insistence on embarrassing his visitor by publicly criticizing Turkey for its handling of the Kurdish issue.