Network externalities and market segmentation in a monopoly

Economics Letters

Volumn 95, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 7-13

  Jing, Bing ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Market segmentation; Network externalities; Quality; Vertical differentiation

Indexed keywords

EID: 33947408800     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2006.08.033     Document Type: Article

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