When Unilateralism is invisible: A different perspective on the oil-for-food scandal

Global Governance

Volumn 13, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 59-77

  Gordon, Joy ^a  

^a FAIRFIELD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Accountability; Iraq; Multilateralism; Office of the Iraq Programme; Oil for food program (OFFP)

Indexed keywords

EID: 33947243356     PISSN: 10752846     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1163/19426720-01301005     Document Type: Review

References (67)

1. Javier Solana, "Rules with Teeth: The Iraq Crisis Reveals the Need for a Better Approach than Either Militant Unilateralism or Feel-Good Multilateralism," Foreign Policy, September-October 2004, no 144, p. 74.
2. See, for example, Marc F. Plattner, "Two Kinds of Internationalism," The National Interest, Spring 2005, no. 79, p. 84.
3. John Ruggie, "Third Try at World Order? American and Multilateralism after the Cold War," Political Science Quarterly 109, no. 4 (1994): 556.
4. James A. Caporaso, "International Relations Theory and Multilateralism: The Search for Foundations," in John G. Ruggie, ed., Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 56.
5. Steven Holloway, "US Unilateralism at the UN: Why Great Powers Do Not Make Great Multilateralists," Global Governance 6, no. 3 (July-September 2000): 369.
6. Claudia Rosett, "Oil-for-Terror," Wall Street Journal, 28 April 2004.
7. Statement of Rep. Christopher Shays, House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, The Iraq Oil-for-Food Program: Starving for Accountability, 108th Cong., 2d sess., 21 April 2004, p. 1.
8. See, for example, Rosett's testimony, maintaining that "the hallmarks of Oil-for-Food were: 1) Privilege 2) Secrecy. These are features usually associated . . . with . . . secret societies, closed systems, dictatorships." Statement for the Record of Claudia Rosett, House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, The Iraq Oil-for-Food Program: Starving for Accountability, 108th Cong., 2d sess., 21 April 2004, p. 3.
9. Available at www.un.org/Depts/oip/dp/index.html.
10. Available at www.un.org/Depts/oip/background/oilexports.html.
11. Available at www.un.org/Depts/oip/background/basicfigures2.html.
12. Available at www.un.org/Depts/oip/background/reportsindex.html.
13. Available at www.un.org/Depts/oip/background/latestindex.html.
14. Available at www.un.org/Depts/oip/background/scrsindex.html.www.un.org/ Depts/oip/background/fact-sheet.html, and www.un.org/Depts/oip/background/chron. html.
15. This was authorized under Security Council Res. 1409 (2002).
16. See www.un.org/Depts/oip/background/latest/backgroundnoteandans030425. html to see the number of audits that were done.
17. S/1996/356, 20 May 1996.
18. See www.un.org/Depts/oip/background/reportsindex.html.
19. "Procedures to be employed by the Security Council committee established by Resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait in the discharge of its responsibilities as required by paragraph 12 Security Council Resolution 986" (1995) (S/1996/636), 12 August 1996.
20. "United Nations: Observations on the Oil for Food Program," Statement of Joseph A. Christoff, Director, International Affairs and Trade. Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate. GAO-04-65IT.
21. "Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD," 30 September 2004, available at www.cia.gov/cia/reports/ iraq_wmd_2004/index.html.
22. "The Management of the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme," Independent Inquiry Committee, 7 September 2005, Vol. I, pp. 85, 91.
23. Ibid., p. 95.
24. Ibid., p. 70-71.
25. Joy Gordon, "The United Nations and Oil-for-Food: The Facts Behind the Volcker Commission's Interim Report," UNA-USA Policy Brief, no. 5, February 2005.
26. "The Management of the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme," Independent Inquiry Committee, 7 September 2005, Vol. I, p.61.
27. "Interim Report," Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme, 3 February 2005.
28. The commanders of the MIF were Rear Admiral A.K. Taylor (1991-1992); Vice Admiral D.J. Katz (1992-1994); Vice Admiral J.S. Redd (1994-1996); Vice Admiral T.B. Fargo (1996-1998); Vice Admiral C.W. Moore Jr. (1998-2002); and Vice Admiral T.J. Keating (2002-2003).
29. In 2001, the United States contributed ninety vessels, the UK contributed four, and all other participating countries contributed one or two. In 2002, the United States contributed ninety-nine vessels, five nations contributed ten or more, and several other countries contributed less than ten. "Department of State Request for Information: Yearly Snapshot of the Maritime Interception Force/Multinational Force," US Navy Central Command, on file with author.
30. From 1994 to 2001, there were several hundred boardings per year; in 2002 and 2003, there were over 3,000 boardings per year. "Department of State Request for Information: Yearly Snapshot of the Maritime Interception Force/Multinational Force," US Navy Central Command, on file with author.
31. Charles Duelfer "Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD," 30 September 2004, Regime Finance and Procurement Section, p. 4-5.
32. Ibid., p. 19.
33. Ibid., p. 34.
34. Ibid., p. 1.
35. Judith Miller, "Panel Leader Says Inquiry Into U.N. Program Is Slowed," New York Times, 22 October 2004, p. All.
36. Although the ISG report repeatedly asserts that the voucher program allowed Iraq to manipulate the sanctions regime for political purposes, it offers very little grounds to suggest that the voucher system was actually illegal or in violation of the program's conditions. The ISG report speculates that certain scenarios might have taken place and, if so, then they were arguably illegal. If an intermediary received a voucher, and sold this entitlement to an oil company, then there could be a third party who profited from the sale who had not been approved by the OFFP. Thus, the report speculates, some individuals or political organizations might have received proceeds from the oil allocations. However, the report then notes that "ISG has no direct evidence linking these individuals or political organizations to actually receiving the proceeds from these oil allocations." Duelfer, "Comprehensive Report," p. 34.
37. Security Council Res. 986 (1995) and "Memorandum of understanding between the Secretariat of the United Nations and the Government of Iraq on the implementation of Security Council Res. 986 (1995)," S/1996/356.
38. The report says that kickbacks on import contracts totaled $1.5 billion, and surcharges from oil sales came to $229 million. Additionally, private sector border trade was about $1.2 billion. Duelfer, "Comprehensive Report," p. 23.
39. Duelfer, "Comprehensive Report," p. 24.
40. It was so widely known that the trade accords were reported in industry periodicals. For the extraordinary amount of detailed information that was publicly available, see, for example, the following: Jan. 4, 1997. Senior Jordanian and Iraqi officials aided by technical experts are now busy working on details of renewing an oil agreement between the two countries. The agreement, under which Iraq is expected to increase by 7% its oil supplies to Jordan, will be signed when Minister of Industry and Trade Ali Abul Ragheb visits Baghdad. At this moment technical experts from the two sides are working on the details. Abul Ragheb is scheduled to visit Baghdad for a meeting of the Joint Jordanian-Iraqi Economic Commission on January 6. During the visit, Jordan and Iraq are also expected to renew their annual trade protocol, which is tied with the oil agreement. Under the proposed agreement, Iraq will provide Jordan 4.5 mmt of crude oil and oil products in 1997. Since the end of the gulf war, Iraq has been meeting Jordan's oil needs by trucking 50,000 bpd of crude oil and 20,000 to 25,000 bpd of fuel oil to the country's only refinery at Zarqa. But Baghdad now owes Jordan $1.3 bn, representing debts accumulated in the 1980s as well as the unsettled payment of part of the Jordanian exports to Iraq. In 1996, Jordan cut the annual trade protocol by about half to $220 mm. Officials have said that the amount is unlikely to be increased in 1997. Issues related to the outstanding Iraqi debts to Jordan and replacement of the present trucking system to pump Iraqi oil to Zarqa by the 500-kilometre pipeline are also expected to be discussed during the talks of Dabbas and Awad with Baghdad officials.
41. "Jordan to Renew Oil Deal with Iraq," Alexander's Gas and Oil Connections 2, no. 1 (15 January 1997), available at www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntm70204.htm.
42. Duelfer, "Comprehensive Report," p. 26.
43. Iraq's official selling price (OSP) plus the premia equals the market price. Discussion paper prepared by oil overseers for 661 Committee, 14 March 2002, p. 6, on file with author.
44. According to the sources cited in the ISO report, purchasers were unwilling to pay surcharges of 50 center/barrel. For the most part the surcharges varied between 10 and 15 cents/barrel. Duelfer, "Comprehensive Report," p. 35.
45. Statement by Ambassador Patrick F. Kennedy, House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, The Iraq Oil-for-Food Program: Starving for Accountability, 108th Cong., 2d sess., 21 April 2004, p. 6.
46. Testimony of Lee Jeffrey Ross Jr., House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, The Iraq Oil-for-Food Program: Starving for Accountability, 108th Cong., 2d sess., 21 April 2004, p. 4.
47. "Under retroactive pricing, the Security Council did not approve a price per barrel until the oil was delivered to the refinery. The Iraqi government signed contracts with suppliers without knowing the price it would have to pay until delivery. This allowed a fair market value to be set." "United Nations: Observations on the Oil for Food Program," Joseph A. Christoff, US General Accounting Office, GAO-04-651T, 7 April 2004, p. 8, footnote 7.
48. "Buyers have the choice of acquiring a wide variety of oil with different qualities and delivery characteristics (cargo size, geographic location, contractual characteristics, etc.). The price of Iraqi oil (OSP) is considered to be fair market value if the contract holders are making similar profits (with all circumstances taken into account) on Iraqi oil as they could make with alternative oils. Because of the substantial quality and logistics differentials of the different oils this does not necessarily mean that the OSP itself needs to be identical to the prices of alternative oils." Report of oil overseers to the Security Council, September 2001, p. 2.
49. Discussion paper prepared by oil overseers for the 661 Committee, 14 March 2002, p. 1.
50. Bernie Woodall, "Too early to change Iraq oil prices policy," Reuters, 19 September 2002.
51. Statement of Benon V. Sevan, 26 February 2002.
52. Statement of Benon V. Sevan, 29 May 2002.
53. Statement made to author in a confidential interview with an anonymous member of the 661 Committee.
54. Statement by Ambassador Patrick F. Kennedy, House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, The Iraq Oil-for-Food Program: Starving for Accountability, 108th Cong., 2d sess., 21 April 2004, p. 6.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Statement by Ambassador Robin L. Raphel, House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, The Iraq Oil-for-Food Program: Starving for Accountability, 108th Cong., 2d sess., 21 April 2004, p. 4.
58. Statement for the Record of Michael Thibeault, House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, The Iraq Oil-for-Food Program: Starving for Accountability, 108th Cong., 2d sess., 21 April 2004, p. 2.
59. "United Nations: Observations on the Oil for Food Program," Joseph A. Christoff, US General Accounting Office, GAO-04-651T, p. 5.
60. According to the briefing memo from the staff of the Government Reform Committee, "In late 2000, allegations of a kickback scheme involving after-sale service fees on humanitarian contracts emerged. The US and UK raised the concern with OIP and the 661 Committee and in March 2001 submitted formal proposals to address these concerns. In the absence of evidence, the proposal received no support from the 661 Committee members." Memorandum from Thomas Costa, 16 April 2004, House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, The Iraq Oil-for-Food Program: Starving for Accountability, 108th Cong., 2d sess., 21 April 2004, p. 7.
61. Statement for the Record of Michael Thibeault, House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, The Iraq Oil-for-Food Program: Starving for Accountability, 108th Cong., 2d sess., 21 April 2004, p. 3-4.
62. Author's communications from former OIP staff, 22 August 2004.
63. "United Nations: Observations on the Oil for Food Program," Joseph A. Christoff, US General Accounting Office, GAO-04-651T, p. 8.
64. Statement by Ambassador Patrick F. Kennedy, House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, The Iraq Oil-for-Food Program: Starving for Accountability, 108th Cong., 2d sess., 21 April 2004, p. 2-3.
65. Statement of John G. Ruggie, House Committee on International Relations, The United Nations Oil-for-Food Program: Issues of Accountability and Transparency, 109th Cong., 2d sess., 28 April 2004, p. 56.
66. This is especially true of the ISG report. The report notes, for example, that "the UN approved the final contract between Iraq and the lifting company," although the approval required was that of the Security Council members. The report maintains that "the oil surcharges were possible because of 'the relatively large built-in profit margin allowed by the UN Oil Overseers,'" although, in fact, the profit margins were subject to the approval of the Security Council committee and not the oil overseers. Duelfer, "Comprehensive Report," p. 34.
67. Under Article 96 of the UN Charter, the International Court of Justice may issue an advisory opinion to the Council, if the Council requests it. However, there is no entity with the power to override the decisions of the Security Council.