Corruption and inefficiency: Theory and evidence from electric utilities

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 91, Issue 5-6, 2007, Pages 939-962

  Dal Bó, Ernesto ^a   Rossi, Martín A ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSIDAD DE SAN ANDRÉS   (Argentina)

Author keywords

Corruption; Efficiency; Electricity; Public vs. private; Regulatory capture

Indexed keywords

EID: 33947160552     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.11.005     Document Type: Article

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