No unchallengeable epistemic authority, of any sort, regarding our own conscious experience - Contra Dennett?

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

Volumn 6, Issue 1-2, 2007, Pages 107-113

  Schwitzgebel, Eric ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

"What it's like"; Fictionalism; Incorrigibility; Introspective infallibility

Indexed keywords

EID: 33847688513     PISSN: 15687759     EISSN: 15728676     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11097-006-9034-y     Document Type: Review

References (12)

1. Dennett, D. C. (1991). Consciousness explained. Boston: Little Brown.
2. Dennett, D. C. (2000). The case for rorts. In R. B. Brandom (Ed.), Rorty and his critics. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
3. Dennett, D. C. (2002). How could I be wrong? How wrong could I be? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9(5-6), 13-16.
4. Dennett, D. C. (2003). Who's on first? Heterophenomenology explained. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10(9-10), 19-30.
5. Dennett, D. C. (2005). Sweet dreams. Cambridge, MA: MIT.
6. Hurlburt, R. T., & Schwitzgebel, E. (forthcoming). Describing inner experience? Proponent meets skeptic. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, http://www.faculty.ucr.edu/~eschwitz/SchwitzAbs/DescExp.htm.
7. Nagel, T. (1974). What is it like to be a bat? Philosophical Review, 63, 435-450.
8. Rorty, R. (1970). Incorrigibility as the mark of the mental. Journal of Philosophy, 67, 399-424.
9. Schwitzgebel, E. (2002). How well do we know our own conscious experience? The case of visual imagery. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9(5-6), 35-53.
10. Schwitzgebel, E. (2004). Introspective training apprehensively defended: Reflections on Titchener's lab manual. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 11(7-8), 58-76.
11. Schwitzgebel, E. (in preparation). The unreliability of naive introspection. http://www.faculty.ucr.edu/~eschwitz/SchwitzAbs/Naive.htm.
12. Schwitzgebel, E., & Gordon, M. S. (2000). How well do we know our own conscious experience? The case of human echolocation. Philosophical Topics, 28, 235-246.