Incorporating organizational factors into probabilistic safety assessment of nuclear power plants through canonical probabilistic models

Reliability Engineering and System Safety

Volumn 92, Issue 8, 2007, Pages 1131-1138

  Galan S F ^a   Mosleh, A ^b   Izquierdo, J M ^c  

^a UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL DE EDUCACIÓN A DISTANCIA   (Spain)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

^c Presidenta de la Comisión Nacional de Radiofísica Vocal del Comité Asesor del Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear Expresidenta de la Sociedad Española de Protección Radiológica   (Spain)

Author keywords

factor approach; Bayesian networks; Canonical probabilistic models; Organizational factors; Probabilistic safety assessment

Indexed keywords

GRAPH THEORY; LOGIC GATES; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; PROBABILISTIC LOGICS; PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS; SAFETY FACTOR;

BAYESIAN NETWORKS; CANONICAL PROBABILISTIC MODELS; ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS; PROBABILISTIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT;

NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS;

EID: 33847367013     PISSN: 09518320     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ress.2006.07.006     Document Type: Article

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