Proportionality and remedies in WTO disputes

European Journal of International Law

Volumn 17, Issue 5, 2006, Pages 985-1008

  Mitchell, Andrew D ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 33847351213     PISSN: 09385428     EISSN: 14643596     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/ejil/chl034     Document Type: Article

References (195)

1. Cannizzaro. 'The Role of Proportionality in the Law of International Countermeasures'. 12 EJIL (2001) 889, at 906.
2. W. Trumble and A. Stevenson (eds.). Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles (5th edn. 2002). ii, at 2371.
3. P. Nygh and P. Butt (eds). Australian Legal Dictionary (1997). at 941.
4. Kirk. 'Constitutional Guarantees. Characterization and the Concept of Proportionality'. 21 Melbourne U. Law Rev. (1997) 1, at 2.
5. For different views on this question. see the sources cited in Gardam. 'Proportionality as a Restraint on the Use of Force'. 20 Australian Yearbook Int'l Law (1999) 161, at 161.
6. On one view, the principle 'has found almost universal acceptance in some way or another in domestic legal orders': Delbrück. 'Proportionality'. in R. Bernhardt (ed.). Encyclopaedia of Public International Law (2003). iii. 1140, at 1141,
7. On this question. see Grieg. 'Reciprocity. Proportionality, and the Law of Treaties'. 34 Virginia J. Int'l Law (1994) 295, at 322-324.
8. Again, on one view, 'the widespread acceptance of the principle in various areas of international law and its fundamental importance for the international law-applying process suggests that proportionality can already be characterized as a general principle of international law': Delbrück. supra note 5, at 1144.
9. See. e.q., de Búra 'Subsidiarity and Proportionality as General Principles of Law', in J. Nergelius and U. Bernitz (eds). The General Principles of EC Law (2000), at 97
10. Bermann. 'The Principle of Proportionality', 26 American J. Comp. Law Supp. (1977-1978) 415.
11. See. e.g., Park. 'Korean Principle of Proportionality, American Multi-leveled Scrutiny. and Empiricist Elements in US-Korean Constitutional Jurisprudence'. 1 J. Korean Law (2001) 105, at 109-110
12. Kirk, 'Constitutional Guarantees. Characterization and the Concept of Proportionality', 21 Melbourne U. Law Rev. (1997) 1, at 5-9.
13. See. e.g,. UN. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. GA Res 21 7A(III) (10 Dec. 1948). Art. 29(2)
14. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 999 UNTS 171 (adopted 16 Dec. 1966). Arts 21. 22(1).
15. See. e.g., TBT, Agreement. Arts 2.4. 5A; SPS Agreement. Art. 2.4: GATT 1994. Art. XX: Sykes. 'The Least Restrictive Means'. 70 U. Chicago Law Rev. (2003) 403
16. Neumann and Türk. 'Necessity Revisited: Proportionality in World Trade Organization Law After Korea-Beef. EC-Asbestos and EC-Sardines'. 37 J. World Trade (2003) 199.
17. Hilf, 'Power, Rules and Principles - Which Orientation for WTO/GATT Law?'. 4 J. Int'l Econ. Law (2001) 111, at 120-121 (footnote omitted).
18. Desmedt. 'Proportionality in WTO Law', 4 J. Int'l Econ. Law (2001) 441, at 442-443.
19. Prosecutor v. Blaskic (IT-95-14) International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Judgment of 3 Mar. 2000, at para. 796.
20. K. Hall (ed.). Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States (1992), at 247.
21. Solem v. Helm, 454 US 277, at 284-286 (198 3) (majority: Powell J. joined by Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens JJ) (footnote omitted).
22. Ewing v. California, 538 US 11, at 33 (2003) (Stevens J. joined by Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer JJ)
23. (quoting Solem v. Helm. supra note 15).
24. See. e.g,. Coker v. Georgia. 433 US 584, at 592 (1977) (plurality: White J. joined by Stewart, Blackmun, and Stevens JJ)
25. Enmund v. Florida. 458 US 782, at 797-798 (1982) (majority: White J. joined by Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens JJ).
26. See, e.g,. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 US 957, at 994 (1991) (Scalia J. concurring in the judgment, joined by Rehnquist CJ):
27. Ewing v. California, supra note 16 (Thomas J. concurring in the judgment).
28. Ibid., at 35 (Stevens J. joined by Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer JJ) (stating that 'a broad and basic proportionality principle' applies, rather than a narrow proportionality principle as held by a plurality of the Court in that case).
29. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 US 63, at 72 (2003) (majority: O'Connor J, joined by Rehnquist CJ, and Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas JJ).
30. See also Harmelin v. Michigan, supra note 18, at 1001 (Kennedy J. joined by O'Connor and Souter JJ):
31. Ewing v. California, supra note 16, at 23-24 (plurality: O'Connor J. joined by Rehnquist CJ and Kennedy J):
32. Pater, 'Struck out Looking: Continued Confusion in Eighth Amendment Proportionality Review after Ewing v California, 123 S. Ct, 1179 (2003)', 27 Harvard J. Law & Public Policy (2003-2004) 399.
33. Lockyer v. Andrade, supra note 20, at 73 (majority: O'Connor J. joined by Rehnquist CJ, and Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas JJ).
34. Ewing v. California, supra note 16, at 20 (plurality: O'Connor J. joined by Rehnquist CJ and Kennedy J.)
35. Solem v. Helm, supra note 15, at 290 (majority: Powell J, joined by Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens JJ).
36. See also Harmelin v. Michigan, supra note 18, at 1001 (Kennedy J, joined by O'Connor and Souter JJ) (referring to the 'primacy of the legislature').
37. Ibid., at 1001 (Kennedy J, joined by O'Connor and Souter JJ).
38. Solem v. Helm, supra note 15, at 292 (majority: Powell J. joined by Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens JJ).
39. Hoare v. The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 348, at para. [7] (see also para. [20]).
40. Bugmy v. The Queen (1990) 169 CLR 525, at para. [24] (Mason CJ and McHugh J. dissenting); see also [7] (majority: Dawson, Toohey, and Gaudron JJ).
41. See generally Fox, 'The Meaning of Proportionality in Sentencing', 19 Melbourne U. Law Rev. (1994) 489.
42. Bugmy v. The Queen, supra note 27, at para. [13] (majority: Dawson, Toohey, and Gaudron JJ); at para. [20] (Mason CJ and McHugh J, dissenting).
43. See also The Queen v. Shrestha (1991) 173 CLR 48:
44. ALR 757, at 768 (Brennan and McHugh JJ, dissenting).
45. Bugmy v. The Queen, supra note 27, at para. [12] (majority: Dawson, Toohey, and Gaudron JJ).
46. The Queen v. Shrestha, supra note 29; at 772 (ALR) (Deane, Dawson, and Toohey JJ).
47. Bugmy v. The Queen, supra note 27, at para. [23] (Mason CJ and McHugh J, dissenting); see also at para. [9] (majority: Dawson, Toohey, and Gaudron JJ).
48. B. Garner (ed.), Black's Law Dictionary (7th edn., 1999), at 1318.
49. Ewing v. California, supra note 16, at 31-32 (Scalia J, concurring in the judgment).
50. Alexander, 'The Philosophy of Criminal Law', in J. Coleman and S. Shapiro (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence & Philosophy of Law (2002), at 815, 816.
51. Von Hirsch, 'Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment', 16 Crime & Justice (1992) 55, at 56.
52. Alexander, supra note 35, at 818
53. Von Hirsch, supra note 36, at 76-77.
54. Von Hirsch, supra note 36, at 81.
55. See generally ibid.
56. Walker, 'Legislating the Transcendental: Von Hirsch's Proportionality', 51 Cambridge Law J. (1992) 530.
57. M. Cohen, Reason and Law (1961), at 53.
58. Official Records of the General Assembly, 56th session, Supplement No. 10, UN DOC.A/56/10, Ch. V.
59. See, e.g., White and Abass, 'Countermeasures and Sanctions', in M. Evans, International Law (2003), at 505, 507 (referring to 'the codification of countermeasures by the International Law Commission').
60. J. Crawford, The International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries (2002), at 294.
61. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, at para. 249 (referring to 'proportionate counter-measures').
62. See, e.g., 'Naulilaa' (Responsibility of Germany for damage caused in the Portuguese colonies in the south of Africa) (1928) II Reports of International Arbitral Awards 1013
63. Air Services Agreement of 27 March 1946 (United States v. France) (1978) XVIII Reports of International Arbitral Awards 417
64. (cited in Crawford, supra note 43, at 294).
65. Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) [1997] ICJ Rep 7, at para. 85.
66. ILC Arts, UN, Report of the International Law Commission, A/56/10 SUPP (1 Oct. 2001), Art 30.
67. Reparation may take the form of restitution, compensation, or satisfaction, which themselves incorporate a requirement of proportionality: Ibid., Arts 31, 34-37.
68. Crawford, supra note 43, at 296. Here, Crawford seems to assume that a countermeasure that is disproportionate to the injury suffered, within the meaning of Art. 51, will also be disproportionate to the need to induce compliance, within the meaning of Art. 49. See also at 284 ('[c]ountermeasures are not intended as a form of punishment for wrongful conduct but as an instrument for achieving compliance with the obligations of the responsible State under Part Two').
69. White and Abass, supra note 42, at 513 ('there appears to be a contradiction in the approach of the ILC. The issue ought not to be one of proportionality to the injury caused, because this would suggest that countermeasures are taken to punish the responsible State').
70. Cannizzaro, supra note 1, at 894.
71. See ibid., at 892, 905
72. von Hirsch, supra note 36, at 63-64.
73. ILC Arts, supra note 47, Art 51.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid., Art 49(2).
76. Ibid., Arts 22, 50(1)(a).
77. Mitchell, 'Does One Illegality Merit Another? The Law of Belligerent Reprisals in International Law', 170 Military Law Rev. (2001) 155, at 158.
78. Ibid., at 160-161.
79. On proportionality in the laws of war, see also Fenrick, 'The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol in Conventional Warfare', 98 Military Law Rev. (1982) 91
80. Gardam, supra note 5.
81. See generally Jürgensen, 'Crime and Punishment: Retaliation under the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement System', 39 J. World Trade (2005) 327.
82. DSU, Art. 3.7.
83. Ibid.
84. See also Art. 22.1. Suspension of concessions was also provided as a last resort under GATT 1947 (Art. XXIII:2).
85. DSU, Art. 22.6.
86. Ibid., Art. 22.3(c).
87. See also Panel Report, US - Certain EC Products, WT/DS165/R + Add (adopted 10 Jan. 2001), DSR 2001:I, 313, at para. 6.8 7 (issue not appealed - Appellate Body Report, US - Certain EC Products, WT/DS165/AB/ R, adopted 10 Jan. 2001, DSR 2001:II, 413, at para. 117).
88. Fox, 'The Meaning of Proportionality in Sentencing', 19 Melbourne U. Law Rev. (1994) 489, at 490
89. Garner (ed), supra note 33, at 924.
90. Two unusual features of the WTO dispute settlement system are that the injury is measured only from the expiry of the reasonable period of time and not retrospectively from the time when the inconsistency began, and that the penalty imposed on the Member acting inconsistently may also harm the complaining Member. For further discussion of these and related problems with the compliance mechanism. see generally Horlick. 'Problems with the Compliance Structure of the WTO Dispute Resolution Process', in D. Kennedy and J. Southwick. The Political Economy of International Trade Law: Essays in Honor of Robert E. Hudec (2002). at 636
91. Charnovitz. 'Should the Teeth be Pulled? An Analysis of WTO Sanctions'. in ibid., at 602, 619-627
92. Anderson, 'Peculiarities of Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement'. 1 World Trade Rev. (2002) 123.
93. DSU, Art. 1.2 and App. 2.
94. SCM Agreement. Arts 7.9-7.10.
95. Ibid., Art. 4.10.
96. Ibid., Art. 4.11.
97. GATT 1994. Art. VI. The normal value of a dumped product is 'the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product when destined for consumption in the exporting country': Anti-Dumping Agreement, Art. 2.1.
98. SCM Agreement. Art. 5.
99. Anti-Dumping Agreement. Art. 9.
100. SCM Agreement. Art. 19.
101. See also GATT 1994, Art. VI:2. The margin of dumping is the difference between the normal value and the export price of the product.
102. See also ibid.. Art. VI:3.
103. Anti-Dumping Agreement. Art. 9.1: SCM Agreement. Art. 19.2.
104. The precision of this exercise may be diminished in certain circumstances, for example where the investigation authorities limit their examination because the number of exporters, producers, importers, or types of products is so large as to render impractical a determination of individual dumping margins: Anti-Dumping Agreement. Arts 6.10.9.4.
105. Agreement on Safeguards, Art. 2.1.
106. The Appellate Body has recognized this distinction between safeguards, on the one hand, and anti-dumping or countervailing measures, on the other hand. See. e.g.. Appellate Body Report. Argentina - Footwear (EC). WT/DS121/AB/R, adopted 12 Jan. 2000. DSR 2000:I, 515, at para. 94.
107. Agreement on Safeguards. Art. 2.2. Some uncertainty surrounds the application of safeguards to products from partners from a regional trade agreement falling within Art. XXIV of GATT 1994, supra note 10.
108. See generally Pauwelyn. 'The Puzzle of WTO Safeguards and Regional Trade Agreements'. 7 J. Int'l Econ. Law (2004) 109
109. Lockhart and Mitchell, 'Regional Trade Agreements Under GATT 1994: An Exception and Its Limits', in A. Mitchell (ed.). Challenges and Prospects for the WTO (2005), at 217.
110. Agreement on Safeguards. Art. 5.1. See also Art. 7.1. In addition. Art. 8.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards requires a Member proposing to apply a safeguard to 'endeavour to maintain a substantially equivalent level of concessions and other obligations to that existing under GATT 1994 between it and the exporting Members which would be affected by such a measure'.
111. The Agreement on Safeguards. provides for an additional unilateral remedy when the Member applying a safeguard is unable to agree with other Members on how to achieve a 'substantially equivalent level of concessions and other obligations' as specified in Art. 8.1. Specifically. upon satisfaction of certain conditions.'the affected exporting Members shall be free ... to suspend ... the application of substantially equivalent concessions or other obligations under GATT 1994, to the trade of the Member applying the safeguard measure': Ibid., Art. 8.2. Again, the requirement of equivalence introduces the notion of proportionality. but this kind of unilateral remedy does not involve a response to unlawful or undesirable conduct, assuming that the safeguard was imposed in a manner consistent with the Agreement on Safeguards. Accordingly. I do not regard ibid., Art. 8 as incorporating the principle of proportionality in the sense described in this article.
112. Decision by the Arbitrators. EC - Bananas III (US) (Art. 22.6 - EC). at para. 6.3.
113. See also Decision by the Arbitrators. Brazil - Aircraft (Art. 22.6 - Brazil), at para. 3.55
114. Decision by the Arbitrators. EC - Hormones (US) (Art. 22.6 - EC). at para. 40
115. Decision by the Arbitrators. US- 1916 Act (Art. 22.6 - US), at paras 5.5-5.8
116. Decision by the Arbitrators. EC - Bananas III (Ecuador) (Art. 22.6 - EC), at para. 76.
117. However, in Decision by the Arbitrators. US - Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Brazil) (Art. 22.6 - US). at paras 3.73-3.74, 6.2-6.4, the arbitrators suggested that inducing compliance is simply one of several possible purposes.
118. Appellate Body Report. US - Cotton Yarn, WT/DS192/AB/R, adopted 5 Nov 2001. DSR 2001:XII. 6027, at para. 120 and n. 92
119. Appellate Body Report. US - Line Pipe. WT?DS202/AB/R, adopted 8 Mar. 2002, DSR 2002:IV, 1403, at n. 252.
120. See also Pauwelyn. 'Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules are Rules - Toward a More Collective Approach', 94 AJIL (2000) 335, at 343.
121. Palmeter and Alexandrov. '"Inducing Compliance" in WTO Dispute Settlement', in Kennedy and Southwick, supra note 65, at 646, 647.
122. Charnovitz, supra note 65, at 611.
123. Palmeter and Alexandrov disagree: See supra note 85, at 650.
124. Charnovitz, supra note 64, at 614
125. Pauwelyn, supra note 83, at 343-344.
126. EC- Bananas III (US) (Art. 22.6 - EC), supra note 83, at para. 6.16.
127. Ibid., at para, 6.15.
128. Ibid., at paras 6.15-6.16 (emphasis omitted).
129. Ibid., at para. 6.12.
130. Ibid., at para. 6.14.
131. Ibid., at para. 6.16.
132. See, e.g., US - Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Brazil) (Art. 22.6-US), supra note 83, at paras 3.20-3.23. 3.30, 3.32, 3.54.
133. See, e.g., ibid., at paras. 3.21, 3.23, 3.34, 3.55.
134. Panel Report, US Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), WT/DS217/R, WT/DS234/R. adopted 27 Jan. 2003, at para. 8.1:
135. Appellate Body Report. US - Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), WT/DS217/AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R. adopted 27 Jan. 2003, at para. 318 (a), (b).
136. See. e.g., US - Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Brazil) (Art.22.6 - US), supra note 83, at paras 3.10, 3.16, 3.56.
137. See Mavroidis, 'Remedies in the WTO Legal System: Between a Rock and a Hard Place', 11 FJIL (2000) 763, at 773, 800-801, 807.
138. See Pauwelyn, supra note 84. at n. 46.
139. Anti-Dumping Agreement. Art. 9.1
140. SCM Agreement. Art. 19.2.
141. Ibid., Art. 7.9.
142. Ibid., Art. 5.
143. Ibid., Art. 7.9.
144. DSU, Art. 22.4.
145. SCM Agreement. Art. 7.10.
146. Brazil - Aircraft (Art. 22.6 - Brazil), supra note 83, at para. 3.51.
147. Decision by the Arbitrators, US - FSC (Art. 22.6 - US), at para. 5.6.
148. Brazil - Aircraft (Art. 22.6 - Brazil), supra note 83, at para, 3.51
149. US - FSC (Art. 22.6 - US). supra note 107, at para. 5.23.
150. Renouf, 'A Brief Introduction to Countermeasures in the WTO Dispute Settlement System', in R. Yerxa and B. Wilson (eds). Key Issues in WTO Dispute Settlement: The First Ten Years (forthcoming 2005), at 75, 80.
151. US - FSC (Art. 22.6 - US), supra note 107, at para. 5.39.
152. Ibid., at paras 5.41, 5.49, 5.61.
153. Brazil - Aircraft (Art. 22.6 - Brazil), supra note 83, at para. 3.60
154. US - FSC (Art. 22.6 - US), supra note 107, at paras 6.10-6.11
155. Decision by the Arbitrators, Canada - Aircraft (Art. 22.6 - Canada), at para. 3.51.
156. See also Renouf, supra note 110, at 80.
157. US - FSC (Art. 22.6 - US), supra note 108, at para. 6.11.
158. Ibid., at paras 5.23, 6.10, 6.33-6.35.
159. Brazil - Aircraft (Art. 22.6 - Brazil), supra note 83, at para. 3.59
160. US - FSC (Art. 22.6 - US), supra note 108, at paras 6.27-6.28, 6.62.
161. Canada - Aircraft (Art. 22.6 - Canada), supra note 113, at para. 3.121.
162. Ibid., at para. 3.119.
163. Ibid., at para. 3.59
164. US - FSC (Art. 22.6 - US), supra note 108, at para. 5.57
165. Brazil - Aircraft (Art. 22.6-Brazil), supra note 83, at para. 3.44.
166. Palmeter and Alexandrov, supra note 85, at 653-654.
167. Appellate Body Report, Canada - Aircraft, WT/DS70/AB/RW, adopted 4 Aug. 2000, DSR 2000:IX, 4299, at paras 3.40-3.41.
168. Appellate Body Report. US - Cotton Yarn, supra note 84, at paras 120-122
169. Appellate Body Report. US - Line Pipe, supra note 84, at para. 2.59.
170. US - Cotton Yarn, supra note 122, at n. 90.
171. US - Line Pipe, supra note 84, at para. 2.59 and n. 2.56
172. (citing Nicaragua v. United States of America, supra note 44, at para. 249
173. and Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 46, at 220).
174. US - Line Pipe, supra note 84, at para, 259 and n 257
175. (referring to the Arbitral Tribunal established by the Compromise of 11 July 1978 in the Air Services Agreemet of 27 March 1946 (United States v. France), supra note 45).
176. ATC, art 6.1.
177. This agreement was terminated, in accordance with its Art. 9. on 1 Jan. 2005.
178. Ibid., Art. 6.2.
179. US - Cotton Yarn, supra note 84, at para. 119.
180. Ibid., at para. 120.
181. Ibid., at para. 120.
182. Ibid., at para. 122.
183. US - Line Pipe, supra note 84, at para. 237.
184. Ibid., at para. 241 (emphasis omitted).
185. Ibid., at para. 252.
186. Ibid., at paras 254-257.
187. Ibid., at para. 257.
188. Ibid., at para. 260.
189. Art. 9.4 of the SCM Agreement also refers to countermeasures in connection with 'non-actionable subsidies'. Art. 9.4 (and the category of non-actionable subsidies in Part IV of the SCM Agreement) expired at the end of 1999 in accordance with Art. 31 of the SCM Agreement.
190. Agreement on Safeguards, Art. 2.1.
191. Ibid., Art. 2.2.
192. US- Line Pipe, supra note 84, at para. 241 (emphasis omitted).
193. The Appellate Body does not appear to account for the words 'to facilitate adjustment' in its reading of Art. 5.1 in ibid., at para. 260.
194. Ibid., at para. 252.
195. See WT/DSB/M/121, Minutes of the DSB meeting held on 8 Mar. 2002, at para. 35.