Institutionalizing Brahimi's "light footprint": A comment on the role and mandate of the peacebuilding commission

International Organizations Law Review

Volumn 2, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 403-415

  Stahn, Carsten ^a,b  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b LEIDEN UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33847345191     PISSN: 15723739     EISSN: 15718069     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1163/157237405775093753     Document Type: Note

References (42)

1. See United Nations, Explanatory Note of the Secretary-General: Peacebuilding Com mission, April 17, 2005 ("I am gratifed by the very broad support that this proposal has received among Member States").
2. General Assembly, Draft resolution referred to the High-level Plenary Meeting of the ra Assembly, 14-16 September 2005, 2005 World Summit Outcome, UN. Doc. A./60/L.1 of 15 September 2005, paras. 97-105.
3. See United Nations, Explanatory Note of the Secretary-General: Peacebuilding Com mission, April 17, 2005.
4. See Steven Ratner & David Helman, Saving Failed States, Foreign Policy, Vol. 89 (1992), 3.
5. For a recent discussion, see Saira Mohamed, From Keeping Peace to Building Peace: A Proposal for a Revitalized United Nations Trusteeship Council, Columbia Law Review, Vol. 105 (2005), 809-840. (Pubitemid 40652946)
6. See generally Edward Mortimer, International Administration of War-Torn Societies, Global Governance, Vol. 10 (2004), 7, at 12-14.
7. See Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN.Doc. A/55/305, S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, para. 78.
8. See Advisory Council on International Affairs & Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law, Failing States: A Global Responsibility, No. 35 May 2004, at 82.
9. See Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A more secure world: our shared responsibility, UN. Doc. A/59/565 of 2 December 2004, para. 261.
10. See also Frederic L. Kirgis, International Law and the Report of the High-Level U.N. Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, ASIL Insight, December 2004.
11. See Article 2 (7), second sentence.
12. See Secretary-General, In larger freedom: Towards development, security and human rights for all, UN. Doc. A/59/2005, 21 March 2005.
13. For an explanation, see Explanatory Note of the Secretary-General: Peacebuilding Commission, April 17, 2005
14. ("My own proposal modifed that of the High-level Panel, based on reactions from States, particularly in terms of the appropriate role for the Economic and Social Council in addition to that of the Security Council, and the inappropriateness of the Peacebuilding Commission taking on an early warning function")
15. and sub v. ("There are other mechanisms in the United Nations for what has become known as 'operational prevention', i.e. the use of tools such as mediation and preventive peacekeeping, when confict has become imminent or has broken out in a small-scale way. These are necessary parts of the United Nations and regional organizations' capacity, and should continue to be strenghtened").
16. For a survey of the different positions taken in the process of negotiation, see the Danish "Discussion paper for the open debate on Post-Confict Peacebuilding on May 26, 2005 (fle on copy with the author).
17. See para. 97 of the Outcome Document.
18. See U.N. Looks to Move from Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding, 9 September 2005, where it is reported the U.S. demanded that the Commission be placed under the authority of the Security Council, while other countries favoured an institutional link to the General Assembly (eg. India, Iran and Malaysia) or to the Economic and Social Council (Uganda).
19. See para. 99 of the Outcome Document ("The Peacebuilding Commission should submit an annual report to the General Assembly").
20. See generally Ralph Wilde, Representing International Territorial Administration, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 15 (2004), 71, at 94-95.
21. See Outcome Document, para. 176.
22. This approach is refected in the Explanatory Note of the Secretary-General, where it is expressly noted that "[t]he institutional structure of the Peacebuilding Commission should not alter the formal prerogatives of the principal organs of the United Nations".
23. See Explanatory Note, sub. VI.
24. For a survey, see Carsten Stahn, Governance Beyond the State: Issues of Legitimacy in International Territorial Administration, International Organizations Law Review, Vol. 2, 9-56.
25. See the Report, A comprehensive strategy to eliminate future sexual exploitation and abuse in United Nations peacekeeping operations, 24 March 2005, UN.Doc. A/59/710, para. 90
26. ("[A] serious effort is needed to address these shortcomings in accountability because the Charter envisaged that immunity would be functional, and crimes of sexual exploitation and abuse are not within the functions of any staff member or exppert on mission").
27. An analogy might be drawn to the UN Sanctiion Committees.
28. See also the Danish Discussion paper fort he open debate on Post-Confict Peacebuilding on May 26, 2005.
29. See Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, December 2001, at 13.
30. See Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A more secure world: our shared responsibility, paras. 201-203
31. See Report of the Secretary-General, In larger freedom, para. 135.
32. See para. 139 of the Outcome Document.
33. See generally Secretary-General, No exit without strategy: Security Council decision-making and the closure or transition of United Nations peacekeeping operations, UN. Doc. S/2001/394 20 (April 2001).
34. See also Explanatory Note of the Secretary-General, sub. IV.
35. See generally Simon Chesterman, Walking Softly in Afghanistan: the Future of UN State-Building, Survival, Vol. 44, No. 3 (2002), at 40.
36. See Secretary-General, The rule of law and transitional justice in confict and post-confict societies, UN. Doc. S/2004/616, 3 August 2004, para. 17.
37. See paras. 100 and 101 of the Outcome Document.
38. See Revised draft outcome document of the High-level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly of September 2005 submitted by the President of the General Assembly, 5 August 2005, Doc. A/59/HLPM/CRP.1/Rev.2.
39. See para. 99 of the Outcome Document.
40. See para. 100 of the Outcome Document.
41. For a survey, see Antony Anghie, Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions: Sovereignty, Economy and the Mandate System of the League of Nations, NYU Journal of International Law & Politics, Vol. 34 (2002), 513, at 604-608.
42. Emphasis added.