Do government suppress growth? Institutions, rent-seeking, and innovation blocking in a model of Schumpeterian growth

Economics and Politics

Volumn 19, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 35-52

  Chaudhry, Azam ^a   Garner, Phillip ^b  

^a LAHORE SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Pakistan)

^b BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC GROWTH; ECONOMIC POLICY; INNOVATION; INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK; MODEL; POLITICAL ECONOMY; RENT SEEKING;

EID: 33847267702     PISSN: 09541985     EISSN: 14680343     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.2007.00301.x     Document Type: Article

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