The Will and Authority of the Security Council after Iraq

Leiden Journal of International Law

Volumn 17, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 645-672

  White, Nigel D ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

interpretation; legal personality; permanent membership; resolutions; Security Council functions; threat or use of force; veto

Indexed keywords

EID: 33846967740     PISSN: 09221565     EISSN: 14789698     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0922156504002171     Document Type: Article

References (139)

1. Inis Claude, ‘The Security Council’, in E. Luard (ed.), The Evolution of International Organizations (1966), 68, at 88.
2. Inis Claude., 83.
3. Inis Claude., 88.
4. E.g. W. M. Reisman, ‘Coercion and Self-determination: Construing Article 2(4)’, (1984) 78 AJIL 642; A. C. Arend and R. J. Beck, International Law and the Use of Force (1993), 179.
5. Claude, ‘Coercion and Self-determination: Construing Article 2(4)’ note 1, at 84. See, e.g., D. D. Caron, ‘The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council’, (1993) 87 AJIL 552, at 561; S. D. Murphy, ‘The Security Council, Legitimacy, and the Concept of Collective Security after the Cold War’, (1994) 32 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 201, at 209.
6. S. C. Schlesinger, Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations (2003), 193-207.
7. I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (2003), 706.
8. Principles of Public International Law., 714. See also I. Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (1963), vii.
9. From a speech given at the University of Edinburgh, Independent, 25 Feb. 2004, 29.
10. D. J. Bederman, ‘The Souls of International Organizations: Legal Personality and the Lighthouse at Cape Spartel’, (1996) 36 Virginia Journal of International Law 275, at 357.
11. H. Schermers and N. M. Blokker, International Institutional Law (2003), 34.
12. States are often resistant to the latter view. See the criticism by the UK minister on the draft EU Constitution: ‘It is not the constitution that grants competences, but the member states, through the constitution’. R.Watson, ‘Giscard's Plan for Europe Swamped by Amendments’, The Times, 25 Feb. 2003, 16.
13. C. F. Amerasinghe, Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations (1996), 89-90; J. Klabbers, ‘Presumptive Personality: The European Union in International Law’, inM. Koskenniemi (ed.), International Legal Aspects of the European Union (1998), 243-9.
14. Brownlie, Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations note 7, at 649. See further Amerasinghe, Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations note 13, at 83; R. Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (1994), 47.
15. R. A.Wessel, ‘Revisiting the International Legal Status of the EU’, (2000) 5 European Foreign Affairs Review 507, at 517.
16. For discussion of capacities and competences see P. H. F. Bekker, The Legal Position of Intergovernmental Organizations (1994), 51-85.
17. Wessel, The Legal Position of Intergovernmental Organizations note 15, 517.
18. N. M. Blokker, ‘Proliferation of International Organizations: An Exploratory Introduction’, in N.M. Blokker and H. G. Schermers (eds.), Proliferation of International Organizations: Legal Issues (2001), 1, at 6.
19. UN Charter, Art. 27.
20. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, [1949] ICJ Rep. 174, at 179.
21. SC Res. 1373, 28 Sept. 2001.
22. Brownlie, SC Res. 1373 note 8, 332-3; D. Sarooshi, The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security (1999), 26-32.
23. See ‘Declaration by the United Nations’, 1 Jan. 1942, in R. B. Russell and J. M. Muther, A History of the United Nations Charter (1958), Appendix C.
24. See N. D.White, ‘The Legality of Bombing in the Name of Humanity’, (2000) 5 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 27.
25. C. Greenwood, ‘International Law and the Pre-emptive Use of Force: Afghanistan, Al-Qaida, and Iraq’, (2003) 4 San Diego International Law Journal 7, at 36.
26. SC Res. 1483, 22May 2003; SC Res. 1511, 16 Oct. 2003; SC Res. 1546, 8 June 2004.
27. P.-M. Dupuy, ‘The Constitutional Dimension of the Charter of the United Nations Revisited’, (1997) 1 Max Planck Yearbook of UN Law 20.
28. UNCIO, vol. 13, 709.
29. T. M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (1995), 26.
30. Murphy, Fairness in International Law and Institutions note 5, at 209.
31. See, e.g., J. E. Alvarez, ‘Judging the Security Council’, (1996) 90 AJIL 1.
32. SC Res. 748, 31March 1992.
33. See discussion of the inconclusive Lockerbie cases in N.D.White, ‘To Review or Not To Review: The Lockerbie Cases before the World Court’, (1999) 12 LJIL 401. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahirya v. United Kingdom), Provisional Measures, [1992] ICJ Rep. 3; Preliminary Objections, [1998] ICJ Rep. 26.
34. R. Cryer and N. D. White, ‘The Security Council and the International Criminal Court: Who's Feeling Threatened?’, (2002) 8 International Peacekeeping: The Yearbook of International Peace Operations 143.
35. Tadić case, No. IT-94-1-AR72, paras. 35-36.
36. M. J.Matheson, ‘United Nations Governance in Postconflict Societies’, (2001) 95 AJIL 76.
37. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa inNamibiaNotwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, [1971] ICJ Rep. 16, at para. 20.
38. Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, [1948] ICJ Rep. 57, at 64.
39. SC Res. 1373, 28 Sept. 2001.
40. What has been described as the erosion of ‘the receptivity of members to the views of the Council’-S. R. Ratner, ‘The Security Council and International Law’, in D. M. Malone (ed.), The UN Security Council (2004), 591, at 603.
41. C. A.Ward, ‘Building Capacity to Combat International Terrorism: The Role of the United Nations Security Council’, (2003) 8 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 289, at 299.
42. E. deWet, The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council (2004), 382.
43. SC 4568thmtg, 10 July 2002.
44. Cryer and White, SC 4568thmtg note 35, at 159-60.
45. SC Res. 1483, 22May 2003.
46. On the effect of Resolution 1483 on the law of occupation see D. Scheffer, ‘Beyond Occupation Law’, (2003) 97 AJIL 842.
47. SC Res.1483,22May2003.SeeSC4761stmtg,22May2003.OnlyGermanyspokeofa'democratic'government.
48. N. D. White, ‘The United Nations and Democracy Assistance: Developing Practice within a Constitutional Framework’, in P. Burnell (ed.), Democracy Assistance: International Co-operation for Democratization (2000), 67.
49. I. Johnstone, ‘Security Council Deliberations: The Power of Better Argument’, (2003) 14 EJIL 437, at 444.
50. See further A. Orakhelashvili, ‘The Post War Settlement in Iraq: The UN Security Council Resolution 1483 (2003) and General International Law’, (2003) 8 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 307, at 312-13 for the view that the peremptory norm of self-determination also requires that the resolution be interpreted in this way.
51. SC Res. 1511, 16 Oct. 2003. See also SC 4844thmtg, 16 Oct. 2003.
52. R. McCarthy, ‘US Must Quit Iraq before Vote, Say Sunnis’, Guardian Weekly, 29 Jan.-4 Feb. 2004. An interim Iraqi constitution was agreed by the Iraqi Governing Council on 8March 2004.
53. See J. I. Charney, ‘The Use of Force Against Terrorism and International Law’, (2001) 95 AJIL 835, at 835, questioning the claim of self-defence against Afghanistan. But see T. M. Franck, ‘Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defense’, (2001) 95 AJIL 839, at 840.
54. UN Doc. S/2003/351, 21March 2003.
55. SC Res. 1368, 12 Sept. 2001; SC Res. 1373, 28 Sept. 2001. But see E. P. J. Myjer and N. D. White, ‘The Twin Towers Attack: An Unlimited Right to Self-Defence?’, (2002) 7 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 5, at 9-11.
56. C. Gray, ‘From Unity to Polarization: International Law and the Use of Force Against Iraq’, (2002) 13 EJIL 1, at 8.
57. ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States of America’, Sept. 2002, available at http://www. whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf. See also the UK government's assessment of the threat posed by Iraq in ‘Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government’, 24 Sept. 2002, available at http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/iraqdosier.pdf.
58. M. Byers, ‘The Shifting Foundations of International Law:A Decade of Forceful Measures against Iraq’, (2002) 13 EJIL 21, at 25.
59. A. Aust,Modern Treaty Law and Practice (2000), 185.
60. See I. Johnstone, ‘Treaty Interpretation: The Authority of Interpretative Communities’, (1991) 12 Michigan Journal of International Law 371, at 381, where he characterizes the interpretative process as ‘intersubjective interpretation’.
61. S. Rosenne, Developments in the Law of Treaties (1989), 244.
62. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, [1962] ICJ Rep. 167-8.
63. Namibia case, supranote 38, at 53. See further M.C.Wood, ‘The Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions’, (1998) 2Max Planck Yearbook of UN Law 73, at 74-5, 79, 95.
64. Gray, Namibia case note 57, at 9.
65. Johnstone, Gray note 50, at 456.
66. SC 4644th mtg, 8 Nov. 2002. Other members spoke about the lack of the automatic right to use force in the resolution (Mexico, Russia, Bulgaria, Syria, Cameroon, China), labelled the ‘two-stage approach’ by France, and the clear assurances about the lack of basis in the resolution for the use of force (Ireland, Colombia); while Norway referred to the Council's responsibility recognized in the resolution to secure international peace. The sense of themeeting was best summed up by the representative of Ireland when he thanked the sponsors of the resolution (United States and United Kingdom) for their assurances that the purpose of the ‘resolution was to achieve disarmament through inspections, and not to establish the basis for the use of force’.
67. Outside the Security Council Blair stated, ‘Defy the UN's will and we will disarm you by force. Be in no doubt whatever about that’. Bush stated, ‘The outcome of this crisis is already determined. The full disarmament of weapons of mass destruction will occur. The only question for the Iraqi regime is to decide how. His co-operation must be unconditional or he will face severest consequences’. Independent, 9 Nov. 2002, 1 and 5.
68. See, e.g., prior to the 1998 air strikes-The Times, 19 Feb. 1998.
69. See N. Grief, ‘The Iraq Hearing’, 19 Dec. 2002, www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/today/reports/archive/international/ iraq-hearing. shtml.
70. But see F. L. Kirgis, ‘Security Council Resolution 1441 on Iraq's Final Opportunity to Comply with Disarmament Obligations’, ASIL Insights (Nov. 2002).
71. See, e.g., SC Res. 1154, 2Mar. 1998; 1194, 9 Sept. 1998; 1205, 5 Nov. 1998.
72. J. Lobel and M. Ratner, ‘Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous Authorization to Use Force, Cease-fires and the Iraqi Inspection Regime’, (1999) 93 AJIL 124.
73. T. M. Franck, ‘What Happens Now? The United Nations After Iraq’, (2003) 97 AJIL 607, at 610-14.
74. A. Grice, ‘Defiant Blair Says UN Has No Veto on War’, Independent, 14 Jan. 2003, 1.
75. D. Usborne, J. Lichfield, P.Waugh, and A. Penketh, ‘Tony Blair, A Man with his Hands Full’, Independent, 8 Feb. 2003, 1.
76. S/PV 4692ndmtg, 27 Jan. 2003. Blix (UNMOVIC) concluded (p. 8) that there were serious gaps in knowledge about Iraq's chemical and bacteriological weapons programmes, and that Iraq was not fully co-operating. He noted that UNMOVIC capability had increased over a short period of time, inferring that more time was needed. El Baradei (IAEA) concluded by saying (p. 12) that ‘we have to date found no evidence that Iraq has revived its nuclear weapons programme since the elimination of the programme in 1990’, but that a more definite conclusion could be provided in the next few months if the inspection processwas allowed to continue.
77. S/PV 4708thmtg, 14 Feb. 2003.
78. UN Doc. S/2003/232. This report by UNMOVIC was critical of Iraq, stating that it should show greater credible evidence of disarmament. On 28 February Iraq started destroying missiles that exceeded the 150 km permitted range. Blix, UNMOVIC's chair, stated that this was a ‘very significant piece of real disarmament’-UN News Service, 28 Feb. 2003.
79. S/PV 4714th mtg, 7 March 2003. Blix referred to the destruction of missiles by saying, ‘we are not watching the breaking of toothpicks. Lethal weapons are being destroyed’.
80. S/PV 4708thmtg, 14 Feb. 2003, 21.
81. S. Castle, ‘France Set to Block Second UN Resolution against Iraq’, Independent, 18 Feb. 2003, 1.
82. Independent, 22 Feb. 2003, 4.
83. UN Doc. S/2003/215, 7March 2003.
84. See D. Usborne, ‘On the Brink of War’, Independent, 8March 2003, 1.
85. R. Cornwell, ‘The Quiet Man’, Independent, 8March 2003, 3.
86. UN Doc. S/2003/351, 21 March 2003. See further W. H. Taft and T. F. Buchwald, ‘Pre-emption, Iraq and International Law’, (2003) 97 AJIL 557.
87. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk politics/2857347.stm (also (2003) 52 ICLQ 819). See further C. Greenwood, UN Doc. S/2003/351 note 25, at 35-6.
88. S/PV 2963rdmtg, 29Nov. 1990, 78 (UK), 101 (US).The meeting at which SCRes. 687, 3April 1991, was adopted showed that member states viewed the authority to authorize further measures as belonging to the Council, not to those states acting under 678-S/PV 2981, 3 April 1991, 85 (US), 111 (UK), 95 (China), 98 (USSR).
89. The main issue in the United Kingdom is the suspect evidence presented to Parliament at various points before the outbreak of hostilities on 20March 2003 to the effect that Iraq could deployWMDwithin an hour of the order being given. A.McSmith, ‘The 45-minute Case Collapses’, Independent, 8 Feb. 2004, 1.
90. UN News Service, 10March 2003, available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/printnews.asp?nid=6399.
91. S/PV 4721 mtg, 19 March 2003. Statements by Germany, France, Russia, Syria, Pakistan, Mexico, Chile, Angola, China. See also open meeting of Security Council S/PV 4717, 12 March 2003, when representatives of 51 states spoke.
92. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle east/2867027.stm. The United States claimed that 30 countries were supporting the military action. ‘Under the standards used by the current Bush administration, the size of the 1991 coalition is likely to have been more than 100 countries’-E.MacAskill, ‘US Lists Coalition of the Willing’, Guardian Weekly, 27March-2 April 2003, 5. In fact 34 countries contributed militarily to the 1991 campaign,while four countries contributed to the 2003 campaign (United States-200,000 personnel;United Kingdom-45,000; Australia-200; Poland-200). In 1991 the US-led coalition acted under a UN resolution and had broad support not only inthe Security Council but also in theGeneral Assembly-seeGARes. 46/135, 17 Dec. 1991.
93. Byers, The United States claimed that 30 countries were supporting the military action note 59, at 27.
94. Wood, Byers note 64, at 77, 95. See also H. Thirlway, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice’ (1996) 67 BYBIL 29. But see C. Stahn, ‘Enforcement of the CollectiveWill After Iraq’, (2003) 97 AJIL 804, at 822, for the view that the Iraq crisiswas a challenge to ‘the old dogma that the Council alone is entitled to interpret and enforce its will’.
95. R. Sadurska, ‘Threats of Force’, (1988) 65 AJIL 239.
96. R. Cornwell, ‘US Hits Roadblock in Push toWar’, Independent, 4March 2003, 1.
97. N. D. White and R. Cryer, ‘Unilateral Enforcement of Resolution 687: A Threat too Far?’, (1999) 29 California Western International Law Journal 243, at 244-55.
98. Brownlie, ‘Unilateral Enforcement of Resolution 687: A Threat too Far?’ note 7, at 488.
99. BBC News, ‘Bush Urges Anti-Terror Allies to Act’, 6 Nov. 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/ americas/newsid_1642000/1642130.stm.
100. Brownlie, BBC News note 7, at 7-8.
101. T. M. Franck, ‘Who Killed Article 2(4) or: Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by States’ (1970) 64 AJIL 809.
102. GA Res. 2625, 24 Oct. 1970.
103. GA Res. 42/22, 18 Nov. 1987.
104. GARes. 56/151, 19 Dec. 2001, on the promotion of a democratic and equitable international order, adopted by a vote of 109 to 53 with 6 abstentions;GARes.56/152, 19 Dec. 2001, on respect for the purposes and principles contained in the Charter of the United Nations to achieve international co-operation in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms and in solving international problems of a humanitarian character, adopted by a vote of 100 to 54 with 15 abstentions.
105. Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America),Merits, [2003] ICJ Rep. paras. 46-78. See further the Separate Opinion of Judge Simma.
106. White and Cryer, Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America) note 101, at 281.
107. SC 4714 mtg, 7March 2003.
108. J. L. Brierly, ‘The Covenant and the Charter’ (1946) 23 BYBIL 83, at 92.
109. Grice, ‘The Covenant and the Charter’ note 76.
110. SC 4644thmtg, 8 Nov. 2002.
111. B. Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations (2002), 514.
112. UN Charter, Art. 27(3).
113. S. D. Bailey and S. Daws, The Procedure of the UN Security Council (1998), 250-6.
114. Russell andMuther, The Procedure of the UN Security Council note 23, at 766.
115. J.Muller (ed.), Reforming the United Nations: The Quiet Revolution (2001), 62-6, 144-55.
116. Bailey and Daws, Reforming the United Nations: The Quiet Revolution note 118, at 240-2.
117. UN Charter, Art. 108.
118. Simma, UN Charter note 116, at 514.
119. Muller, Simma note 120, at 65.
120. J. Stromseth, ‘Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention’, in J. F. Holzgrefe and R. O. Keohane (eds.), Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas (2003), 265.
121. Franck, ‘Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention’ note 29, at 51-3, 219-20.
122. Simma, Franck note 116, at 508.
123. Claude, Simma note 1, 71.
124. Simma, Claude note 116, at 514.
125. SC 3730thmtg, 10 Jan. 1997.
126. See draft resolution UN Doc. S/1999/210.
127. SC 3982ndmtg, 25 Feb. 1999.
128. SC 4568thmtg, 10 July 2002.
129. Achieved in SC Res. 1422, 12 July 2002.
130. SC 4947thmtg, 21 April 2004. UN Doc. S/2004/313, 21 April 2004.
131. See comments by United States and France in SC 4947th mtg, 21 April 2004. ‘UN Plan on Cyprus Unity Receives TwoMajor Setbacks’, International Herald Tribune, 23 April 2004, 3.
132. The exceptional subsidiary powers of theGeneral Assembly should not lightly be invoked inthese situations, but it is arguable that, in the case of the pernicious vetoes of the UN Preventive Force inMacedonia in 1999 by China and of the replacement for theUNForce in Cyprus by Russia in 2004, that competence should have been utilized, just as it was in 1956 to create first significant peacekeeping force in theMiddle East, following the French and British vetoes in the Council. The Assembly's power to mandate peacekeeping forces was recognized by the International Court in 1962-see Certain Expenses of the United Nations, [1962] ICJ Rep. 162.
133. But seeUS vetoes of drafts on aspects of the Palestinian issue-SC3765thmtg, 21March 1997; SC 4828thmtg, 16 Sept. 2003.
134. SC Res. 1484, 30May 2003.
135. Guardian Weekly, 12-18 June 2003, 4.
136. SC Res. 1529, 29 Feb. 2004.
137. SC Res. 1078, 9 Nov. 1996.
138. HC Deb., 6th Ser. 14 Nov. 1996, cols. 487-9 (Michael Portillo).
139. Ratner, HC Deb note 41, at 603.