The interpretation of schedules of commitments

Journal of World Trade

Volumn 41, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 1-52

  Van Damme, Isabelle ^a  

^a GONVILLE AND CAIUS COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

INTERNATIONAL LAW; INTERNATIONAL TRADE; TRADE AGREEMENT;

EID: 33846903863     PISSN: 10116702     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.54648/trad2007001     Document Type: Article

References (274)

1. The term "treaty language" is used as a generic term to describe all treaty provisions that are the subject of interpretation and meet the definition of Article 2(1)(a) VCLT, irrespective of the possible classification of the treaty, and particularities in the negotiation and conclusion of the treaty.
2. Appellate Body Report, EC - Computer Equipment, para. 84;
3. Appellate Body Report, EC - Poultry, para. 82;
4. Appellate Body Report, Canada - Milk Dairy, paras 131-133;
5. Appellate Body Report, Kornea - Beef, paras 96-97;
6. Appellate Body Report, US - Gambling Services, para. 160.
7. S. Rosenne, Is the Constitution of an International Organization an International Treaty? Reflections on the Codification of the Law of Treaties (Milan: Giuffrè, 1966), p. 29.
8. P.C. Mavroidis, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 80.
9. For a discussion of special and new ways of treaty-making in international, mostly environmental, law, see M. Fitzmaurice, Consent to Be Bound - Anything New under the Sun?, 74 Nord. J. Int'l L. (2005), pp. 483-508.
10. See Article XXVIII bis GATT 1994. For a detailed discussion of negotiations and renegotiations of schedules of commitments, see A. Hoda, Tariff Negotiations and Renegotiations under the GATT and the WTO - Procedures and Practices (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
11. Article XXVIIII:1 bis GATT 1994. See also B.M. Hoekman and M.M. Kostecki, The Political Economy of the World Trading System - The WTO and Beyond (2nd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 123.
12. Tokyo Round Decision on "Different and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries" ("Enabling Clause"), adopted 28 November 1979, BISD, 26th Supplement, p. 204.
13. Hoda, as note 6 above, pp. 48-50.
14. Ibid., pp. 49, 69-70.
15. Ibid., p. 49.
16. Ibid., p. 50.
17. Ibid., pp. 50-52.
18. Ibid., p. 52.
19. Ibid., p. 68.
20. GATT, BISD, 30th Supplement, 17-21 (decision of 12 July 1983).
21. WCO, at (visited 22 April 2006). The HS has multiple uses, including trade facilitation, internal taxation, statistical import and export data, quota controls, economic studies and analysis, ...
22. In contrast with, e.g., certain obligations in TRIPS and the TBT and SPS Agreements, which are possibly of a more law-making nature.
23. J. Pauwelyn, A Typology of Multilateral Treaty Obligations: Are WTO Obligations Bilateral or Collective in Nature?, 14 E.J.I.L. 5 (2003), p. 926.
24. Hoekman and Kostecki, as note 7 above, pp. 125-126.
25. For example, the current Doha Round negotiations are on the verge of a breakdown because WTO Members are not capable of finding a consensus on the modalities of the negotiations on tariff concessions, especially in the area of full modalities for farm subsidy and tariff cuts.
26. Note that Article XXVIII:2(a) his GATT 1994 talks of other "multilateral procedures".
27. Article XXVIII:3 bis GATT 1994 describes those other relevant circumstances as including "the fiscal, developmental, strategic and other needs of the contracting parties concerned". Ad Article XXVIII his GATT 1994 further clarifies that "reference to fiscal needs would include the revenues aspect of duties and particularly duties imposed primarily for revenue purpose, or dudes imposed on products which can be substituted for products subject to revenue dudes to prevent the avoidance of such duties".
28. Article XXI GATS deals with the modification and withdrawal of commitments in services schedules.
29. For a discussion, see H. Nottage and T. Sebastian, Giving Legal Effect to the Results of WTO Trade Negotiations: An Analysis of the Methods of Changing WTO Law, 9 J.I.E.L. 7 (2006, forthcoming).
30. Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules and Tariff Concessions, L/4962 (26 March 1980);
31. also Procedures for the Implementation of Article XXI of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (Modification of Schedules). S/L/80 (29 October 1999), para. 20.
32. See Nottage and Sebastian, as note 25 above.
33. Hoekman and Kostecki, as note 7 above, pp. 123-124.
34. Ibid., p. 126.
35. Ibid., pp. 127, 135.
36. Appellate Body Report, EC - Computer Equipment, para. 109.
37. Panel Report, Korea - Government Procurement, para. 7.109.
38. Ibid., paras 7.110, 7.119.
39. Ibid., para. 7.125 (referring to Appellate Body Report, EC - Computer Equipment, paras 109-110).
40. Ibid., para. 7.121.
41. Id.
42. There is also a high burden of proof to establish the bad faith. of a WTO Member. In Korea - Government Procurement, the Panel explicitly stated that it did not find that Korea had acted in bad faith.
43. Ibid., para. 6.3.
44. Appellate Body Report, EC - Bananas, para. 154.
45. ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with commentaries, ILC Yb. (1996), II, p. 189.
46. Report on the Law of Treaties by Mr H. Lauterpacht, Special Rapponeur, Doc. A/CN.4/63, ILC Yb. (1953), II,p. 96, para. 4.
47. Report by J.L. Brierly, Special Rapporteur, Doc. A/CN.4/23, ILC Yb. (1950), II, p. 228, paras 28, 31.
48. J. Klabbers, The Concept of Treaty in International Law (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996), p. 38.
49. For example, see ibid.
50. See R.S. Lee, "Multilateral Treaty-Making and Negotiation Techniques: An Appraisal", in B. Cheng and E.D. Brown (eds), Contemporary Problems of International Law: Essays in honour of Georg Schwarzenberger on his eightieth birthday (London: Stevens & Sons, 1988), pp. 157-176.
51. On (GATT/WTO) trade round negotiations, see Hoekman and Kostecki, as note 7 above, pp. 100-142.
52. Hoekman and Kostecki, as note 7 above, p. 136.
53. Appellate Body Report, EC - Computer Equipment, para. 85.
54. Ibid., para. 109.
55. Ibid., para. 82.
56. Ibid., para. 109.
57. Ibid., para. 84 (original emphasis).
58. In EC - Boneless Chicken Cuts, the Appellate Body relied on this same definition to justify that the EC's views regarding the interpretation of tariff heading 02.10 of its goods schedules pertained to the "subjective views as to what was the agreement reached during tariff negotiations", Appellate Body Report, EC - Boneless Chicken Cuts, para. 250.
59. F. Ortino, Treaty Interpretation and the WTO Appellate Body Report in US - Gambling: A Critique, 9 J.I.E.L. 1 (2006), p. 124 (original emphasis).
60. Appellate Body Report, EC - Computer Equipment, para. 109 (original emphasis).
61. Ibid., para. 93 (original emphasis).
62. Ibid., para. 83.
63. For example, in EC - Poultry, the Appellate Body found that a claim that the Panel has added or diminished the rights and obligations in the covered agreements (under Article 11 DSU) "goes to the very core of the integrity of the WTO dispute settlement process itself". Appellate Body Report, EC - Poultry, para. 133.
64. Similarly, the Appellate Body in Australia - Salmon concluded that "the Panel did not abuse its discretion in a manner which even comes close to attaining the level of gravity required for a claim under Article 11 DSU to prevail". Appellate Body Report, Australia - Salmon, para. 266.
65. See also Appellate Body Report, EC - Poultry, paras 82-83;
66. Appellate Body Report, EC - Boneless Chicken Cuts, paras 148, 175;
67. Panel Report, Korea - Government Procurement, para. 6.16;
68. Appellate Body Report, Korea - Various Measures on Beef, para. 96.
69. Appellate Body Report, EC - Poultry, para. 79.
70. Ibid., para. 81.
71. Ibid., para. 98 (finding confirmation of this interpretation in para. 3 Marrakesh Protocol and referring to Appellate Body Report, EC - Bananas, paras 154-158).
72. Appellate Body Report, Korea - Various Measures on Beef, para. 102 (original emphasis).
73. Panel Report, Korea - Government Procurement, para. 7.9
74. (referring to Appellate Body Report, EC - Computer Equipment, para. 84).
75. Ibid., para. 6.16.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Ibid., para. 7.13.
79. Appellate Body Report, US - Gambling Services, paras 159-160.
80. Other means to modify schedules are the adoption of protocols and certification. See note 24 above.
81. Additional procedures are set out in Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII, Guidelines Proposed by the Committee in Tariff Concessions, C/113 and Corr. 1, 27s/26, 3 November 1980.
82. Article XXVIII(3) GATT 1994.
83. Interpretative Note Ad Article XXVIII: "On the other hand, it is not intended that the scope of the negotiations should be such as to make negotiations and agreement under Article XXVIII unduly difficult nor to create complications in the application of this Article in the future to concessions which result from negotiations thereunder."
84. Article XXI:3(a) GATS.
85. Even if schedules were unilateral acts, they would be allowed, authorized, and sanctioned by a package of multilateral treaties.
86. ICJ, Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (United Kingdom v. Iran), Preliminary Objection, I.C.J. Reports (1952) 93, at 105.
87. Ibid., at 104.
88. Id.
89. Ibid., at 104-105.
90. Ibid., at 105.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. ICJ, Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (United Kingdom v. Iran), Preliminary Objection, Individual Opinion President McNair, I.C.J. Reports (1952) 93, at 118;
95. see also ICJ, Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (United Kingdom v. Iran), Preliminary Objection, Dissenting Opinion Judge Hackworth, I.C.J. Reports (1952) 93, at 146;
96. ICJ, Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (United Kingdom v. Iran), Preliminary Objection, Dissenting Opinion Judge Levi Carneiro, I.C.J. Reports (1952) 93, at 154.
97. ICJ, Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (United Kingdom v. Iran), Preliminary Objection, I.C.J. Reports (1952) 93, at 105.
98. Id.
99. Ibid., at 106.
100. Id.
101. ICJ, Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Spain v. Canada), 4 December 1998, I.C.J. Reports (1998) 432, at 454.
102. Id.
103. Ibid., at 455.
104. ICJ, Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (United Kingdom v. Iran), Preliminary Objection, I.C.J. Reports (1952) 93, at 107.
105. ICJ, Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (United Kingdom v. Iran), Preliminary Objection, Individual Opinion President McNair, I.C.J. Reports (1952) 93, at 121.
106. ICJ, Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (United Kingdom v. Iran), Preliminary Objection, Dissenting Opinion Judge Hackworth, I.C.J. Reports (1952) 93, at 136.
107. Ibid., at 137.
108. Ibid., at 137.
109. Ibid., at 137.
110. ICJ, Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (United Kingdom v. Iran), Preliminary Objection, I.C.J. Reports (1952) 93, at 107.
111. ICJ, Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (United Kingdom v. Iran), Preliminary Objection, Dissenting Opinion Judge Heard, I.C.J. Reports (1952) 93, at 141-142.
112. ICJ, Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (United Kingdom v. Iran), Preliminary Objection, Dissenting Opinion Judge Hackworth, I.C.J. Reports (1952) 93, at 143. Judge Hackworth made similar objections to the application of the principle of restrictive interpretation to jurisdictional clauses in general, which relates to the substance of the norm rather than its form. In the end, Judge Hackworth applied an effective and contemporary interpretation to the jurisdictional clause in the Iraniam Declaration.
113. GATT Panel Report, Panel on Newsprint, para. 51.
114. Appellate Body Report, EC - Computer Equipment, para. 80.
115. Appellate Body Report, EC - Boneless Chicken Cuts, para. 175.
116. Ibid., para. 176.
117. ICJ, Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (United Kingdom v. Iran), Preliminary Objection, Dissenting Opinion Judge Alvarez, I.C.J. Reports (1952) 93, at 125.
118. Ibid., at 125-126, 132. Judge Alvarez took the occasion to proclaim the end of the traditional means of interpretation, which needed to be replaced by a more dynamic, cultural, and evolutionary interpretation of international law "in accordance with the new conditions of international law" that allowed the Court to declare and develop the law. In essence, Judge Alvarez did not argue that a special set of interpretation principles applied to his new category of multilateral acts of a special character. He did distinguish between the interpretation of unilateral acts and multilateral acts. Judge Alvarez's new theory of interpretation as part of new international law, as explained in his dissenting opinion, would appear to apply to all multilateral acts, whether of a special kind or not. Since he rejected the Court's view that the Iranian Declaration was a unilateral act, Judge Alvarez did not elaborate on the means of interpretation of those acts. However, it would seem that his new international law principles of interpretation would also influence the interpretation of unilateral acts. 132. Judge Alvarez took the occasion to proclaim the end of the traditional means of interpretation, which needed to be replaced by a more dynamic, cultural, and evolutionary interpretation of international law "in accordance with the new conditions of international law" that allowed the Court to declare and develop the law. In essence, Judge Alvarez did not argue that a special set of interpretation principles applied to his new category of multilateral acts of a special character. He did distinguish between the interpretation of unilateral acts and multilateral acts. Judge Alvarez's new theory of interpretation as part of new international law, as explained in his dissenting opinion, would appear to apply to all multilateral acts, whether of a special kind or not. Since he rejected the Court's view that the Iranian Declaration was a unilateral act, Judge Alvarez did not elaborate on the means of interpretation of those acts. However, it would seem that his new international law principles of interpretation of unilateral acts
119. Appellate Body Report, EC - Sugar Subsidies, para. 223.
120. Ibid., para. 167.
121. Ibid., para. 223.
122. Not all WTO Members have signed and ratified the VCLT. The VCLT, or at least Articles 31, 32, and 33 VCLT, applies in WTO dispute settlement as customary international law, not as treaty law.
123. Appellate Body Report, EC - Boneless Chicken Cuts, para. 243.
124. Id.
125. Appellate Body Report, US - Gambling Services, para. 160.
126. "DONE at Marrakesh this fifteenth day of April one thousand nine hundred and ninety-four, in a single copy, in the English, French and Spanish languages, each text being authentic."
127. Appellate Body Report, US - Gambling Services, at footnote 351. The United States also argued on appeal that the Panel had incorrectly interpreted Article XVI:2(c) GATS on the basis of the French and Spanish versions of that Article. The Appellate Body did not, however, respond to this specific claim. It found merely that all three versions of the text of Article XVI:2(c) GATS were "grammatically ambiguous". The Appellate Body was sceptical and hesitant to give too much importance to the use of commas in Article XVI:2(c) GATS.
128. See ibid., para. 245.
129. Ibid., para. 164.
130. Ibid., para. 166.
131. Id.
132. Ortino, as note 50 above, p. 123.
133. Panel Report, Korea - Government Procurement, paras 7.49, 7.72.
134. Ibid., para. 7.33.
135. Ibid., para. 7.58.
136. Ibid., para. 7.42.
137. Ibid., para. 7.43.
138. Prior to EC - Boneless Chicken Cuts, the Appellate Body already relied on "factual context", though not qualified as such. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report US - Wheat Gluten, paras 105-106;
139. Appellate Body Report, US - Line Pipe, paras 97-110.
140. Appellate Body Report, EC - Boneless Chicken Cuts, para. 148.
141. Ibid., para. 175.
142. Ibid., para. 209.
143. Ibid., para. 212.
144. Ibid., para. 175.
145. Ibid., para. 176.
146. Ibid., para. 193.
147. Ibid., para. 194.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Ibid., para. 199.
151. Ibid., para. 195.
152. Ibid., para. 197.
153. Ibid., para. 198.
154. Appellate Body Report, US - Gambling Services, paras 18-19, 49, 106.
155. Ibid., para. 173.
156. Panel Report, US - Gambling Services, paras 6.93-6.95.
157. Appellate Body Report, US - Gambling Services, paras 175-176.
158. Ibid., para. 204.
159. The Panel in Mexico - Telecom Services did hint to the possibihty of qualifying document W/120 and the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines as context. Panel Report, Mexico - Telecom Services, paras 7.43-7.44.
160. Appellate Body Report, US - Gambling Services, paras 179-182.
161. Ibid., para. 180.
162. Id.
163. Ibid., para. 184.
164. Id.
165. Contra Ortino, as note 50 above, p. 131.
166. Appellate Body Report, Chile - Price Band System, para. 272 (referring to Appellate Body Report, EC - Computer Equipment, paras 84, 90, 93).
167. Appellate Body Report, EC - Sugar Subsidies, para. 194.
168. Ibid., para. 196.
169. Ibid., para. 223, footnote 346.
170. ICJ, Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Spain v. Canada), 4 December 1998, I.C.J. Reports (1998) 432, at 460.
171. Appellate Body Report, EC - Sugar Subsidies, para. 196.
172. Ibid., para. 225.
173. Ibid., paras 216, 222.
174. Appellate Body Report, EC - Boneless Chicken Cuts, para. 214.
175. Id.
176. Ibid., para. 226.
177. Ibid., paras 229-230.
178. Ibid., paras 233-234.
179. Ibid, para. 238.
180. Id.
181. Ibid., para. 239.
182. Ibid., para. 243.
183. Id.
184. Ibid., para. 161.
185. Panel Report, Korea - Government Procurement, para. 7.59.
186. Appellate Body Report, EC - Computer Equipment, para. 95.
187. Id.
188. Appellate Body Report, US - Gambling Services, para. 192.
189. Id.
190. Ibid., para. 193.
191. Appellate Body Report, EC - Boneless Chicken Cuts, para. 255 (referring to the ILC).
192. Ibid., para. 259.
193. Id.
194. Ibid., paras 264, 266 (referring to EC - Computer Equipment).
195. Ibid., para. 262.
196. Ibid., para. 268.
197. Ibid., paras 269-270.
198. Ibid., para. 272.
199. Ibid., para. 272 (referring to Aust, Anzilotti, Cot, Karl, Capotorti).
200. Ibid., para. 272.
201. Ibid., para. 273.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Ibid., para. 275.
205. Panel Report, Korea - Government Procurement, para. 6.16.
206. Ibid., para. 7.43.
207. Ibid., para. 7.44.
208. Ibid., para. 7.45.
209. Ibid., para. 7.49.
210. Id.
211. Ibid., para. 7.73.
212. Ibid., para. 7.74.
213. Ibid., para. 7.75.
214. Id.
215. Ibid., para. 7.82.
216. Appellate Body Report, EC - Computer Equipment, para. 38.
217. Ibid., para. 90.
218. Ibid., para. 92.
219. Appellate Body Report, US - Gambling Services, paras 174-175.
220. Ibid., para. 175.
221. Ibid., para. 176.
222. Ibid., para. 196, footnote 244.
223. Ortino, as note 50 above, p. 128 (original. emphasis).
224. Appellate Body Report, US - Gambling Services, para. 203.
225. Ibid., para. 208.
226. Ibid., para. 238.
227. Ibid., paras 211-212.
228. Appellate Body Report, EC - Poultry, para. 82-83. This is another example of an interpretation of the VCLT that the Appellate Body will need to take into account when it will be asked to interpret Article 31(3)(c) VCLT.
229. Ibid., para. 98.
230. A pellate Body Report, EC - Boneless Chicken Cuts, para. 283.
231. Id.
232. Ibid., para. 289.
233. Id.
234. Ibid., para. 291.
235. Id.
236. Ibid., para. 293.
237. Ibid., paras 319-321.
238. Ibid., para. 293 (citing Panel Report, EC-Boneless Chicken Cuts, para. 7.344).
239. Ibid., para. 327.
240. Ibid., paras 327-328.
241. Ibid., para. 293.
242. Ibid., para. 333.
243. Ibid., para. 296.
244. Ibid., para. 297.
245. Ibid., para. 334.
246. Id.
247. In Mexico - Telecom Services, the particular Mexican regulations to which the commercial present (mode 3) commitment relating to services supplied by "commercial agencies" referred were not yet in place when Mexico finalized its services commitments on 15 February 1997. Panel Report, Mexico - Telecom Services, para. 7.371.
248. Ibid., paras 300-301.
249. Ibid., para. 305.
250. Id.
251. Ibid., para. 307.
252. Id.
253. Ibid., paras 338-343.
254. Ibid., paras 308-309.
255. Ibid., para. 309.
256. Appellate Body Report, EC - Sugar Subsidies, para. 59.
257. Panel Report, Korea - Government Procurement, para. 7.93.
258. Ibid., para. 7.94.
259. Ibid., para. 7.96, footnote 753.
260. Id.
261. Ibid., paras 7.123-7.124. The Panel also referred to case-law of the PCIJ and the ICJ. Note that the Panel did not consider the corresponding Article 65 VCLT on the procedure for invoking the invalidity of a treaty as part of customary international law, and therefore not applicable to WTO disputes. The Panel relied on case-law of the ECJ to deny the customary nature of Article 65 VCLT.
262. Ibid., para. 7.126, footnote 769.
263. Ibid., para. 7.125 (referring to Appellate Body Report, EC - Computer Equipment, paras 109-110).
264. Ibid., para. 7.96.
265. Ibid., para. 7.96. Prior to this conclusion, the Panel had already found that the Principles on State Responsibility apply to the conduct of WTO Members during treaty negotiations. The Panel did not, however, discuss the potential customary nature of the Principles on State Responsibility.
266. Ibid., para. 6.5.
267. Appellate Body Report, EC - Computer Equipment, para. 13 (original emphasis).
268. Ibid., para. 89.
269. Appellate Body Report, EC - Boneless Chicken Cuts, para. 199, footnote 384.
270. Ibid., para. 199.
271. Panel Report, Korea-Government Procurement, para. 7.72.
272. Appellate Body Report, Argentina - Footwear, para. 46 (original emphasis).
273. Ibid., para. 47.
274. Id.