Corrigendum to "OPEC and the international oil market: Can a cartel fuel the engine of economic development?" [Internat. J. of Ind. Organization 25 (2007) 187-199] (DOI:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.04.010);OPEC and the international oil market: Can a cartel fuel the engine of economic development?

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 25, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 187-199

  Noguera, Jose ^a   Pecchecnino, Rowena A ^b  

^a CERGE EI   (Czech Republic)

^b MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Economic development; Oil market structure; Oil market volatility

Indexed keywords

INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION; SOCIETIES AND INSTITUTIONS; STABILITY; SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT;

INTERNATIONAL OIL MARKET; OIL MARKET STRUCTURE; OIL MARKET VOLATILITY;

PETROLEUM INDUSTRY;

EID: 33846844896     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2007.04.001     Document Type: Erratum

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