The legal profession as a blue state: Reflections on public philosophy, jurisprudence, and legal ethics

Fordham Law Review

Volumn 75, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 1339-1365

  Pearce, Russell G ^a  

^a FORDHAM UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 33846593954     PISSN: 0015704X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (367)

1. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis et al., The Patterns and Implications of Political Contributions by Elite Law School Faculty, 93 Geo. L.J. 1167 (2005);
2. Editorial, The ABA's Liberal Agenda, Tampa Trib., Aug. 12, 2001, at cmt., p. 2;
3. John R. Lott, Jr., Pulling Rank, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 2006, at A21;
4. Robert F. Nagel, The Problem with The Court: Well, the Justices, Being Lawyers, Think Like Them, Nat'l Rev., Nov. 21, 2005, at 43;
5. Hans Bader, Why Stop with Non-Judges?, Competitive Enter. Inst., July 18, 2005, http://www.cei.org/gencon/019.04690.cfm.
6. See, e.g., Joshua Rozenberg, Why the White House Wants to Judge Judges: Back in Office with Scores to Settle, The Republicans Are Determined that "Left-Leaning Liberals " at the American Bar Will No Longer Hinder Judicial Appointments, Daily Telegraph (London), Mar. 27, 2001, at 17;
7. Bader, supra note 1.
8. See, e.g., William C. Duncan, "A Lawyer Class": Views on Marriage and "Sexual Orientation" in the Legal Profession, 15 B.Y.U. J. Pub. L. 137 (2001);
9. Justin Katz, An Invidious Prohibition, Building Bias into the Judiciary, Nat'l Rev. Online, Oct. 4, 2004, http://www.nationalreview.com/ comment/katz200410040858.asp;
10. Lott, supra note 1;
11. Editorial, supra note 1.
12. Kenneth R. Bazinet, Bush On Defensive: Sez Nominee 'Best Person I Could Find,' N.Y. Daily News, Oct. 5, 2005, at 23 (quoting David Frum).
13. For similar observations regarding the leftward drift of the legal system, see, for example, Bader, supra note 1 ("Judges typically drift to the left after being appointed to a high-profile post.");
14. Nagel, supra note 1 (discussing the contention that conservative judges "are subjected to intense pressure to undergo radical ideological changes," much of it from "read[ing] the Washington Post [and] socializing] with liberal law professors").
15. Francis M. Lazarus, Genesis of a Conference, 78 Marq. L. Rev. 397 (1995);
16. Jane Lampman, Bringing the Case Against Judges, Christian Sci. Monitor, Apr. 13, 2005, at 15;
17. Adam Liptak, Giving the Law a Religious Perspective: Falwell's School Says Its Mission Is to Train "Ministers of Justice," N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 2004, at A16;
18. Emma Schwartz, Falwell's School Joins Others in Teaching Law to Their Flocks: The Legal Program at the Reverend's University Represents the Latest Effort by the Religious Right to Change American Society, L.A. Times, Nov. 21, 2004, at A24.
19. I use this term in the same way Michael Sandel employs it to indicate philosophical approaches that "blur the line between political commentary and political philosophy." Michael J. Sandel, Public Philosophy: Essays on Morality in Politics 5 (2005). The goal of this essay is to identify the outlines of the dominant political philosophies that have provided the foundation, at least in broad strokes, of prevailing political perspectives.
20. See David Brooks, One Nation, Slightly Divisible, Atlantic Monthly, Dec. 2001, at 53;
21. William Safire, Battleground: Those "Swing States " Neither Red nor Blue, N.Y. Times, § 6 (Magazine), at 32;
22. Katharine Q. Seelye, Moral Values Cited as a Defining Issue of the Election, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 2004, at P4;
23. see also Michael Barone, The 49 Percent Nation, Nat'l J., June 9, 2001, at 1710, 1716. When using the terms Red State and Blue State, the essay refers to the contrasting approach to moral values and not to any particular geographic area. The title of the essay refers to the legal profession as an institution that supports Blue State values.
24. See, e.g., William Safire, Inside a Republican Brain, N.Y. Times, July 21, 2004, at Al9;
25. Randy E. Barnett, Keeping Libertarians Inside the Tent, Nat'l Rev. Online, Nov. 22, 2002, http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment- barnett112202.asp;
26. Patrick Hynes, Hurting the Ones You (Ought to) Love, Am. Spectator Online, June 27, 2006, http://www.spectator.org/dsp_article.asp?art_id= 10013.
27. See, e.g., Caryle Murphy & Alan Cooperman, Religious Liberals Gain New Visibility: A Different List of Moral Issues, Wash. Post, May 20, 2006, at Al ;
28. Red and Blue Religion? Faith Leads the Devout to Different Sides of Political Divide, Dallas Morning News, Sept. 1, 2004, at 23A (interview with Joseph Hough and Gary Bauer);
29. Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism, The First Session of the 107th Congress: The Legislative Agenda of the Religious Action Qr. (Mar. 2001), http://rac.org/advocacy/reviewagenda/agenda107-1/.
30. See, e.g., Am. Humanist Ass'n, Humanism and Its Aspirations (2003);
31. Caroline Hsu, Rallying the Humanists, U.S. News & World Rep., Aug. 8, 2005, at 46.
32. Barone, supra note 7, at 1716;
33. see also Brooks, supra note 7;
34. Thomas L. Friedman, Two Nations Under God, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 2004, at A25;
35. Seelye, supra note 7.
36. Barone, supra note 7, at 1716. As Michael Sandel has observed, "The Democrats have ceded to Republicans a monopoly on the moral and spiritual sources of American politics."
37. Friedman, supra note 11 (quoting Sandel);
38. see also Brooks, supra note 7.
39. But see Gary Langer, A Question of Values, N. Y. Times, Nov. 6, 2004, at A19;
40. Dick Meyer, The Anatomy of a Myth, Wash. Post, Dec. 5, 2004, at B1.
41. Ronald Dworkin, Who Should Shape Our Culture?, L. Sch., Autumn 2005, at 20, 21;
42. see also Sandel, supra note 6, at 149 (noting that liberals assert that "the state should not impose on its citizens a preferred way of life, but should leave them as free as possible to choose their own values and ends, consistent with a similar liberty for others");
43. Barone, supra note 7, at 1716. Interestingly, some critics-often liberals-argue that liberals do indeed have values and that the Red State/Blue State distinction based on the polling question regarding values is the result only of a "poorly devised" question.
44. See, e.g., Langer, supra note 12. In fact, this critique only underscores the accuracy of the distinction. As conservative commentators have pointed out-and more liberal commentators have recently acknowledged-political liberals do possess strongly held values.
45. See infra note 183-86 and accompanying text. But what the polling question revealed is important data about how Blue State voters generally think. They view their own policy prescriptions as neutral with regard to values at the same time that they believe that politically conservative perspectives wrongly impose values on the public sphere in ways that are intolerant and impermissibly limit individual freedom.
46. See, e.g., Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 613, 622;
47. William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wise. L. Rev. 29, 36;
48. Norman W. Spaulding, Reinterpreting Professional Identity, 74 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1, 7 (2003);
49. see also Russell G. Pearce & Amelia J. Uelmen, Religious Lawyering in a Liberal Democracy: A Challenge and an Invitation, 55 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 127, 142-45 (2004).
50. David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study 20 (1988);
51. Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 Cal. L. Rev. 669, 671 (1978).
52. Sanford Levinson, Identifying the Jewish Lawyer: Reflections on the Construction of Professional Identity, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 1577, 1578 (1993);
53. see also Pearce & Uelmen, supra note 14, at 142-45.
54. Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tenn., Formal Ethics Op. 96-F-140 (June 13, 1996), available at http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/ OPINIONS/Ethics/BdofProResp/_PDF_Files/92-99/96-f-140.pdf. 18. W. at 2-3.
55. Id. at 2-5;
56. see also Teresa Stanton Collett, Professional Versus Moral Duty: Accepting Appointments in Unjust Civil Cases, 32 Wake Forest L. Rev. 635, 642-43 (1997);
57. Martha Minow, On Being a Religious Professional: The Religious Turn in Professional Ethics, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 661, 681-82 (2001);
58. Pearce & Uelmen, supra note 14, at 143-45.
59. Russell G. Pearce, Lawyers as America's Governing Class: The Formation and Dissolution of the Original Understanding of the American Lawyer's Role, 8 U. Chi. Roundtable 381 (2001).
60. Warren E. Burger, The State of Justice, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1984, at 62;
61. see also Pearce, supra note 20, at 410-11.
62. See, e.g., Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself: A Review of Empirical Research on Attorney Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 Am. U. L. Rev. 1337, 1347 (1997);
63. Eugene R. Gaetke, Renewed Introspection and the Legal Profession, 87 Ky. L.J. 903, 909-10 (1999);
64. Samuel J. Levine, Faith in Legal Professionalism: Believers and Heretics, 61 Md. L. Rev. 217 (2002);
65. Pearce & Uelmen, supra note 14, at 148-49;
66. Deborah L. Rhode, Law, Lawyers, and the Pursuit of Justice, 70 Fordham L. Rev. 1543, 1556 (2002).
67. See, e.g., Robert Stevens, Law School: Legal Education in America from the 1850s to the 1980s, at 93 (1983) (noting that bar leaders "accepted as axiomatic that bar standards had declined between 1840 and 1870");
68. Charles Warren, A History of the American Bar (1911).
69. The classic statement of the history is Roscoe Pound's observation that "[t]he high point [of the American bar] at the beginning is on the eve of the Revolution. The lowest point is immediately after the Civil War." Roscoe Pound, The Lawyer From Antiquity to Modern Times 223 (1953).
70. Elements of this story are found in the mythology of the bar. See, e.g., Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap, Legal Education and Professional Development-an Educational Continuum 103-20 (1992) [hereinafter MacCrate Report]. Elements are also found in the work of distinguished scholars.
71. See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, American Lawyers 40-48 (1989);
72. Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law 226-49, 463-500 (3d ed. 2005). Instead of examining the dominant understandings of lawyers and judges, these commentators use the rigor of standards for admission as the determinant of how well the bar was fulfilling its public role.
73. See, e.g., MacCrate Report, supra note 24.
74. Perry Miller, The Life of the Mind in America from the Revolution to the Civil War (1965).
75. Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787, at 403-09 (1969) [hereinafter Wood, Creation];
76. Gordon Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution 104-07, 253-55, 346 (1991) [hereinafter Wood, Radicalism];
77. see, e.g., William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 455, 462 (2005) (describing Gordon Wood as "the leading historian of the framing").
78. But while Gordon Wood's analysis has dominated the approach of historians to this era, not all agree with him. See, e.g., Christopher Flannery, Tender of the Flame, Am. Scholar, Spring 1997, at 310, 311 (reviewing Lance Banning, The Sacred Fire of Liberty: James Madison and the Founding of the Federal Republic (1995)) (describing Wood as having "established the leading historical paradigm for founding studies for the past thirty years" but criticizing his work).
79. Miller, supra note 26, at 99-206;
80. Wood, Radicalism, supra note 27, at 254, 323.
81. In the legal literature, see Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 14 (1988)
82. and Pearce, supra note 20, at 384-92, especially 387 n.53.
83. Although his earlier work rejects a strong antebellum connection between lawyers and the public good, see Norman W. Spaulding, The Myth of Civic Republicanism: Interrogating the Ideology of Antebellum Legal Ethics, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 1397 (2003)
84. [hereinafter Spaulding, Myth of Civic Republicanism]. Norman Spaulding's more recent work at least rejects the standard bar notion that the antebellum connection was largely nonexistent.
85. Norman W. Spaulding, The Discourse of Law in Time of War: Politics and Professionalism During the Civil War and Reconstruction, 46 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2001, 2029-39 (2005)
86. [hereinafter Spaulding, Discourse of Law].
87. See infra Part II.
88. See infra Part III.
89. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
90. See, e.g., Pearce, supra note 20;
91. Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1229 (1995)
92. [hereinafter Pearce, Professionalism Paradigm Shift];
93. Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics Codes, 6 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 241 (1992)
94. [hereinafter Pearce, Republican Origins].
95. As Brian Tamanaha observes, these romantic jurisprudential perspectives "invoked abstractions and offered accounts of law and judging that, in hindsight, appear patently implausible. Nonetheless, they were widely espoused and sincerely believed, especially by the legal elite." Brian Z. Tamanaha, Law as a Means to an End: Threat to the Rule of Law 4 (2006). Tamanaha's work parallels this essay. In describing the shift to an "instrumental view of the law," he focuses on a different aspect within the same general trends. Id.
96. Id. at 2.
97. Id. at 4.
98. See, e.g., Jerold S. Auerbach, Unequal Justice: Lawyers and Social Change in Modern America 5, 25-30, 51, 100 (1976);
99. Report of the Thirty-Fifth Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association 12-16 (1912) (resolution stating that "it has never been contemplated that members of the colored race should become members of this Association"); Tamanaha, supra note 33, at 35;
100. Samuel J. Levine, Rediscovering Julius Henry Cohen and the Origins of the Business/Profession Dichotomy: A Study in the Discourse of Early Twentieth Century Legalism, 47 Am. J. Legal Hist. 1, 3-16 (2005);
101. Deborah L. Rhode, Perspectives on Professional Women, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 1163, 1167-73 (1988);
102. David B. Wilkins, A Systematic Response to Systemic Disadvantage: A Response to Sander, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1915, 1920-23 (2005).
103. Martin Luther King, Jr., for example, relied on the general commitment of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution to human dignity and equality to argue that their spirit supported equal rights for African Americans even though the documents themselves were written, in part, by slaveholders and did not abrogate-but actually permitted-slavery. Martin Luther King, Jr., "I Have A Dream," Address Delivered at the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom 1 (Aug. 28, 1963), available at http://www.stanford.edu/ group/King/publications/speeches/address_at_march_on_washingto n.pdf (transcript) ("When the architects of our republic wrote the magnificent words of the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, they were signing a promissory note to which every American was to fall heir.");
104. see also Gordon S. Wood, Revolutionary Characters: What Made the Founders Different 8-11 (2006) (defending the "greatness" of the founders even though they "do not share our modern views about important matters, about race, the role of woman, and equality").
105. For a similar argument regarding a noninstrumental approach to the law, see Tamanaha, supra note 33, at 250.
106. Elliot A. Krause, Death of the Guilds: Professions, States, and the Advance of Capitalism, 1930 to the Present 2-6 (1996).
107. Id. at 7.
108. See, e.g., Samuel Haber, The Quest for Authority and Honor in the American Professions, 1750-1900, at 74-78 (1991).
109. See, e.g., id. at 67;
110. Robert Robson, The Attorney in Eighteenth-Century England 82-83 (Wm. W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc. 1986) (1959);
111. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 268 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence trans., Anchor Books 1969) (1835).
112. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 88-91, 116-17 (2d ed. 1994).
113. Wood, supra note 37, at 14.
114. See, e.g., Wilfrid R. Prest, The Rise of the Barristers: A Social History of the English Bar 1590-1640, at 87 (1986);
115. Tocqueville, supra note 42, at 268.
116. Miller, supra note 26, at 144;
117. see also Tocqueville, supra note 42, at 267-68.
118. Miller, supra note 26, at 144.
119. Pearce, Republican Origins, supra note 32, at 251.
120. William Michael Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 Yale L.J. 694, 701 (1985).
121. Id.; see also Wood, Creation, supra note 27, at 134.
122. Treanor, supra note 49, at 699;
123. see also Wood, Creation, supra note 27, at 60-68, 162-65;
124. Wood, Radicalism, supra note 27, at 104-06, 188-89;
125. Treanor, supra note 27.
126. Wood, Radicalism, supra note 27, at 252-53.
127. Wood, Creation, supra note 27, at 403-09;
128. William Michael Treanor, Taking the Framers Seriously, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1016, 1033 (1988).
129. Wood, Creation, supra note 27, at 403-09;
130. Treanor, supra note 53, at 1033.
131. Jennifer Nedelsky, Private Property and the Limits of American Constitutionalism 179 (1990).
132. Wood, Radicalism, supra note 27, at 253-54.
133. Id. at 253-58;
134. see also Nedelsky, supra note 55, at 170-83;
135. Pearce, supra note 20, at 386.
136. The Federalist No. 35, at 257 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright éd., 1961);
137. see also Wood, Radicalism, supra note 27, at 253-58;
138. Pearce, supra note 20, at 386.
139. See infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
140. Wood, supra note 37, at 14-16. This transformation helps explain the contrast between the English preference for the landed gentry to assume political leadership,
141. see supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text, with the American preference for professionals,
142. see The Federalist No. 35, supra note 58 (identifying professionals as preferred political leadership though finding the landed gentry superior to merchants).
143. 1 David Hoffman, A Course of Legal Study, Addressed to Students and the Profession Generally 26-27 (2d ed. Baltimore, Joseph Neal 1836) (observing that "[t]o be great in the law ... it is essential that we should be great in every virtue; skilled in many, and somewhat improved in most of the departments of knowledge, for 'it applies the greatest powers of the understanding to the greatest number of facts,' and embraces nearly the entire extent of human actions and concerns").
144. Stephen M. Feldman, From Premodern to Modern American Jurisprudence: The Onset of Positivism, 50 Vand. L. Rev. 1387, 1414 (1997) (omission in original) (quoting Justice Joseph Story).
145. Id. at 1411.
146. Id. at 1401.
147. Id. at 1398.
148. Id. at 1404.
149. Id. at 1415 (quoting Justice Story in part). Morton Horwitz uses Story's concern with "commercial needs" as evidence that the antebellum jurisprudence "reshaped ["the legal system"] to the advantage of men of commerce and industry at the expense of farmers, workers, consumers, and other less powerful groups within the society." Morton U. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860, at 253-54 (1977);
150. see also Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Crisis of Democratic Theory: Scientific Naturalism & the Problem of Value (1973). Even assuming that Horwitz is correct both with regard to the instrumental approach and the negative impact of that approach on society, the subject of this essay is how Story and other jurisprudential thinkers of the time understood the nexus between lawyers and the public good, not whether they in fact were promoting the public good. As Brian Tamanaha points out, Story and his peers uniformly described themselves as applying natural law in a noninstrumental way.
151. Tamanaha, supra note 33, at 24-28, 33-35.
152. This essay also follows Stephen Feldman's approach in identifying antebellum jurisprudence as containing both natural law and empirical elements. See Feldman, supra note 62, at 1404-05 (seeking to "reconcile" commentators, such as William LaPiana and G. Edward White, who emphasize the primacy of natural law analysis with commentators, such as Robert Gordon, Morton Horwitz, Karl Llewellyn, and Grant Gilmore, who emphasize the primacy of pragmatic considerations).
153. Pearce, supra note 20, at 387-92.
154. Id. at 387;
155. see also Friedman, supra note 24, at 110 ;
156. Hon. George Sharswood, An Essay on Professional Ethics 25, 30-31 (5th ed., Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1993) (1896).
157. Pearce, Republican Origins, supra note 32, at 256;
158. see also Sharswood, supra note 69, at 30-31, 53-54.
159. Pearce, supra note 20, at 388-91;
160. Pearce, Republican Origins, supra note 32, at 258-66.
161. David Hoffman, Resolutions in Regard to Professional Deportment, in 2 Hoffman, supra note 61, at 752,754 (Resolution XI).
162. Id. (Resolution XII) (emphasis omitted).
163. Id. at 755-56 (Resolution XV) (emphasis omitted).
164. Pearce, Republican Origins, supra note 32, at 265-66, 265 n.193
165. (citing Sharswood, supra note 69).
166. Sharswood, supra note 69, at 98;
167. see also id. at 95-99;
168. Pearce, Republican Origins, supra note 32, at 265-66 (explaining the civil context).
169. Pearce, Republican Origins, supra note 32, at 266
170. (quoting Sharswood, supra note 69, at 98-99, 112).
171. Maxwell Bloomfield, American Lawyers in a Changing Society, 1776-1876, at 150-51 (1976);
172. Wood, Radicalism, supra note 27, at 284.
173. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 26, at 100-04, 187, 203-06.
174. Norman Spaulding has argued that the "civic republican" conception of lawyering and a "client-centered" approach were dominant in the antebellum period. See Spaulding, Myth of Civic Republicanism, supra note 28, at 1399-1400.
175. By creating a straw man of "civic republicanism" grounded in modern arguments for moral activism, he mistakenly classifies perspectives, such as Sharswood's, that integrate advocacy with a strong commitment to the public good as exclusively client centered and he fails to recognize that commentators he describes as client centered expressly reject the amoral perspective of the hired gun. Id. at 1442-43.
176. Spaulding describes as a defender of "client-centered, ethically neutral lawyering," id. at 1440, a commentator who asserted, '"[Clients] have purchased your services, but not your consciences.
177. You are not responsible for the goodness of their cause; but you are responsible for the means you use to gain it."' Id. at 1442
178. (quoting T. Walker, Advice to Law Students: Being the Substance of a Valedictory Address to the Graduates of the Law Class in the Cincinnatti College, Delivered March 3, 1838, 1 W. L.J. 481, 483 (1844)).
179. Perhaps one of the grounds for these erroneous readings is his attempt to place the antebellum conception of republican lawyering in the context of the "civic republicanism" of the Revolution and of contemporary discourse, rather than the more complex liberal republicanism that was dominant among the elites in the antebellum period. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
180. Interestingly, Spaulding's later work acknowledges the power of obligations to the public good in the antebellum period, though he does so by reading the late nineteenth century conception of professionalism into the earlier period. Spaulding, Discourse of Law, supra note 28, at 2029-39.
181. David Mellinkoff, The Conscience of a Lawyer 189 (1973) (quoting Brougham). For a recent debate regarding Henry Lord Brougham, compare Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, "Anything Rather Than A Deliberate and Well-Considered Opinion"-Henry Lord Brougham, Written By Himself, 19 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1221 (2006),
182. with Monroe H. Freedman, Henry Lord Brougham, Written by Himself, 19 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1213 (2006).
183. See Maxwell Bloomfield, David Hoffman and the Shaping of a Republican Legal Culture, 38 Md. L. Rev. 673, 684 (1979);
184. see also Sharswood, supra note 69, at 84-97;
185. Pearce, Republican Origins, supra note 32, at 257-58.
186. See Bloomfield, supra note 78, at 84;
187. see, e.g., Friedman, supra note 24, at 236-37.
188. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text;
189. see also Spaulding, Discourse of Law, supra note 28, at 2029-39 (discussing professionalism in the Jacksonian era).
190. For republicanism, see supra text accompanying notes 47-51.
191. See, e.g., John Gray, Liberalism, at ix-xi, 26-36, 82 (1986);
192. Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue, and Community in Liberal Constitutionalism 9 (1990);
193. Michael J. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy 4-7 (1996);
194. Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society 181 (rev. ed. 1983).
195. See, e.g., Gray, supra note 85, at ix-xi, 82; Richard A. Posner, Overcoming Law 23-24 (1995).
196. See, e.g., Gray, supra note 85, at 62-72;
197. Posner, supra note 86, at 24-25.
198. See, e.g., Sandel, supra note 85, at 5.
199. Majority rule offers a method for aggregating individual preferences. Id.
200. Although many liberal theorists emphasize that democracy may in fact undermine individual freedom, Posner, supra note 86, at 25-29;
201. Gray, supra note 85, at 73-78, the emerging preference for deference to majority rule reflected that it was-at least implicitly-becoming a higher good than limited government.
202. See infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
203. Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? 334-38 (1988);
204. Sandel, supra note 85, at 7-8.
205. See, e.g., Gray, supra note 85, at 7-25, 45-56.
206. For a discussion of civic republicanism, see supra note 79.
207. Sandel, supra note 85, at 4-7;
208. see also supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 55-58.
210. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
211. Tamanaha, supra note 33, at 63;
212. Feldman, supra note 62, at 1400-14.
213. For example, in the antebellum period, a scientific approach consisted of knowledge acquired through both virtue and empiricism. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 26, at 158-59;
214. Feldman, supra note 62, at 1400-14.
215. See, e.g., Michal Alberstein, Pragmatism and Law: From Philosophy to Dispute Resolution 21 (2002) (noting that, from the late nineteenth century, "anything not scientifically constructed, logical, argumentative, or structured will be considered outside the discourse");
216. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due Process, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 379, 380 (1988) (noting that as a result of this shift "[b]y the 1920s, nearly every respectable scientist claimed to believe that no statement about any subject, including humanity and society, was meaningful unless it could be empirically proven or disproven")• 96.
217. See, e.g., George M. Marsden, The Soul of the American University: From Protestant Establishment to Established Nonbelief (1994);
218. Purcell, supra note 67, at 7-8, 15.
219. See, e.g., Macedo, supra note 85, at 97-98 (describing liberalism's rejection of elite political leadership);
220. Feldman, supra note 62, at 1417-19.
221. See, e.g., Robert H. Wiebe, Self-Rule: A Cultural History of American Democracy 82-85 (1995).
222. See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 62, at 1417-19, 1425;
223. Treanor, supra note 27, at 464 (identifying leading commentators and judges of this period who developed arguments for limiting judicial review).
224. Tamanaha, supra note 33, at 38;
225. see, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 95, at 402-04.
226. Tamanaha, supra note 33, at 38;
227. see also Hovenkamp, supra note 95, at 411-20.
228. Tamanaha, supra note 33, at 40;
229. see also Hovenkamp, supra note 95, at 387-89.
230. Herbert Hovenkamp notes that the activism of the courts should not be exaggerated since they did refuse to overturn a number of regulatory statutes. Id.
231. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Law Without Values: The Life, Work, and Legacy of Justice Holmes 58-63, 102-03 (1997);
232. Treanor, supra note 27, at 464.
233. Miller, supra note 26, at 166-67;
234. Feldman, supra note 62, at 1396-1404.
235. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 103, at 10 (discussing Oliver Wendell Holmes's "revolt against natural law");
236. Tamanaha, supra note 33, at 61-65;
237. Feldman, supra note 62, at 1417-46.
238. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 103, at 58-59.
239. See, e.g., Tamanaha, supra note 33, at 43-52;
240. Hovenkamp, supra note 95, at 393-94.
241. Hovenkamp describes how the views of the Justices in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), as well as the state court judges who struck down state regulations, derived from their training in a natural law-based understanding of political economy and law "taught in American universities in the 1870s and 1880s."
242. Hovenkamp, supra note 95, at 400-01.
243. Hovenkamp also describes how, through the late nineteenth century, American legal and economic commentators relied on a natural law approach that the English had generally abandoned for more empirical approaches, such as utilitarianism, in the early nineteenth century. Id. at 402-03, 415-16.
244. Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of the Law (1964).
245. Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession 196 (1993).
246. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457 (1897).
247. See generally Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 Colum. L. Rev. 605 (1908).
248. See, e.g., Kronman, supra note 109, at 187-226.
249. Alberstein, supra note 95, at 167;
250. Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law 174-80 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., Found. Press 1994) (1958).
251. See Fuller, supra note 108, at 96.
252. See Lon L. Fuller, Philosophy for the Practicing Lawyer, in The Principles of Social Order 282, 290 (Kenneth I. Winston ed., 1981);
253. Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159 (1958).
254. See supra notes 59-70 and accompanying text.
255. See, e.g., Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order: 1877-1920, at 17, 116 (1967).
256. Id. at 116.
257. Robert Gordon, "The Ideal and the Actual in the Law": Fantasies of New York City Lawyers, 1870-1910, in The New High Priests: Lawyers in Post-Civil War America 51, 61 (Gerard W. Gawalt ed., 1984) (internal quotation marks omitted);
258. see also Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. 158 (1955);
259. Pearce, supra note 20, at 396.
260. Pearce, Professionalism Paradigm Shift, supra note 32, at 1238.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 1239;
263. see also Burton J. Bledstein, The Culture of Professionalism: The Middle Class and the Development of Higher Education in America 90 (1976);
264. Rayman L. Solomon, Five Crises or One: The Concept of Legal Professionalism, 1925-1960, in Lawyers' Ideals/Lawyers' Practices: Transformations in the American Legal Profession 146 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992) (citing ABA, Report of the Commission on Professionalism 10(1986)).
265. Pearce, Professionalism Paradigm Shift, supra note 32, at 1239-40.
266. See 1 Huffman, supra note 61, at 26-27;
267. Pearce, Republican Origins, supra note 32, at 259-60.
268. See Louis Brandeis, The Opportunity in the Law, in Business-A Profession 329, 331-335 (Hein 1996) (1914);
269. see also Pearce, supra note 20, at 399-403.
270. Brandeis, supra note 125, at 329.
271. Pearce, Professionalism Paradigm Shift, supra note 32;
272. Pearce, supra note 20, at 399.
273. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, The Lawyer as a Social Engineer, 3 J. Pub. L. 292, 292 (1954).
274. Roscoe Pound, The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence, 19 Green Bag 607, 612 (1907).
275. Id.
276. See, e.g., Brandeis, supra note 125, at 337.
277. Holmes, supra note 110, at 458;
278. see also Alschuler, supra note 103, at 139-40.
279. See, e.g., Haber, supra note 41, at 219 (describing Holmes's general views as "anomalous" in his time).
280. Canons of Prof'l Ethics pmbl. (1908).
281. Pearce, Republican Origins, supra note 32, at 267-72;
282. see also James M. Altman, Considering the A.B.A.'s 1908 Canons of Ethics, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 2395 (2003);
283. Bloomfield, supra note 81;
284. Susan D. Carle, Lawyers' Duty to Do Justice: A New Look at the History of the 1908 Canons, 24 Law & Soc. Inquiry 1 (1999).
285. Canons of Prof'l Ethics Canon 32.
286. Pearce, Republican Origins, supra note 32, at 268 (quoting Canons of Prof'l Ethics Canon 32).
287. Canons of Prof'l Ethics Canon 15. (quoting Sharswood, supra note 69, at 78-79);
288. Pearce, Republican Origins, supra note 32, at 243-47.
289. Canons of Prof'l Ethics Canon 15.
290. Id. Canon 31.
291. Id. Canon 15.
292. See e.g., Charles P. Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 Stan. L. Rev. 3 (1951).
293. Fuller & Randall, supra note 115, at 1162.
294. See generally Erwin Smigel, The Wall Street Lawyer: Professional Organization Man? (1964).
295. Pearce, supra note 20, at 381.
296. Smigel, supra note 144, at 5-6.
297. Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (1962); Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N. Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 32 (deriding those in business who care about social responsibility as socialism's "unwitting puppets").
298. See, e.g., Michael Kranish, Religious Right Wields Clout: Secular Groups Losing Funding Amid Pressure, Boston.com, Oct. 9, 2006, http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2006/10/09/ religious_right_wields_clout/;
299. Ramesh Ponnuru, Secularism and Its Discontents: The Debate over Religion and Politics Is in Desperate Need of Sanity, Nat'l Rev., Dec. 27, 2004, at 32.
300. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 103, at 3-7;
301. Kronman, supra note 109, at 231 (discussing dominant approach to law and economics);
302. Posner, supra note 86, at 1-4.
303. One prominent exception is religious conservative Robert George. See, e.g., Robert P. George, Public Reason and Political Conflict: Abortion and Homosexuality, 106 Yale L.J. 2475 (1997).
304. Louis Menand, The Thrashing of Professionalism, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1995, § 6 (Magazine), at 41.
305. Kathryn Abrams, The Progress of Passion, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 1602, 1614 (2002);
306. Deborah L. Rhode, Feminism and the State, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1181, 1187 (1994);
307. Michael J. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and Homosexuality, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 521, 521 (1989);
308. see, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism: Educating for Citizenship, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 131, 158 (1995).
309. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
310. See, e.g., Alberstein, supra note 95, at 178;
311. Alschuler, supra note 103, at 7-8;
312. Kronman, supra note 109, at 240-41;
313. Tamanaha, supra note 33, at 120-23;
314. David Kairys, Law and Politics, 52 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 243, 247 (1984);
315. John Henry Schlegel, Notes Toward an Intimate, Opinionated, and Affectionate History of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 391, 410-11 (1984).
316. See generally Fuller & Randall, supra note 115.
317. See, e.g., Robert P. George, In Defense of Natural Law 338 (2001) (lawyers not mentioned in index).
318. See, e.g., Luban, supra note 15.
319. See, e.g., Kronman, supra note 109.
320. Pearce, supra note 20, at 407-09.
321. Id. at 417.
322. See, e.g., Luban, supra note 15, at xx;
323. William H. Simon, The Practice of Justice: A Theory of Lawyers' Ethics (1998);
324. Schwartz, supra note 15, at 671;
325. see also Russell Pearce, How Law Firms Can Do Good While Doing Well (And the Answer is Not Pro Bono), 33 Fordham Urb. L.J. 211 (2005);
326. Pearce, supra note 20, at 409.
327. See Pearce, Professional Paradigm Shift, supra note 32, at 1239-40.
328. Pearce, supra note 20, at 410-15;
329. Pearce, Professionalism Paradigm Shift, supra note 32, at 1254-57.
330. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Professionalism, "... In the Spirit of Public Service:" A Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism (1986);
331. ABA Ctr. on Prof'l Responsibility, A Guide to Professionalism Commissions (2001), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/professionalism/ scop_commission_guide.html;
332. Rhode, supra note 22, at 1556 (describing the development of "a cottage industry of bar committees, conferences, commissions, and centers [focusing] on this 'crisis of professionalism'").
333. See infra notes 165-76 and accompanying text.
334. Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility pmbl. (1983).
335. Model Rules of Prof;l Conduct pmbl. (2003).
336. Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility pmbl. (1983).
337. Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility Canon 7, DR 7-101(A)-(B).
338. Pearce, Republican Origins, supra note 32, at 273-74, 273 nn. 266-68.
339. Id. at 276-78;
340. see also text accompanying supra note 159.
341. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct pmbl. But see Monroe H. Freedman & Abbe Smith, Understanding Lawyers' Ethics 87-89 (2d ed. 2002) (arguing that the Model Rules require less zealous advocacy than the Model Code).
342. Pearce, supra note 20, at 417-19.
343. Id. at 419-20.
344. See generally Howard M. Erichson, Doing Good, Doing Well, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 2087 (2004);
345. Judith L. Maute, Changing Conceptions of Lawyers ' Pro Bono Responsibilities: From Chance Noblesse Oblige to Stated Expectations, 77 Tul. L. Rev. 91 (2002).
346. Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility EC 2-25 (1981).
347. See Stephen Gillers & Roy D. Simon, Regulation of Lawyers: Statutes and Standards 331-41 (discussing Model Rule 6.1 and its legislative history).
348. Pearce, supra note 20, at 419-20.
349. Pearce, Professionalism Paradigm Shift, supra note 32, at 1250-52.
350. Russell G. Pearce, Brian Danitz & Romelia S. Leach, Revitalizing the Lawyer-Poet: What Lawyers Can Learn from Rock and Roll, 14 Widener L.J. 907, 914 & n.37.
351. For example, although lawyers comprise only .7% of the employed population, see U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2006, at tbl.604 (2006), available at http;//www.census.gov/ compendia/statab/labor_force_employment_earnings/employed_pers ons/ (showing that lawyers represented 954,000 out of 139,252,000 employed civilians in 2004), lawyers represented approximately 40% of the members of the House of Representatives and 64% of the Senate for the 109th Congress.
352. See Harold W. Stanley & Richard G. Niemi, Vital Statistics on American Politics 2005-2006 Online Edition, at tbl. 5-3 (2006), http://library.cqpress.com/vsap/document.php?id=vsap05tab5-3&type= toc&num=5. 180.
353. Pearce, Professionalism Paradigm Shift, supra note 32, at 1274.
354. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
355. See, e.g., Thomas Frank, What's the Matter with Kansas?: How Conservatives Won the Heart of America (2004);
356. Jim Wallis, God's Politics: Why the Right Gets it Wrong and the Left Doesn't Get it (2005);
357. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Democrats Getting Lessons in Speaking Their Values, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 2005, at A20.
358. See, e.g., George Lakoff, Don't Think of an Elephant!: Know Your Values and Frame the Debate (2004);
359. Barack Obama, The Audacity of Hope: Thoughts on Reclaiming the American Dream 43-69 (2006);
360. Paul Waldman, Being Right Is Not Enough: What Progressives Must Learn from Conservative Success 97 (2006);
361. Stolberg, supra note 182;
362. Jim Wallis, The Message Thing, N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 2005, at A19.
363. See, e.g., Sandel, supra note 6, at 122-55, 211-47.
364. Dworkin, supra note 13, at 21.
365. See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text;
366. see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652-63 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
367. Macedo, supra note 85, at 260-65.