Thoughts, motor actions, and the self

Mind and Language

Volumn 22, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 22-43

  Vosgerau, Gottfried ^a,b   Newen, Albert ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TÜBINGEN   (Germany)

^b Philosophisches Seminar   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33846587043     PISSN: 02681064     EISSN: 14680017     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2006.00298.x     Document Type: Review

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