The quality of democracy after joining the European union

East European Politics and Societies

Volumn 21, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 162-180

  Zielonka, Jan ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Central and Eastern Europe; Democratic quality; EU enlargement; European Union

Indexed keywords

EID: 33846556177     PISSN: 08883254     EISSN: 15338371     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0888325406297133     Document Type: Article

References (56)

1. See, e.g., Karen E. Smith, "The Evolution and Application of EU Membership Conditionality," in Marise Cremona, ed., The Enlargement of the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 114 - 115 ; or Milada A. Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration after Communism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
2. See Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions: Copenhagen European Council ( Brussels: Council of the European Union, 1993 ).
3. See Loukas Tsoukalis, The European Community and Its Mediterranean Enlargement ( London: Allen & Unwin, 1981 ).
4. This argument is often put forward by Polish experts, but according to the 2006 Eurobarometer, a much higher percentage of Poles are satisfied with the way democracy works in the EU (62 percent) than in Poland (39 percent). See Eurobarometer (Brussels: European Commission, June 2006), 5. On average, more citizens in the new member states than in the old EU fifteen are satisfied with the way democracy works in the EU (59 versus 48 percent, respectively).
5. See, e.g., Lester M. Salomon, ed., The Tools of Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). or Christopher Hood, The Art of the State (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1998). See also Max Weber, "Politik als Beruf," in Gesammelte politische Schriften (Tübingen, Germany: J.C. Mohr, 1971); and Hendrik Spruyt, The Sovereign State and Its Competitors (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).
6. See Peter Flora et al., eds., State Formation, Nation-Building, and Mass Politics in Europe. The Theory of Stein Rokkan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). or Stefano Bartolini, Restructuring Europe. Centre Formation, System Building, and Political Structuring between the Nation State and the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
7. Beate Kohler-Koch and R. Eising, eds., The Transformation of Governance in the European Union (London: Routledge, 1999). or Jeremy Richardson, ed., European Union Power and Policy-Making (London: Routledge, 2001).
8. See R. Daniel Kelemen, "The Politics of 'Eurocratic' Structure and the New European Agencies," West European Politics 25 (2002). 93-118.
9. As Michael Keating put it, "This is a complex political order, comparable, although not identical to, the pre-state European order of overlapping and underlapping sovereignties, different types of authority in the state, the economy and civil society, and competing forms of legitimacy." See Michael Keating, "Europe's Changing Political Landscape: Territorial Restructuring and New Forms of Government," in Paul Beaumont, Carole Lyons, and Neil Walker, eds., Convergence and Divergence in European Law (Oxford: Hart, 2002). 12-12. See also Helen Wallace, William Wallace, and Mark Pollack, eds., Policy-Making in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
10. See, e.g., Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, "Unravelling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-level Governance," American Political Science Review 97 (2003). 234-234.
11. For instance, Adrienne Heritier pointed out that 4,500 lobbies and 650 consultancy firms and legal' offices specializing in EU affairs have disproportionate access to and influence over EU decisions. See Adrienne Heritier, "Composite Democracy in Europe: The Role of Transparency and Access to Information," Journal of European Public Policy 9 (2003). 816-816.
12. See, e.g., Frank Decker, "Governance beyond the Nation-State: Reflections on the Democratic Deficit of the European Union," Journal of European Public Policy, 8 (2002). 256-272 ; or Yannis Papadopoulos, "Cooperative Forms of Governance: Problems of Democratic Accountability in Complex Environments," European Journal of Public Research 42 (2003): 493-493.
13. Yves Mény, "Making Sense of the EU: The Achievements of the Convention," Journal of Democracy 14 (2003). 68-69.
14. See Eurobarometer (Brussels: European Commission, June 2006). 30-30.
15. The new members tried to stall efforts to limit tax competition by the EU because they need to continue to offer better conditions to investors if they are to catch up with the more developed members. The new members also worry that the convergence criteria required by the Maastricht Treaty will prevent any fast growth and by the same token frustrate their efforts to catch up with the old members. This is because fast growth in their case would imply much higher rates of inflation and public deficit than allowed by the Maastricht Treaty. For instance, the new members are sorely dependent on investments in infrastructure to implement the necessary structural adjustments and fulfill the objectives of real (rather than merely nominal) convergence. Harmonization of trade rules for all EU members has meant that some new members such as Estonia have had to increase their external tariffs and nontariff barriers (e.g., subsidies, quotas, and antidumping duties) with regard to low-cost locations outside the EU. See, e.g., Helmut Wagner, "Pitfalls in EMUEnlargement," at http://www.aicgs.org/c/wagner.shtml ; or Likka Korhonen, "Some Implications of EU Membership on Baltic Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies," in Vello Pettai and Jan Zielonka, eds., The Road to the European Union: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2003), 255-81. Also see Magnus Feldmann and Razeen Sally, "From the Soviet Union to the European Union: Estonian Trade Policy, 1991-2000," World Economy 25 (2002): 79-106.
16. "European Integration: New Opportunities and Challenges," address by Vaira Vike-Freiberga, President of Latvia, at the Institute of European Affairs in Dublin, 4 June 2002, http://europa.eu.int/futurum/documents/ speech/sp040602_en.htm.
17. Dimitrij Rupel, "The Future of Europe-Debate," Ljubljana, Slovenia, 3 July 2001, http://europa.eu.int/futurum/documents/other/ oth030701_en.pdf.
18. For a more in-depth analysis of the scope of parliamentary powers, see, e.g., Gerhard Loewenberg and Samuel C. Patterson, Comparing Legislatures (Lanham, MD: University of America Press, 1979). 43-67.
19. The European Parliament (EP), first directly elected in 1979, has significantly increased its powers over the past two decades. The Single European Act introduced the cooperation procedure, the first step to making the EP a colegislator with the European Council. The Maastricht Treaty then introduced the codecision procedure (which was modified in the Amsterdam Treaty), which makes the EP de facto a colegislator in policy areas in which it applies. This means that neither the European Council nor the European Parliament can adopt any legislation without the support of the other. See Andreas Maurer, "The Legislative Powers and Impact of the European Parliament," Journal of Common Market Studies 41 (2003). 227-247. As far as other traditional legislative tasks are concerned, especially the selection of the executive and the judiciary, the EP has far fewer powers. Although incoming European Commissioners have to undergo hearings in the EP, the Parliament can only refuse the nomination of the Commission as a whole and not simply of individual Commissioners. This weakens the EP'sinfluence considerably. (Although in October 2004 the incoming President of the European Commission was forced to reconsider the proposed list of his Commissioners under the EP's pressure). Judges at the European Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance are all appointed by the member states without any approval of the EP being necessary.
20. See Luciano Bardi, "Transnational Party Federations, European Parliamentary Party Groups and the Building of Europarties," in Richard Katz and Peter Mair, eds., How Parties Organize: Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies ( London: Sage, 1995 ).
21. See Amie Kreppel, The European Parliament and Supranational Party System: A Study in Institutional Development ( New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002 ).
22. See, e.g., Alec Sweet Stone, Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe ( Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000 ).
23. See Giandomenico Majone, "Delegation of Regulatory Powers in a Mixed Polity," European Law Journal 8 (2002). 319-339.
24. The overall turnout at the 2004 European Parliament election was 45.7 percent. The individual turnout numbers for all member states, new and then old, lowest turnout first, were as follows, in percentages: Slovakia 16.96, Poland 20.87, Estonia 26.83, Czech Republic 28.32, Hungary 28.5, Latvia 41.34, Lithuania 48.43, Cyprus 71.19, Malta 82.37, Sweden 37.8, Portugal 38.6, United Kingdom 38.83, Netherlands 39.3, Finland 39.4, Austria 42.43, France 42.76, Germany 43, Spain 45.1, Denmark 47.9, Ireland 58.8, Greece 63.4, Italy 73.1, Luxemburg 89, Belgium 90.81 (compulsory voting); data available at http://www.elections2004.eu.int/ep-election/sites/en/results1306/turnout_ep/ index.html.
25. Interestingly, the country with the lowest turnout at the European elections, Slovakia, had the highest turnout of all membership referenda and the new member state with the highest turnout for the EP elections, Malta, had the lowest in its membership referendum. The turnout for membership referenda, highest first, was as follows, in percentages: Lithuania 90, Slovenia 90, Hungary 84, Czech Republic 77, Poland 77, Estonia 67, Latvia 67, Malta 54, Cyprus:
26. See, e.g., address by Ms. Kristiina Ojuland, Estonian Foreign Minister, An EU of 25 and Estonia's Role in It, at the European Policy Centre's lecture series "Meet the New Member States," 23 October, 2002, Brussels, http://www.vm.ee/eng/kat_140/2961.html&arhiiv_kuup=kuup_2002;
27. contribution by Prime Minister Milos Zeman of the Czech Republic to "The Debate on the Future of Europe," 14 June, 2001 http://europa.eu.int/futurum/documents/contrib/cont140601_en.htm.
28. Stephen Holmes, "A European Doppelstat?" East European Politics and Societies 17 (2003). 113-113. Holmes also observed, "The accession process has deprived the incompletely democratized East European states of that most important 'school of democracy,' namely, the necessity, under the pressure of events, to hammer a coherent policy out of a cacophony of domestic interest and opinions."
29. Opinions on the Functioning of Public Institutions (Warsaw, Poland: CBOS, June 2002). Of course, many other factors were behind this decreasing popularity of Eastern European parliaments, but it is important to note that some nonmajoritarian institutions such as the Constitutional Courts or Central Banks enjoyed much higher popularity despite their rather controversial political activism. In 1995 in Hungary, public support for the Constitutional Court was 58 percent, compared to the parliament at 36 percent and the government at 35 percent. The data are taken from Gabor Halmai and Kim Lane Schepple, "Living Well Is the Best Revenge: The Hungarian Approach to Judging the Past," in A. James McAdams, ed., Transitional Justice in New Democracies (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996), 155-84, at 181, Figure 1. Similar data, with respect to the Czech Republic and Slovakia, are given by Herman Schwartz, The Struggle for Constitutional Justice in Post-Communist Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 320, n. 22. See also the 2004 Eurobarometer poll showing that people in the EU-25 trust the European Court of Justice more than they trust any other European institution and this "trust gap" is particularly evident in the new member states. European Commission, Eurobarometer Spring 2004 (Brussels: European Commission, 2004).no referendum held. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/ 2266385.stm.
30. Renauld Dehousse, "Constitutional Reform in the European Community: Are There Alternatives to the Majority Avenue?" in Jack Hayward, ed., The Crisis of Representation in Europe (London: Frank Cass, 1995). 134-134.
31. See Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963). and Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs, eds., Citizens and the State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
32. Of course, this is not to ignore the experiences of multinational states that have managed to sustain multiple identities. See, e.g., Michael Keating, "Europe's Changing Political Landscape: Territorial Restructuring and New Forms of Government," in Paul Beaumont, Carole Lyons, and Neil Walker, eds., Convergence and Divergence in European Public Law (London: Hart, 2002). 7-7.
33. See Kalypso Nicolaidis, "We, the Peoples of Europe...," in Paul Hilder, ed., The Democratic Papers: Talking about Democracy in Europe and Beyond (Brussels: The British Council, 2004). 22-33. Also see J. H. H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
34. Mathew J. Gabel and Christopher J. Anderson, "The Structure of Citizen Attitudes and the European Political Space," Comparative Political Studies 25 (2003). 893-913 ; Philip Schlesinger, "The Changing Spaces of Political Communication: The Case of the European Union," Political Communication 16 (1999): 263-79; and Hans-JörgTrenz and Klaus Eder, "The Democratizing Dynamics of a European Public Sphere: Towards a Theory of Democratic Functionalism," European Journal of Social Theory 7 (2004): 5-25.
35. See, e.g., Simon Hix et al., "The Party System in the European Parliament: Collusive or Competitive?" Journal of Common Market Studies 41 (2003). 309-331.
36. There have been five enlargements so far. Since its creation in 1957, the European Union has grown from a European Economic Community of six member states (Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg) to a union of twenty-five members with a population of more than 450 million citizens. In 1973, Britain, Ireland, and Denmark joined; in 1981, Greece; in 1986, Spain and Portugal; in 1995, Austria, Sweden, and Finland; and in 2004, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Cyprus, and Malta. See Ania Krok-Paszkowska and Jan Zielonka, "EU Enlargements and the Evolving Nature of European Integration," in Anand Menon and Colin S. Hay, eds., European Politics ( Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006 ).
37. According to the World Survey of Values (see http://www. worldvaluessurvey.org/). Spain and Lithuania have a similarly low score for those who perceive violence as illegitimate. Support of autocratic rule is higher in Finland than in Hungary, Estonia, or Slovenia. But Germany (East and West) shows even less support for autocratic rule than any of the new members. Ethnic tolerance in the Czech Republic is higher than in Spain, but Spain is much more tolerant than either the Baltic states or Hungary. And in Poland and Estonia, the solidarity index is much higher than in Sweden, but still lower than in Spain. See Dieter Fuchs and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, "Eastward Enlargement of the European Union and the Identity of Europe," West European Politics 25 (2002). 19-54.
38. For a more in-depth analysis of the European public space, see Philip Schlesinger and Diedre Kevin, "Can the European Union Become a Sphere of Publics?" in Erik Oddvar Eriksen and John Erik Fossum, eds., Democracy in the European Union (London: Routledge). 222-228.
39. Václav Klaus, Ceska cesta (Prague, Czech Republic: Profile, 1994). 136-136.
40. Eurobarometer (Brussels: European Commission, June 2004). 182-182.
41. For an in-depth analysis of a rich set of comparative data on civil society in the new member states, see especially Joerg Forbrig, "Civil Society: Theory and Practice in East-Central Europe" (Unpublished PhD thesis, European University Institute, Florence, 2004).
42. See also Think Tanks in Central and Eastern Europe (Washington, D.C.: Freedom House, 1999);
43. For an in-depth analysis of a rich set of comparative data on civil society in the new member states, see especially Joerg Forbrig, "Civil Society: Theory and Practice in East-Central Europe" (Unpublished PhD thesis, European University Institute, Florence, 2004). See also Think Tanks in Central and Eastern Europe (Washington, D.C.: Freedom House, 1999); and Katherine Gaskin and Justin Davis Smith, A New Civic Europe? A Study of the Extent and Role of Volunteering (London: National Centre for Volunteering, 1997).
44. See http://euobserver.com/?aid=16766;
45. http://www.guardian.co.uk/guardianpolitics/story/0,1238317,00.html For an in-depth analysis of parties in Eastern Europe
46. Herbert Kitschelt et al. Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Interparty Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 1999, 402.
47. See also Anna M. Grzymała-Busse, Redeeming the Communist Past: The Regeneration of
48. Klaus von Beyme, "Parties in the Process of Consolidation in East-Central Europe," in Geoffrey Pridham and Attila Agh, eds., Prospects for Democratic Consolidation in East-Central Europe (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2001), 146, 154.
49. See, e.g., Helena Luczywo, "Media Market Development, Privatisation and Ownership Patterns in SEE and New EU Member Countries" (Conference paper, June 2004). http://www.mirovni-insitut.si/mdia_ownership/conference/pdf/ Galik.pdf ; and Michal Klima, "Czech Media Market 1992-2004" (Conference paper, June 2004), http://www.mirovniinstitut.si/media_ownership/ conference/pdf/Klima.pdf.
50. The notion of "constitutional patriotism" is usually associated with the work of Jürgen Habermas. See, e.g., Jürgen Habermas, "Yet Again: German Identity - A Unified Nation of Angry DM Burghers?" New German Critique 52 (1991). 84-101 ; or Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), 11-16. For a comprehensive analysis of the origin of the concept and Habermas's interpretation of it, see Jan-Werner Müller, Another Country: German Intellectuals, Unification and National Identity (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), 90-119.
51. According to Yves Mény, the draft of the European Constitution has clarified the positions of the European branches of government only slightly. For instance, no clear answer has been given to the question, "Who is the executive of the EU?" See Yves Mény, "Making Sense of the EU: The Achievements of the Convention," Journal of Democracy 14 (2003). 68-69.
52. As Robert A. Dahl rightly argued, "The larger scale of decisions need not lead inevitably to a widening sense of powerlessness, provided citizens can exercise significant control over decisions on the smaller scale of matters important to their daily lives: education, public health, town and city planning." See Robert A. Dahl, "A Democratic Dilemma: System Effectiveness versus Citizen Participation," Political Science Quarterly 109 (1994). 33-33.
53. See Marc Morjé Howard, The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe ( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003 ).
54. See International Herald Tribune, 30 June, 2006, 2-2.
55. The European Union applied this article for the first time in 2000 when Jörg Haider's FPÖ (Freedom Party) extremist party became part of the Austrian government. However, the exercise proved only partly successful and quite controversial. See, e.g., Per Cramér and Pál Wrangle, "The Heider Affair, Law, and European Integration," Europarättslig tidskrift 28 (2000). 28-63 ; or Matthew Happold, "Fourteen against One: The EU Response to Freedom Party Participation in the Austrian Government," International and Comparative Law Quarterly 49 (2000): 953-63.
56. This includes the right to contest actions of the European institutions. See, e.g., Adam Cygan, "Protecting the Interests of Civil Society in Community Decision-Making - The Limits of Article 230 EC," International and Comparative Law Quarterly 52 (2003). 955-1012.