Interpreting bills of rights: The value of a comparative approach

International Journal of Constitutional Law

Volumn 5, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 122-152

  Lee, Jack Tsen Ta ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 33846381010     PISSN: 14742640     EISSN: 14742659     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/icon/mol042     Document Type: Article

References (187)

1. Rudolf von Jhering, Geist des Römichen Rechts auf den Verschiedenen Stufen Seiner Entwicklung [The Spirit of Roman Law at Different Stages of its Development], Part I, 8f (B. Schwabe 9th ed. 1955),
2. cited in Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kötz, Introduction To Comparative Law 17 (Tony Weirtrans., Clarendon 3d rev. ed. 1998).
3. Alberto R. Gonzales, Prepared Remarks, Address at the University of Chicago Law School 2 (Nov. 9, 2005) available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/Attorney-General-Foreign-Law-Speech. Transcript also available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2005/ ag_speech_0511092.html (web sites last visited Oct. 5, 2006).
4. Gov. of Kelantan v. Gov. of Malaya, [1963] 1 M.L.J. 355, 358 (Malaysia).
5. Malaysia Act[1963] c. 35.
6. Adegbenro v. Akintola, [1963] A.C. 614,
7. [1963] 3 W.L.R. 63 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Nig.).
8. Id.,
9. [1963] A.C. at 631-632.
10. Li-ann Thio, The Secular Trumps the Sacred: Constitutional Issues Arising from Colin Chan v. Public Prosecutor, 16 Sing. L. Rev. 26, 62 (1995)
11. Li-ann Thio, Recent Constitutional Developments: Of Shadows and Whips, Race, Rifts and Rights, Terror and Tudungs, Women and Wrongs, Sing. J. Legal Stud. 328, 347 (2002)
12. Victor V. Ramraj, Comparative Constitutional Law in Singapore, 6 Sing. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 302 (2002)
13. Li-ann Thio, Pragmatism and Realism Do Not Mean Abdication: A Critical and Empirical Inquiry into Singapore's Engagement with International Human Rights Law, 8 Sing. Y.B. Int'l L. 41, 59 (2004).
14. Loh Kooi Choon v. Gov't of Malaysia, [1977] 2 M.L.J. 187 (Malay. Fed. Ct.)
15. Phang Chin Hock v. Public Prosecutor, [1980] 1 M.L.J. 70 (Malay. Fed. Ct.)
16. Public Prosecutor v. Pung Chen Choon, [1994] 1 M.L.J. 566 (Malay. Sup. Ct.).
17. See also Public Prosecutor v. Ooi Kee Saik, [1971] 2 M.L.J. 108 (Malay. High Ct.).
18. Ong Ah Chuan v. Public Prosecutor, [1981] A.C. 648,
19. [1980] 3 W.L.R. 855,
20. [1980-1981] S. L.R. 48
21. [1981] 1 M.L.J. 64 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Sing.).
22. Sing. Const. (1999) reprint; available at http://statutes.agc.gov.sg.
23. [1981] A.C. at 669,
24. [1980-1981] S.L.R. at 60-61, para. 22.
25. Att'y-Gen. v. Wain (No. 1), [1991] S.L.R. 383,
26. [1991] 2 M.L.J. 525.
27. Id.
28. [1991] S.L.R. at 393, paras. 31-32.
29. Id.
30. Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v. LeeKuan Yew, [1992] 2 S.L.R. 310.
31. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
32. Lingens v. Austria, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 407 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1986).
33. With the enactment of the Judicial Committee (Repeal) Act 1994 (No. 2 of 1994) (Sing.).
34. Chan Hiang Leng Colin v. Public Prosecutor, [1994] 3 S.L.R. 662.
35. [1994] 3 S.L.R. 681.
36. Peter Williams Nappalli v. Institute of Technical Education, [1998] SGHC 351, paras. 40-42.
37. The four walls doctrine was also cited with approval in Taw Cheng Kong v. Public Prosecutor, [1998] 1 S.L.R. 943, para. 78.
38. Id. at para. 42.
39. Nappalli Peter Williams v. Institute of Technical Education, [1999] 2 S.L.R. 569, para. 19.
40. Supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
41. Supra note 5.
42. Ramraj, supra note 7, at 309-310.
43. Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative Constitutional Interpretation, 74 Ind. L.J. 819 (1999).
44. Choudhry, id., at 838.
45. Ramraj, supra note 7, at 311-313.
46. Kok Hoong Tan Dennis v. Public Prosecutor, [1997] 1 S.L.R. 123.
47. Id. at para. 3 4.
48. Datuk Haji bin Harun Idris v. Public Prosecutor, [1977] 2 M.L.J. 155.
49. Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 538 (1959) S.C.R. 279.
50. Supra note 21.
51. Id. at 308-309.
52. Id. at 313-317.
53. Choudhry, supra note 27, at 836.
54. id.
55. Choudhry, supra note 27, at 857.
56. Id. at 858.
57. Id.
58. Ramraj, supra note 7, at 314.
59. Supra note 15.
60. Tucker v. Douglas, [1950] 2 D.L.R. 827 (Sask. C.A.).
61. Supra note 19.
62. Adelaide Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses Inc v. Commonwealth, (1943) 67 C.L.R. 116 (Austl. High Ct.).
63. Ramraj, supra note 7, at 315.
64. Choudhry, supra note 27, at 892.
65. Ramraj, supra note 7, at 315-316.
66. See the discussion on cross-fertilization infra, at the text accompanying notes 107-108.
67. Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 Yale L.J. 1225-1228 (1999).
68. Seth F. Kreimer, Invidious Comparisons: Some Cautionary Remarks on the Process of Constitutional Borrowing, 1 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 640, 648-649 (1999).
69. Gonzales, supra note 2, at 19.
70. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988).
71. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989).
72. In Thompson v. Oklahoma, supra note 54, the Supreme Court held that statutes that permitted the imposition of capital punishment on a person under the age of sixteen at the time when the offense was committed violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution.
73. Stanford v. Kentucky, supra note 5 5, decided that such punishment was permissible if a person was over the age of fifteen but under eighteen at the relevant time.
74. The latter decision was abrogated in Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005):
75. infra note 67 and the accompanying text.
76. Lorraine E. Weinrib, Constitutional Conceptions and Constitutional Comparativism, in Defining the field Comparative Constitutional Law (Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet eds., Praeger 2002), ch. 1, 3 at 5.
77. Thompson, supra note 54, 487 U.S. at 830-831, pointing out that the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and the Soviet Union did not permit the execution of juveniles; that the death penalty had been abolished entirely in Australia (except for New South Wales), West Germany, France, Portugal, the Netherlands, and all Scandinavian countries; and that it was available only for exceptional crimes such as treason in Canada, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and in New South Wales in Australia.
78. Stanford, supra note 55, 492 U.S. at 389. Justice Brennan's dissent was joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens.
79. Thompson, supra note 54, 487 U.S. at 868 n. 4
80. Stanford, supra note 55, 492 U.S. at 369 n. 1.
81. Thompson and Stanford, id.
82. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
83. Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 18 USC §921 et. seq, (named for presidential press secretary James Brady, who was shot with an illegal handgun during an attempted assassination of President Ronald Reagan in 1981).
84. Printz, id. at 521 U.S. at 976 (Stevens J. joining).
85. Id. at 977.
86. Id. at 921 note 11,
87. citing U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 at 575, 115 S. Ct. 1624 at 1638 (1995).
88. Roper v. Sinmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
89. Supra note 55.
90. 1 W. & M., c. 2,s. 10: Roper, supra note 67 at 1198-1199.
91. Roper, id. at 1200.
92. Id. at 1215-1216. However, as she did not believe that a genuine national consensus against the juvenile death penalty had yet developed, and because she did not believe that the majority's moral proportionality argument justified a categorical, age-based constitutional rule, she was of the view that the international consensus described by the majority could not be regarded as confirmation of the Court's decision:
93. id. at 1215.
94. Id. at 1226.
95. Scalia J. found the majority's particular reliance on the laws of the United Kingdom "perhaps the most indefensible part of its opinion." Taking a characteristically originalist viewpoint, he said it was true that the United States shared a common history with the United Kingdom, and that the Court often consulted English sources when asked to discern the meaning of a constitutional text written against the backdrop of eighteenth-century English law and legal thought. If the majority had applied that approach, it would have found that the "cruel and unusual punishments" provision of the English Declaration of Rights was originally meant to describe those punishments that were not authorized by common law or statute, but that were nonetheless administered by the Crown or the Crown's judges. Under that reasoning, the death penalty for under-18 offenders would have easily survived the present challenge: Id. at 1227.
96. See also id. at 1229: "...I do not believe that approval by' other nations and peoples' should buttress our commitment to American principles any more than (what should logically follow) disapproval by'other nations and peoples' should weaken that commitment." Eclecticism toward foreign law may not objectionable if one appreciates the distinction between legal transplants and cross-fertilization; this point is discussed in section 3, infra.
97. Supra note 70.
98. Roper, supra note 67 at 1229.
99. Id. at 1217-1218 per Scalia J. (dissenting),
100. citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86 at 101, 78 S. Ct. 590 (1958).
101. Vicki Jackson, however, notes that foreign and international law have been referred to in interpreting the Eighth Amendment since the nineteenth century: Vicki Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 109, 109 (2005),
102. citing Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 134 (1879) (sentence of death by shooting in the Utah Territory constitutional, partly because" [c]orresponding rules [that] prevail in other countries" supported the practice)
103. see also the cases cited id. at note 4.
104. Tushnet, supra note 51.
105. Tushnet, id. at 1236-1237.
106. See also Jackson, supra note 77, at 116-117 (if more than one interpretation of the Constitution is plausible from domestic legal sources, approaches taken in other countries may provide helpful empirical information in deciding what interpretation will work best; further, comparisons can shed light on the distinctive functioning of the domestic legal system)
107. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, A Decent Respect of the Opinions of [Human]kind: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 64 Cambridge L.J. 575, 580, 584 (2005) (foreign opinions not authoritative, but "add to the store of knowledge relevant to the solution of trying questions," and since judges are free to consult other forms of legal commentary such as restatements of law, treatises, and law reviews, there should be no objection to them considering the analysis of a question contained in a foreign case as well).
108. Weinrib, supra note 57, at 15.
109. See also Jackson, supra note 77, at 118 (individual rights embedded in national constitutions have 'universal' aspects, and foreign or international legal sources may illuminate these suprapositive dimensions of constitutional rights, as when constitutional text or doctrine requires contemporary judgments about a quality of action or freedom, such as the "reasonableness" of a search or the "cruelty" of a punishment).
110. Ramraj, supra note 7, at 304.
111. Id. at 325-326.
112. Id. at 329.
113. Nguyen Tuong Van v. Public Prosecutor, [2005] 1 S.L.R. 103 (Sing. C.A.).
114. Cap. 185, [2001] Rev. Ed. (Sing.).
115. Nguyen Tuong Van, supra note 84, at para. 89. Art. 9(1) is set out in the text accompanying notes 10-11.
116. Id. at paras. 91-92.
117. In addition, it held that even if there were a customary international law rule prohibiting execution by hanging, the domestic statute providing for such punishment, that is, the Misuse of Drugs Act, prevailed in the event of inconsistency: Id. at para. 94.
118. Note, however, the view taken that if the word law in the Constitution includes international law, it is only where the executive and the courts "agree" that a specific customary rule (which conflicts with parliamentary legislation) applies that such a customary rule may be said to have been incorporated into the Constitution, unless a nonderogable rule of customary international law (that is, jus cogens) is involved where, as a matter of law, it would be unimaginable that Singapore would object to it: C.L. Lim, The Constitution and the Reception of Customary International Law: Nguyen Tuong Van v. Public Prosecutor, [2005] Sing. J. Legal Stud. 218, 227-233.
119. S. Afr. (Interim) Const. 1993.
120. Hoyt Webb, The Constitutional Court of South Africa: Rights Interpretation and Comparative Constitutional Law, 1 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 205, 206-207 (1998).
121. S. Afr. Const. 1996.
122. Except for one provision relating to the election of chairpersons to municipal councils: Proclamation No R 6, 1997.
123. Webb, supra note 90, at 206-207.
124. Id. at 208 and 219.
125. State v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) S.A. 391 (C.C.) (S. Afr.).
126. Id. at 414.
127. The Fifth Amendment states that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury..." and "nor shall any person...be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law."
128. Makwanyane, supra note 95, at 422.
129. Unlike the South African interim constitution, the United States Constitution does not have a limitations clause, thus forcing courts to find limits to constitutional rights through a narrow interpretation of the rights themselves: Makwanyane, id. at 435.
130. Id. at 417-421.
131. See Webb, supra note 90, at 238-240.
132. Makwanyane, supra note 95, at 433-434.
133. Li-ann Thio, An 'i' for an 'I'? Singapore's Communitarian Model of Constitutional Adjudication, 27 Hong Kong. L.J. 152, 176,(1997)
134. quoted in Ramraj, supra note 7, at 331.
135. Seth F. Kreimer, Invidious Comparisons: Some Cautionary Remarks on the Process of Constitutional Borrowing, 1 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 640 at 646-647 (1999).
136. Id. at 642.
137. John Bell, Mechanisms for Cross-Fertilisation of Administrative Law in Europe, in New Directions in European Public Law (Jack Beatson & Takis Tridimas eds., Hart 1998), ch. 11, 147.
138. Id. at 147-148.
139. See, e.g., Alan Watson, Legal Transplants and Law Reform, 92 L.Q.R. 79, 81 (1976): "Without hesitation one can accept the proposition that a foreign legal rule will not easily be borrowed successfully if it does not fit into the domestic political context. The word 'political' is used...with a rather wide meaning, with reference not only to the structure of government and governmental institutions but also to powerful organised groups..."
140. Bell, supra note 105, at 147-148.
141. Watson, supra note 107, at 79.
142. Makwanyane, supra note 95.
143. Section 33(1) states: "The rights entrenched in this Chapter may be limited by law of general application, provided that such limitation- a. shall be permissible only to the extent that it is- i. reasonable; and ii. justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality; and b. shall not negate the essential content of the right in question, and provided further that any limitation to- i. a right entrenched in section 10, 11, 12, 14 (1), 21, 25 or 30 (1) (d) or (e) or (2); or ii. a right entrenched in section 15, 16, 17, 18, 23 or 24, in so far as such right relates to free and fair political activity, shall, in addition to being reasonable as required in paragraph (a) (i), also be necessary."
144. Makwanyane, supra note 95, at 436-439.
145. Id. at 438-439.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 436.
148. See Webb, supra note 90, at 241-243.
149. Ramraj, supra note 7, at 329-331.
150. Id. at 331-332.
151. Id. at 331.
152. Gonzales, supra note 2, at 10.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 11-12
155. See also Ernest A. Young, Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 148, 165-166 (2005) (decision costs (time, effort, and expense involved in deciding cases in a particular way) and error costs (likelihood of making mistakes by pursuing a particular method) seem likely to be high for American courts dealing with foreign materials, given language and cultural barriers and most American lawyers' lack of training in comparative analysis).
156. Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 132 (2005).
157. Id. at 133.
158. Supra note 67.
159. Waldron, supra note 122, at 144.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 145.
162. Id.
163. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 77, at 125-126 ("[P]ractices of countries with commitments to human rights, democracy, and the rule of law roughly comparable to ours [the U.S.] are likely to have more positive persuasive value as to the empirical consequences of doctrinal rules, the legitimate justifications for government action, or the implications of basic constitutional commitments").
164. Young, supra note 121, at 167.
165. See also Gonzales, supra note 2, at 12: "[I]t cannot be expected that the laws of all sovereign nations - or, perhaps, even all the courts of a single nation - will agree on a disputed point of constitutional law. The decisionmaker will then be left somehow to choose among them. And this, of course, may lead to...judicial activism or unrestrained judicial discretion..."
166. Young, supra note 121, at 166.
167. Supra note 9.
168. Reyes v. The Queen, [2002] 2 A.C. 235,
169. [2002] 2 W.L.R. 1034 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Belize).
170. Enright v. Ireland, [2003] 2I.R. 321 (H.Ct.) (Ir.).
171. Ir. Const., 1937.
172. Enright v. Ireland, supra note 134, at 331.
173. Id. at 334.
174. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144(1962).
175. John W.F. Allison, Transplantation and Cross-Fertilisation, in New Directions in European Public Law (Jack Beatson & Takis Tridimas eds., Hart 1998), 175-176.
176. Mohamed v. President of the Republic of South Africa, 2001 (3) S.A. 893 (C.C.) (S. Afr.).
177. State v. Makwanyane, supra note 95.
178. U.S. v. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283,
179. (2001) 195 D.L.R. (4th):
180. see Mohamed, supra note 140, at 913, paras. 46-47.
181. Soering v. U.K., 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1989)
182. Chahal v. U.K., 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 413 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1996)
183. Hilal v. U.K., 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 2 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2001):
184. see Mohamed, id. at 916-917, paras. 56-58.
185. S. Afr. Const. 1996, supra note 91, s. 7(2):
186. supra note 91, s. 7(2):
187. see Mohamed, id. at 58.