Hommage à Louis Favoreu

International Journal of Constitutional Law

Volumn 5, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 17-27

  Neuborne, Burt ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 33846281579     PISSN: 14742640     EISSN: 14742659     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/icon/mol046     Document Type: Article

References (68)

1. The phrase "missionary" is drawn from Didier Maus, Conseil Constitutionnel: Colloque du 22 octobre 2004, Trente ans de saisine parlementaire, Hommage à Louis Favoreu [Constitutional Council Colloquium of October 22, 2004: Thirty Years of Access by the Parliamentary Minority - Homage to Louis Favoreu], available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/bilan/annexes/coloct2004i2.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2006).
2. See also Didier Maus, Louis Favoreu, Le Monde, Sept. 4, 2004.
3. From among the more than 275 articles written by Professor Favoreu, I have always viewed Le droit constitutionnel, le droit de la Constitution et la constitution du droit [Constitutional Law, the Law of the Constitution and the Constitution of the Law], 1 Revue Français de Droit Constitutionnel [R.F.D.C.] 72 (1990-1991), as the best summary of his philosophy of constitutional law.
4. Grandes decisions du Conseil Constitutionnel [Landmark Decisions of the Constitutional Council] (Louis Favoreu, Loïc Philip & Andre Roux, eds., Dalloz, 13th ed. 2005).
5. Burt Neuborne, Judicial Review and Separation of Powers in France and the United States, 57 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 363 (1982).
6. In my experience, the only Americans to rival Holmes in French eyes are Jerry Lewis and Woody Allen.
7. Professor Favoreu was unique in his ability to resist the blandishments of Paris, even as he enjoyed them. His widely admired thesis, Du déni de justice en droit public français [On the Denial of Justice in French Public Law] (Librairie générale de droit et jurisprudence 1964) marked him as a young scholar of exceptional promise.
8. His article Le Conseil constitutionnel, régulateur de l'activité normative des Pouvoirs publics [The Constitutional Council, Regulator of the Normative Activities of Public Authorities], 83 Revue De Droit Public [R.D.P.] 5 (1967) cemented his academic reputation. After a short sojourn at La Réunion, Professor Favoreu returned to Aix-Marseilles as dean of the Faculty of Law in 1973, and then as president of the university from 1978 to 1983. He remained at the center of an extensive academic world at Aix-Marseilles until his death in 2004 in his sixty-eighth year. It is fair to say that for at least twenty-five years, not a year went by without an unsuccessful effort to lure him to Paris.
9. See Louis Favoreu, Modèle américain et modèle européen de justice constitutionnel [The American Model and the European Model of Constitutional Justice], IV Annuaire international de justice constitutionnelle 57 (1988).
10. For helpful English-language discussion of the French Constitutional Council, see James Beardsley, Constitutional Review in France, 1975 Sup. Ct. Rev. 189
11. James Beardsley, The Constitutional Council and Constitutional Liberties in France, 20 Am. J. Comp. L. 431 (1972)
12. George Haimbaugh, Was It France's Marbury v. Madison? 35 Ohio St. L.J. 910 (1974)
13. Barry Nicholas, Fundamental Rights and Judicial Review in France (pts. 1 & 2), 85 Pub. L. 82 (1978), 85 Pub. L. 155 (1978).
14. See, e.g., Louis Favoreu & Loïc Philip, Le Conseil constitutionnel (Presses Univ. de France, 6th ed. 1995) 1978
15. Les cent premières annulations prononcées par le Conseil constitutionnel [The First Hundred Nullifications Pronounced by the Constitutional Council], 103 R.D.P. 443 (1987)
16. Louis Favoreu, Conseil constitutionnel, Mythes et réalités [The Constitutional Council: Myths and Realities], 132 Regards sur l'actualité 12 (1987)
17. L'apport du Conseil Constitionnel au droit public [The Contribution of the Constitutional Council to Public Law], in Revue pouvoirs 17-26 (Presses Univ. de France, 1980)
18. Louis Favoreu, La constitutionnalisation du droit [The Constitutionalization of the Law], in L'unité du Droit: Mélanges en hommage à Roland Drago [The Unity of the Law: Collected Tributes to Roland Drago] 25-42 (Economica 1996)
19. Louis Favoreu, L'application directe et l'effet indirect des normes constitutionnelles [The Direct Application and Indirect Effect of Constitutional Norms], 1 Revue Francaise de droit administratif [R.F.D.A.] 174 (1984)
20. Louis Favoreu, La politique saisie par le droit: Alternance, cohabitation et Conseil constitutionnel [Politics Captured by the Law: Regime change, cohabitation and the Constitutional Council] (Economica 1988).
21. Available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/dossier/quarante/ q18.htm.
22. I believe that the first exercise of judicial review in modern French history took place in 1959 when the Conseil Constitutionnel, exercising its mandatory article 61(1) authority to review the internal rules of the National Assembly, invalidated a rule permitting the National Assembly to bar membership to political parties that it determined failed to respect the principles of national sovereignty and democracy. See CC decision no. 59-2DC, June 17, 18, and 24, 1959. I have sought to explain the 1959 decision as an effort to enforce principles of separation of powers by preventing the National Assembly from both promulgating the rule and acting to implement it in particular cases. See Neuborne, supra note 4, at 390-391.
23. The 1971 decision striking down prior restraints on free association was the result of a challenge lodged by the president of the Senate under the pre-1974 rules that limited access to the Constitutional Council to the president, and the leaders of the National Assembly and Senate. See CC decision no. 71-44DC, July 16, 1971. During the Gaullist years, only the president of the Senate was likely to challenge a law enacted by the parliamentary majority. The 1971 decision is discussed in Neuborne, supra note 4, at 391-392.
24. The French Senate is an indirectly elected body with a suspensive veto.
25. See 1958 Const. art. 61(2).
26. See CC decision no. 75-56DC, July 23, 1975. The early efforts by the Conseil Constitutionnel to chart the boundary between the legislative domain of loi and the executive's domain of règlement is discussed in Louis Favoreu, La Délégalisation des textes de forme législative par le Conseil constitutionnel [The Delegalization of Legislative Texts by the Constitutional Council], in Mélanges offerts à Marcel Waline: Le juge et le droit public [Assorted tributes to Marcel Walne: The Judge and Public Law] 429 (Librarie Generale de Droit et de Jurisprudence 1974),
27. and Louis Favoreu, Le domaine de la loi et du règlement [The Domain of Law and Regulation] (Economica, 2d ed. 1981) (1978).
28. It has been reported that former president Valéry Giscard D'Estaing has recently begun to sit with the Conseil Constitutionnel.
29. French law operates a separate judicial system for the review of administrative actions, culminating in the Conseil d'État. Ordinary legal questions proceed through a judicial system that culminates in the Cour de Cassation. The Conseil Constitutionnel stands apart from the two principal judicial systems. The Cour des Comptes considers specialized financial issues. Professor Favoreu wrote perceptively on the problem of integrating the jurisprudence of the Conseil Constitutionnel into the day-to-day activities of the Conseil d'État and the Cour de Cassation. See Louis Favoreu, Dualité on unite d'ordre juridique - Conseil constitutionnel et Conseil d'Etat participent-ils de deux ordres juridiques differents? [Duality or Unity in the Juridical Order - Do the Conseil Contitutionnel and Conseil d'Etat Belong to Two Different Legal Systerns?], in Conseil Constitutionnel et Conseil d'Etat 145-190 (Librairie générale de droit et jurisprudence, 1988)
30. Louis Favoreu, La Cour de Cassation, le Conseil constitutionnel et l'article 66 de la Constitution [The Court of Cassation, the Constitutional Council and Article 66 of the Constitution], 23 Recueil Le Dalloz 169 (1986)
31. Louis Favoreu, L'application des decisions du Conseil constitutionnel par le juge administrative (nouveaux développements) [The Application of Constitutional Council Decisions by the Administrative Judge (New Developments)], 6 R.F.D.A. 142 (1989)
32. Favoreu, L'application directe et l'effet indirect, supra note 8.
33. There is some room in the Conseil d'État for postpromulgation review of executive efforts to enforce a controversial statute, but only under the rubric that the executive's acts are not authorized by the statute. See Amicale des Annamites de Paris, CE Ass., July 11, 1956, Rec 317.
34. While constitutional values play a role in the Conseil d'État's reading of the scope of a parliamentary grant of power to the executive, the Conseil d'État has not yet crossed the Rubicon by holding that a statute cannot authorize the executive to engage in an unconstitutional act. See Favoreu, Dualité on unite, supra note 16
35. Louis Favoreu, L'application des décisions du Conseil constitutionnel par le Conseil d'Etat et le Tribunal des conflits (bilan provisoire) [The Application of Constitutional Council Decisions by the Council of State and the Conflicts Tribunal (Provisional Report)], 4 R.F.D.A. 264 (1987).
36. Since a challenge automatically suspends the promulgation of a law enacted by parliament, ordinarily, decisions must be rendered within thirty days of an article 61 (2) challenge.
37. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
38. See Felix Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 1002 (1924).
39. The three procedural limitations on judicial review arise out of the Marbury justification are standing, mootness, and ripeness. See e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (discussing standing)
40. DeFunis v. Odegard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (discussing mootness)
41. and UPW v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (discussing ripeness).
42. David Gans, Strategic Facial Challenges, 85 B.U.L. Rev. 1333 (2005).
43. See Programm commun de government du Parti communiste et du Parti socialiste [The Joint Government Program of the Communist Party and the Socialist Party] 145-146 (Editions Sociales, 1972).
44. See Rapport Krieg [1974] Journal officiel de la république français [J.O.] Deb. parl. A.N. 4995.
45. The definitive statement of the theory of French parliamentary supremacy under the Third and Fourth Republics is Raymond Carré de Malberg, La loi, expression de la volonté générale [The Law as an Expression of the general Will] (Economica 1931).
46. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and the preamble to the 1946 constitution are incorporated by reference into the Constitution of the Fifth Republic, rendering the Conseil Constitutionnel's use of those texts to invalidate legislation somewhat less dramatic.
47. The process is described by Professor Favoreu in Le bloc de constitutionnalité [The Bloc of Constitutionality] (Colloque de Seville 1989).
48. Marshall's ingenious opinion in Marbury makes at least two questionable assumptions: (1) that the text of the Constitution was, without more, subject to enforcement in a court; and (2) that the judiciary, as opposed to the legislature, was the appropriate body to construe ambiguous constitutional provisions. See generally Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 Duke L.J. 1. Don't get me wrong. I rejoice that Marshall's opinion jump-started judicial review and cannot imagine American democracy without it - but the positivist patrimony of judicial review is awfully thin.
49. For recent commentary on Marbury, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Marbury and the Constitutional Mind: A Bicentennial Essay on the Wages of Doctrinal Tension, 91 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2003).
50. For an excellent historical study of Marbury, See William E. Nelson, Marbury v. Madison: The Origins and Legacy of Judicial Review (Univ. Press Kansas 2000).
51. Theories of literalism and originalism seek to rescue judicial review from its dubious positivist patrimony by limiting it to settings in which a clearly discernible external command can be discovered. See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of the United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and The Law (Amy Guttmann ed., Princeton Univ. Press 1997).
52. Favoreu, supra note 6.
53. The early efforts of the Supreme Court of India were characterized by a narrow literalism. See A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 27.
54. By 1973, the Court had adopted the "basic structure" doctrine that purported to review the constitutionality of constitutional amendments that were inconsistent with the basic democratic structure of the document. Kesavananda Bharathi v State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461.
55. In 1978, the Court adopted a more purposive interpretive philosophy. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 597.
56. For an overview of the evolution of the Supreme Court of India, see Burt Neuborne, The Supreme Court of India, 1 Int'l J. Const. L. (I•CON) 475 (2003).
57. E.g., Cours constitutionelles européennes et droits fondamentaux [European Constitutional Courts and Fundamental Rights], in Colloque D'Aix-en-Provence, 19-20 et 21 février 1981 [European Constitutional Court and Fundamental Rights, Second Aix-en-Provence Symposium, February 19-21, 1981] (Economica 1982)
58. Actualité et légitimité du contrôle jurisdictionel des lois en Europe occidentale [The Practice and Legitimacy of Judicial Review of Legislation in Western Europe], 100 R.D.P. 1146 (1984)
59. La légitimité du juge constitutionnel [The Legitimacy of the Constitutional Judge], 46 Revue Internationale de Droit Comparé 558 (1994)
60. La notion de Cour constitutionnelle [The Concept of the Constitutional Court], in De la constitution [About the Constitution] 15-28 (Helbing & Liechtenhahn 1996)
61. Les Cours Constitutionnelles [The Constitutional Courts] (Presses Univ. de France, 3d ed. 1996) (1986)
62. Quel(s) modèle(s) constitutionnel(s)? [Which Constitutional Model (s)?], 7 Revue Universelles des Droits de l'Homme 337 (1995).
63. Louis Favoreu, Los tribunales constitucionales [The Constitutional Courts], in Lal jurisdiccion constitucional en iberoamericana [Constitutional Jurisdiction in Latin America] (Francisco Fernandez Segado & Domingo Garcia Belaunde eds., Dykinson 1997).
64. See La constitutionnalisation du droit [The Constitutionalization of Law], supra note 8, at 25-42
65. Louis Favoreu, La modernité des vues de Charles Eisenmann sur la justice constitutionnelle [The Modernity of Charles Eisenmann's Views on Constitutional Adjudication], in La justice constitutionnelle et la Haute Cour constitutionnelle en Autriche [Constitutional Justice and the High Constitutional Court of Austria] 87 (Charles Eisenmann ed., Economica 1987).
66. Even the United Kingdom, a principal bastion of parliamentary supremacy, has indirectly adopted a form of judicial review by conferring jurisdiction on its courts to enforce the European Convention of Human Rights. Human Rights Act 1998, 46 Eliz. 2, c.42, 38 I.L.M. 464 (Eng.).
67. See Lord Irvine of Lairg, Sovereignty in Comparative Perspective: Constitutionalism in Britain and America, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 18-19 (2001).
68. See generally Norman Dorsen, Michel Rosenfeld, András Sajó & Susanne Baer, Comparative Constitutionalism (Thomson West 2003).