The political economy of Chinese investment in North Korea: A preliminary assessment

Asian Survey

Volumn 46, Issue 6, 2006, Pages 898-916

  Kim, Jae Cheol ^a  

^a The Catholic University of Korea   (South Korea)

Author keywords

China; Investment; North Korea; North Korean regime; Sino North Korean relations

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC GROWTH; ECONOMIC REFORM; ECONOMIC RELATIONS; INVESTMENT; POLITICAL ECONOMY;

ASIA; CHINA; EURASIA; FAR EAST; KOREA; NORTH KOREA; P'YONGYANG;

EID: 33846109321     PISSN: 00044687     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1525/as.2006.46.6.898     Document Type: Article

References (92)

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