The High Level Panel Report on Threats, Challenges and Change and the Future Role of the United Nations Security Council

Leiden Journal of International Law

Volumn 18, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 605-620

  Manusama, Kenneth M ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

collective security; economic and social threats; High Level Panel; Security Council; terrorism; weapons of mass destruction

Indexed keywords

EID: 33846099289     PISSN: 09221565     EISSN: 14789698     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S092215650500289X     Document Type: Article

References (95)

1. A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility-Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, UN Doc. A/59/565 (2004) (hereinafter Report).
2. See, e.g., Agenda for Peace, UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111 (1992); Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, UN Doc. S/1995/1 (1995); Agenda for Democratization-Support by the United Nations System of the Efforts of Governments to Promote and Consolidate New or Restored Democracies, UN Doc. A/51/761 (1996);We the People: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century, Report of the Secretary-General ('Millennium Report'), UN Doc. A/54/2000 (2000).
3. See Report, Agenda for Peace note 1, para. 13.
4. Report., para. 14.
5. Report., para. 16.
6. Report., paras. 17-31.
7. Report., paras. 17-23. The Panel notes that 9/11 increased the number of people living in poverty by tenmillion, and the total cost to the world economy probably exceeded $80 billion.Moreover, the Report also mentions in the relevant paragraphs issues such as terrorism, poverty and environmental degradation.
8. Report., para. 24.
9. Report., para. 30.
10. Report., paras. 31-43.
11. Report., para. 35.
12. Report., paras. 40-1.
13. Report., para. 42.
14. Report., para. 43.
15. Report., para. 30.
16. See, e.g., D. Sarooshi, The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security-The Delegation by the UN Security Council of its Chapter VII Powers (1998), at 5; K. Herndl, ‘Reflections on the role, functions and procedures of the Security Council, (1987) 6 Recueil des Cours 206, at 297; N. D. White and Ö. Ülgen, ‘The Security Council and the Decentralized Military Option: Constitutionality and Function’, (1997) 94 NILR 378, at 382.
17. See Report, The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security-The Delegation by the UN Security Council of its Chapter VII Powers note 1, at 25.
18. Report., para. 48.
19. Report., para. 56.
20. Report., paras. 59-73.
21. Report., para. 67.
22. UN Doc. S/PV.4087 (2000).
23. UN Doc. S/RES/1308 (2000).
24. See, e.g., P.Wallensteen and P. Johansson, ‘Security Council Decisions in Perspective’, in D. M. Malone (ed.), The UN Security Council-From the ColdWar to the 21st Century (2004), at 28.
25. ‘Security Council Decisions in Perspective’., at 28.
26. See Report, ‘Security Council Decisions in Perspective’ note 1, paras. 180-1.
27. Report., para. 182.
28. UN Doc. S/RES/1267 (1999).
29. See Report, UN Doc note 1, paras. 84-8.
30. For an enlightening and persuasive argument for greater protection of access and right to water, see, e.g., A. Hildering, International Law, Sustainable Development andWaterManagement (2004).
31. See Report, For an enlightening and persuasive argument for greater protection of access and right to water note 1, paras. 91-7.
32. Report., para. 90.
33. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 13(b).
34. See Report, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court note 1, paras. 101-3.
35. Report., para. 146.
36. Report., para. 110.
37. Report., para. 111.
38. Report., paras. 120-1.
39. Report., paras. 120-1, 124.
40. Report., paras. 127-8.
41. Report., paras. 129-30.
42. Report., para. 122.
43. F. L. Kirgis, ‘International Law and the Report of the High-Level U.N. Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change’, ASIL Insight, December 2004, available at http://www.asil.org.
44. See Report, ‘International Law and the Report of the High-Level U.N. Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change’ note 1, para. 129.
45. Report., para. 134; Kirgis, Report note 43.
46. UN Doc. S/RES/687.
47. UN Doc. S/23500 (1992).
48. UN Doc. S/RES/984 (1995).
49. UN Doc. S/RES/1540 (2004).
50. Resolution 1540 (2004) is a ‘legislative’ resolution as in the case of Resolution 1373 (2001), which purport to impose general and binding obligations on states. See, e.g., P. Szasz, ‘The Security Council starts legislating’, (2002) 96 AJIL 901. For the argument that the Security Council is an executive organ and not authorized to enact resolutions of a legislative character, see, e.g., K. M. Manusama, The Principle of Legality in the Law and Post-ColdWar Practice of the United Nations Security Council (forthcoming 2005).
51. See Report, Resolution 1540 note 1, para. 136.
52. P. Teixeira Da Silva, ‘Weapons ofMass Destruction: The Iraqi case’, inMalone, Report note 24, at 217.
53. See Report, ‘Weapons ofMass Destruction: The Iraqi case’ note 1, para. 132.
54. See US State Department, at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls/24134.htm.
55. See, e.g.,M. Byers, ‘Policing the High Seas: The Proliferation Security Initiative’, (2004) 98 AJIL 526, at 528.
56. ‘Policing the High Seas: The Proliferation Security Initiative’. Byers notes that the right to interdiction of vessels is recognized, inter alia, with respect to the slave trade and drug smugglers. ‘Policing the High Seas: The Proliferation Security Initiative’., at 534-6, 538-40.
57. See Report, ‘Policing the High Seas: The Proliferation Security Initiative’ note 1, paras. 147-8.
58. Report., para. 146.
59. See, e.g., E. C. Luck, ‘Tackling terrorism’, inMalone, Report note 24, at 85.
60. Report, ‘Tackling terrorism’ note 1, para. 151.
61. See Report note 50.
62. See Szasz, Report note note 50, at 902
63. Szasz., at 902-3.
64. E.Rosand, ‘Security CouncilResolution1373 (2001), theCounter-Terrorism Committee,andtheFightAgainst Terrorism’, (2003) 97 AJIL 333, at 333-4.
65. See Report, ‘Security CouncilResolution1373 note 1, para. 156.
66. Report., para. 159.
67. Report., para. 160.
68. Report., para. 164.
69. The Report describes terrorism as ‘any action, in addition to actions already specified by the existing conventions on aspects of terrorism, the Geneva Conventions and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act’.
70. Resolution 1566 (2004) describes terrorism as: ‘criminal acts, including against civilians, committedwith the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror inthe general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a governmentoraninternational organization todoor to abstainfromdoinganyact,whichconstituteoffences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature. ’ UN Doc. S/RES/1566 (2004).
71. See Report, Resolution 1566 note 1, para. 81.
72. Report., para. 188.
73. ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States of America’, (2002) 41 ILM 1478.
74. See, e.g., T. Franck, ‘Preemption, Prevention and Anticipatory Self-defence: New Law Regarding the Recourse to Force?’, (2004) 27 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev 425.
75. See Report, ‘Preemption, Prevention and Anticipatory Self-defence: New Law Regarding the Recourse to Force?’ note 1, at para. 191.
76. Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for InternationallyWrongful Acts,UNDoc. A/CN.4/L.602/Rev.1 (2001).
77. See UN Doc. S/2001/947 (2001) (letter to the Security Council of the US, as required by Article 51, notifying the Council of its defensive actions).
78. See, e.g., E. deWet, The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council (2004).
79. See Report, The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council note 1, para. 198.
80. T. Franck, Recourse to Force-State Action Against Threats and Armed Attacks (2002), 27.
81. See, e.g., Recourse to Force-State Action Against Threats and Armed Attacks., at 26; deWet, Recourse to Force-State Action Against Threats and Armed Attacks note 81, at 260-5.
82. See, e.g., D. Sarooshi, The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security-The Delegation by the UN Security Council of its Chapter VII Powers (1998), 148, and the sources cited therein.
83. Gill argues, ‘[s]ince the Security Councilhas the authority to decide toemploymilitary enforcement measures under Article 42 there is no reason why it should not be able to authorize or recommend such operations under the same provision’. T. Gill, ‘Legal and Some Political Limitations on the Power of the UN Security Council to Exercise its Enforcement Powers under Chapter VII of the Charter’, (1995) 26 NYIL 33, at 58.
84. See, e.g., N. Blokker, ‘Is the Authorization Authorized? Powers and Practice of the UN Security Council to Authorize theUse of Force by “Coalitions of theAble andWilling”, (2000) 11 EJIL 541. This is also recognized by the Report, paras. 212-13.
85. F. Berman, ‘The AuthorizationModel: Resolution 678 and its Effects’, inMalone, ‘Is the Authorization Authorized? Powers and Practice of the UN Security Council to Authorize theUse of Force by “Coalitions of theAble andWilling” note 24, at 155-61.
86. See, e.g., J. Lobel, M. Ratner, ‘Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous Authorizations to Use Force, Cease-fires and the Iraqi Inspection Regime, (1999) 93 AJIL 124;White and Ülgen, ‘The AuthorizationModel: Resolution 678 and its Effects’ note 16, at 378.
87. See Report, ‘Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous Authorizations to Use Force note 1, para. 203.
88. The Responsibility to Protect-Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001).
89. See Report, The Responsibility to Protect-Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty note 1, para. 206.
90. Report., paras. 207-8.
91. See, e.g., I.Daalder, ‘TheUse of Force in a ChangingWorld-US and European Perspectives, (2003) 16LJIL 171, at 179. Daalder also suggests for consideration the protection of ‘global public good’, and ‘lessmalignant acts or even inadvertent threats’, such as ‘large-scale epidemiological outbreaks or environmental disasters’.
92. In ‘Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All’ Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/59/2005 (2005).
93. See, e.g., Daalder, ‘Larger Freedom: Towards Development note 94, at 180 (advocating a genuine reappraisal of the norms on the use of force, instead of re-interpreting them over and over).
94. See, e.g., E. Suy, ‘Is the United Nations Security Council Still Relevant? AndWas it Ever?’, (2004) 12 Tul. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 7, at 24-5.
95. See, e.g., UN Doc. S/RES/1593 (2005) (referral of the crimes committed in Darfur, Sudan, by the Security Council).