A verifiable formal specification for RBAC model with constraints of separation of duty

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 4318 LNCS, Issue , 2006, Pages 196-210

  Yuan, Chunyang ^a,b   He, Yeping ^a   He, Jianbo ^a,b   Zhou, Yi ^a,b  

^a INSTITUTE OF SOFTWARE   (China)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CHINESE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES   (China)

Author keywords

Formal specification; RBAC; Separation of duty; Verification

Indexed keywords

CONSTRAINT THEORY; FORMAL LANGUAGES; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; SECURITY OF DATA;

FORMAL SPECIFICATION; RBAC; SEPARATION OF DUTY;

SPECIFICATIONS;

EID: 33845944921     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/11937807_16     Document Type: Conference Paper

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