Management of a transboundary wildlife population: A self-enforcing cooperative agreement with renegotiation and variable transfer payments

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

Volumn 53, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 54-67

  Bhat, Mahadev G ^a   Huffaker, Ray G ^b  

^a FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Bargaining agreements; Differential games; Migratory population; Renegotiation proofness; Variable transfer payments

Indexed keywords

CONTRACTS; ENVIRONMENTAL ENGINEERING; MATHEMATICAL MODELS;

BARGAINING AGREEMENTS; DIFFERENTIAL GAMES; MIGRATORY POPULATION; RENEGOTIATION PROOFNESS; VARIABLE TRANSFER PAYMENTS (VTP);

BIODIVERSITY;

BARGAINING; COOPERATIVE SECTOR; NEGOTIATION PROCESS; TRANSBOUNDARY COOPERATION; VOLUNTARY APPROACH; WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT; WILLINGNESS TO PAY;

MAMMALIA;

EID: 33845927913     PISSN: 00950696     EISSN: 10960449     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2006.04.002     Document Type: Article

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