The warming of Turkish-Russian relations: Motives and implications

Demokratizatsiya

Volumn 14, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 127-143

  Warhola, James W ^a   Mitchell, William A ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MAINE   (United States)

^b Department of Political Science ^*

^c BAYLOR UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Chechnya; Eurasia; European Union; Recep Erdogan; Russia, terrorism; Turkey; Vladimir Putin

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; GEOPOLITICS; INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS; NATIONAL POLITICS; NATIONAL SECURITY; REGIONAL SECURITY; TERRORISM;

ANKARA [TURKEY]; CHECHNYA; EURASIA; MOSCOW [RUSSIAN FEDERATION]; RUSSIAN FEDERATION; TURKEY;

EID: 33845792881     PISSN: 10746846     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3200/DEMO.14.1.127-143     Document Type: Article

References (70)

1. Harroutiun Khachatrian, "The Russia-Turkish Rapprochement Could Benefit Armenia," EurasiaNet, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/article.print?id= 5215 (accessed February 3, 2005).
2. Shireen T. Hunter, Islam in Russia: The Politics of Identity and Security (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2004), 370.
3. Ian O. Lesser, qtd. in Gokhan Bacik, "The Blue Stream Project, Energy Co-operation and Conflicting Interests," Turkish Studies 2, no. 2 (2001): 85.
4. Although not the conclusion of this present article, see Hunter, Islam in Russia, 361, for arguments pertaining to the "ambiguous" character of the "dual aspect[s]" of Turkish-Russian relations.
5. Cf. Khachatrian, "The Russia-Turkish Rapprochement."
6. Zalmay Khalilzad, Ian O. Lesser, and F. Stephen Larrabee, The Future of Turkish-Western Relations: Toward a Strategic Plan (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), ix-xi.
7. See, for example, Emil Ĉeĉen, Kemalizm (Istanbul: Cumhuriyet Kitaplan, 1999), 99-118.
8. For the official European Union timeline of significant events regarding relations with Turkey, including prospective membership, see "Key Events in Turkey-EU Relations," http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey/ key_events.htm. For more detailed information
9. see "EU-Turkey: Historical Review: Historical Background and Recent Developments," http://www.deltur.cec.eu.int/english/historical.html.
10. See, for example, "Sovyetsko-Turetskiye Otnosheniya - Spravka," Tsentral'nii Komitet KPCC (April 11, 1964)
11. qtd. in Erel Tellal, Uluslararasi ve Bölgesel Gelişmeler Cercevisinde: SSCB-Türiye Ilişkilieri 1953-1964 (Ankara: Mülkiyeliler Birliǧi Vakfi Yaymlari, 2000), 279.
12. Cf. Gokhan Bacik, "The Blue-Stream Project, Energy Co-operation, and Conflicting Interests," Turkish Studies 2, no. 2 (2001): 85.
13. See http://titus.fkidg1.uni-frankfurt.de/didact/karten/turk/turklm.htm for maps and related commentary depicting the location, range, and basic descriptions of the various Turkic peoples.
14. The official Soviet literature on this matter is vast, both at the level of CPSU propaganda and at the level of scholarly discourse, at least to the extent that the latter was genuinely possible under conditions of Soviet "scholarship" on such extraordinarily sensitive issues as national identity, cultural affinity, and ethnopolitical identity. For a more or less typically official Soviet version of the concept of the Soviet people (including, of course, those of Turkic ethnological orientation, such as the Uzbeks, Azeris, Karakalpaks, etc.), see P. N. Fedoseyev, Leninizm 1 Natsional'nii Vopros V Sovremennich Uslovyach (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977).
15. For a recent example, see Marat Yermukanov, "Kazakhstan: Between Pan-Turkism and Globalization," Eurasia Daily Monitor 1, no. 56 (2004), http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=401&issue_id= 3022&article_id=2368277. For background up to the ultimately forlorn efforts of Turkey to establish itself as a major political, economic, and cultural influence among the various Turkic Eurasian peoples outside of Turkey itself
16. see Igor Torbakov, "Ankara's Post-Soviet Efforts in the Caucasus and Central Asia: The Failure of the Turkic World' Model," EurasiaNet, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eay122602.shtml (accessed December 26, 2002).
17. See, for example, the numerous writings of Igor Torbakov, who has closely chronicled the path of Russian foreign policy in the post-Soviet space for EurasiaNet. For example, see Igor Torbakov, "Russia Seeks to Restore Its Influence in Central Asia," http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/ articles/eav120502a.shtml (accessed December 5, 2002).
18. K. Gajendra Singh, "Putin's Visit to Ankara: Russian-Turkish Relations in Perspective," South Asia Analysis Group, http://www.saag.org/ papers12/paper1101.html. Singh is the former Indian ambassador to Turkey and Azerbaijan and chairman of the Foundation for Indo-Turkic Studies.
19. Approximately 70 percent of gas comes from Russian sources. See Bacik, "The Blue-Stream Project," 89.
20. See also Zalmay Khalilzad et al., The Future of Turkish-Western Relations, x.
21. Cf. Bacik, "The Blue-Stream Project," 87.
22. According to Pravda, "a protocol on putting the pipeline in operation was signed on December 30, 2002; its official launch is scheduled for February 3, 2003. Industrial gas supplies are most likely to start on this day, too. It is planned to supply two billion cubic meters of gas to Turkey in 2003. The pipeline is to reach its planned capacity of sixteen billion cubic meters per year in 2008. It is worth mentioning that the Russian part of the Blue Stream system includes 370 kilometers of overland pipeline and 396 kilometers of sea-bottom pipeline." See http://english.pravda.ru/comp/2003/01/27/42606. html/. For the official Gazprom view of the entire project, see http://www.gazprom.com/eng/articles/article8895.shtml/.
23. Also, for an overview, cf. Bacik, "The Blue-Stream Project," 85-93.
24. See Laurent Ruseckas, "Turkey and Eurasia: Opportunities and Risks in the Caspian Pipeline Derby," Journal of International Affairs 54, no. 1 (2000). See also the U.S. Department of Energy's Web site outlining the political and economic situation regarding energy resources in the region at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Region_ni.html.
25. Cf. Bacik, "The Blue-Stream Project," 89.
26. See a speech given at the Istanbul Forum, May 5, 2005, by First Deputy Managing Director Krueger. Anne O. Krueger, "Turkey's Economy: A Future Full of Promise," http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2005/050505.htm (accessed May 5, 2005).
27. Bulent Aras, "Turkish-Russian Relations: Implications for Eurasia's Geopolitics," Power and Interest News Report, http://www.pinr.com/report. php?ac=view_printable&report_id=265&language_id=1 (accessed February 9, 2005).
28. "Relations with Russia," Turkishpress.com, http://www. turkishpress.com/specials/2003/yir/Russia.asp (accessed September 19, 2005).
29. "OECD Economic Survey of the Russian Federation 2004: The Sources of Russian Economic Growth," Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, http://www.oecd.Org/dataoecd/56/0/32389025.pdf. For President Putin's address and comments
30. see http://www.kremlin.ru/sdocs/appears.shtml.
31. Cited from U.S. Energy Information Agency, Department of Energy, "Country Analysis Briefs: Russia," http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/ russia.html.
32. Allen C. Lynch, How Russia Is Not Ruled: Reflections on Russian Political Development (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 245-46.
33. Hunter notes that "The Turkish military's doubts about the wisdom of Turkey's attempts to join the EU, which would require significant changes in Turkey's policy towards ethnic minorities and a strengthening of civilian control over the military. . . . Therefore some Turkish generals have talked about closer cooperation with Russia" (Islam in Russia, 370).
34. See Mikhael Meyer, "Russia-Turkey-EU: Partnership Inevitable," Turkish Weekly, http://www.turkishweekly.net/articles.php?id=30 (accessed November 16, 2004).
35. Rossiya i Mirovoya Torgovaya Organizatsiya, "German Gref Nazyvayet Nyeprostoi Situatsiyu Na Peregovorach s SSHA o vstuplenii v VTO," http://www.wto.ru/ru/news.asp?msg_id=13773.
36. Mustafa Unal, "Brightest Period in Turkish-Russian Relations," Zaman Daily News, http://www.zaman.com/?bl=columnists&trh=20050914&hn= 15612 (accessed January 12, 2005).
37. Cf. "Relations with Russia," Turkishpress.com.
38. Unal, Turkishpress.com. op. cit.
39. Cf. Bacik, "The Blue-Stream Project," 87.
40. See also Khalilzad et al., The Future of Turkish-Western Relations, xi.
41. Hunter, Islam in Russia,367.
42. http://www.euractiv.com/Article?tcmuri=tcm:29-134083-16&type= LinksDossier.
43. Duygu Bazoǧlu Sezer, "Turkish-Russian Relations: The Challenges of Reconciling Geopolitical Competition with Economic Partnership," Turkish Studies 1, no. 1 (2000): 59.
44. Significantly, the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, adopted by Putin in June 2000, only several months after his election to the presidency, establishes Russian influence in the post-Soviet regions as a priority. "A priority area in Russia's foreign policy is ensuring conformity of multilateral and bilateral cooperation with the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to national security tasks of the country. The emphasis will be made on the development of good neighborly relations and strategic partnership with all CIS member states. We attach a priority importance to joint efforts toward settling conflicts in CIS member states, and to the development of cooperation in the military-political area and in the sphere of security, particularly in combating international terrorism and extremism" ("The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation," http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm).
45. Nasuh Uslu, "The Russian, Caucasian, and Central Asian Aspects of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post Cold War Period," Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations 2, no. 3-4 (2003): 168-69.
46. Singh, "Putin's Visit to Ankara."
47. See also Idil Tuncer, "The Security Policies of the Russian Federation: The 'Near Abroad' and Turkey," Turkish Studies 1, no. 2 (2000): 95-112.
48. Cf. Khachatrian, "The Russia-Turkish Rapprochement."
49. These sentiments were conveyed to one of the authors by sources who wish to remain anonymous. See also Steve Fainaru, "Kurds Claiming Prized Territory in Northern Iraq," Washington Post, October 30, 2005, A01.
50. "Turkish Demonstrators Denounce Putin," Chechnya Weekly 5, no. 45 (December 8, 2004): 1.
51. Bulent Aras, "Turkish-Russian Relations."
52. This was forecast in 2000 to become and persist as a major point of tension between Turkey and Russia; see Sezer, "Turkish-Russian Relations," 59-82.
53. "Chechen Gunmen Seize Moscow Theater," CNN.com, http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/10/23/russia.siege (accessed October 24, 2002).
54. Jon Gorvett, "Chechen Question Harms Turkish-Russian Relations," Eurasia Insight, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/ articles/eav110702a.shtml (accessed November 7, 2002).
55. See also Fotios Moustakis and Ella Ackerman, "September 11 : A Dynamic for Russo-Turkish Cooperation or Conflict?" Central Asia Survey 21, no. 4 (2002): 423-34. Yeni Safak (New Dawn) is a moderately Islamist publication.
56. Fotios Moustakis and Ella Ackerman, "September 11 : A Dynamic for Russo-Turkish Cooperation or Conflict?" Central Asia Survey, Ibid.
57. For a breakdown of the election results, see "Elections Around the World: Elections in Turkey," http://www.electionworld.org/turkey.htm.
58. "Başbakan Recep Tayyip Erdoǧan Tarafindan TBMM'ne Sunulan 59'uncu Hükümet Programi" (Governmental Program of the AK Party, address to the Turkish Grand National Assembly), March 18, 2003, http://www.akparti.org.tr/hukumetprg.doc.: İyi komşuluk ilişkileri içinde Rusya Federasyonu ile, kültürel yakinliǧimiz çerçevesinde Orta-Asya ve Kafkasya ülkelerinde taraflarin çikarlarini zedelemeyen, iş birliǧine dayalişilikiler sürdürülecektir. Hükümetimiz, Rusya Federasyonu ile ilişkilerini azamileştirmeyi önceleyen Avrasya perspektifini titizlikle geliştirecektir.
59. Hunter, Islam in Russia, 369-70.
60. For Freedom House's report on Turkey (which it considers "partly free"), see http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2005/Spain- Zimbabwe.pdf. For Russia (which it considers "unfree")
61. see http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2005/Paraguay- SouthKorea.pdf.
62. Brian Lai and Dan Reiter, "Democracy, Political Similarity, and International Alliances 1816-1992," Journal of Conflict Resolution 44, no. 2 (2000): 203-27.
63. Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and War," Foreign Affairs 74, no. 3 (1995): 79-97.
64. See also their more recent and expansive work, Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005).
65. For an excellent summary of the changes in the political party system in Russia that arc only strengthening the grip on power of Putin's Unified Russia party (Yedinaya Rossiya, which some translate as United Russia), see "Duma: How the Duma Electoral System Works," http://www.russiavotes.org/.
66. Mehmet Ali Birand and Hikmet Bila-Ridvan Akar, 12 Eylül: Türkiye'nin Miladi (Istanbul: Doǧan Kitapčilik, 1999).
67. Igor Torbakov, "Turkey and Russia Forge New Ties on Security, Trade," EurasiaNet http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/ eav080805.shtml (accessed August 8, 2005).
68. Cf. Khachatrian, "The Russia-Turkish Rapprochement."
69. Cf. Khachatrian, "The Russia-Turkish Rapprochement."
70. For an assessment of Turkish public opinion on this matter, see Nasuh Uslu, Metin Toprak, Ibrahim Dalmis, and Ertan Aydin, "Turkish Public Opinion toward the United States in the Context of the Iraq Question," Middle East Review of International Affairs 9, no. 2 (2005): 75-80.