From Ter-Petrossian to Kocharian: Explaining continuity in Armenian foreign policy, 1991-2003

Demokratizatsiya

Volumn 14, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 235-251

  Papazian, Taline ^a  

^a IEP ^*

Author keywords

Actors; Continuity change; Decision making; Diaspora; Foreign policy; Ideology; Institutions; Internal politics; Leadership; Military; Nagorno Karabakh conflict issue; Political elites; Security

Indexed keywords

DECISION MAKING; ELITE POLITICS; FOREIGN POLICY; INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS; LEADERSHIP; NATIONAL POLITICS; POLITICAL CHANGE; POST-INDEPENDENCE; SOVEREIGNTY;

ARMENIA; ASIA; EURASIA; WEST ASIA;

EID: 33845781059     PISSN: 10746846     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3200/DEMO.14.2.235-251     Document Type: Article

References (35)

1. Although the realist approach has been rather negligent of small states and out of favor since the collapse of the Soviet Union, it appears to be quite relevant in the study of a newly independent state for which sovereignty is an utmost priority.
2. By the constraints of geography one should take into consideration the enclave situation, the geostrategic potentialities versus realities, and the regional alliances, all of which currently isolate rather than integrate Armenia into the region. Also, the burden of history is widely discussed, in particular referring to the 1915 genocide of Armenians in Ottoman Turkey, the denial of this fact, and the subsequent relations between Armenians and Turks. Given the format of this study and because these are generally well-known facts, we chose not to develop them further. For a description of Armenia's relations with its neighbours and the historic and geographical constraints explaining them, see Paul Rouben Adalian, "Armenia's Foreign Policy: Defining Priorities and Coping with Conflict," in The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the News States of Eurasia, ed. Adeed and Karen Dawisha, (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1995).
3. This article does not elaborate on this topic as the government of Armenia has intentionally chosen to disassociate politics from history, and formulate a foreign policy that would be independent of history as long as political and economic relations were beneficial to Armenia. For accurate developments on this subject, see, among others, Gerard J. Libaridian, Modern Armenia: People, Nation, State (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2004).
4. Speech by Vartan Oskanian, Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the Permanent Council of the OSCE, October 8, 1998.
5. Haratch, "Interview with Levon Ter-Petrossian," April 15, 1990.
6. According to the new political thinking of Ter-Petrossian's administration - to be realistic and to establish normal relations with all neighbors - Armenia has constantly stated that it had no claim toward Azerbaijan and was taking part in the conflict between Nagorno-Karabakh's inhabitants and Azerbaijan only as an interested third party, preoccupied by the fate of its compatriots in Nagorno-Karabakh.
7. From Robert Kocharian's inaugural speech to the National Assembly on April 9, 1998.
8. Resolution 822, passed on April 30, 1993, condemns the seizure of Kelbajar by the Armenian forces of Nagorno-Karabakh, but not Armenia itself; and Resolution 853, passed on July 29, 1993. Two more resolutions were issued the same year, neither blaming Armenia directly.
9. Artsakh is the historical Armenian name for Nagorno-Karabakh.
10. "On the eve of the Karabakh Talks in Geneva: What does Armenia gain or lose from a peace agreement?" Armenian News Network, May 15, 2001.
11. For an overview of the new political thinking of the HHSh and Karabakh Committee leaders, see Gerard Libaridian, ed., Armenia at the Crossroads: Democracy and Nationhood in the Post-Soviet Era, Essays, Interviews and Speeches by the Leaders of the National Democratic Movement in Armenia (Watertown: Blue Crane Books, 1991).
12. It is commonly accepted that the first republic led by the HMD or Dashnak government (1918-20) surrendered to the Bolsheviks to gain protection from the advancing Turkish armies and to avoid the loss of Eastern Armenia.
13. Notably the Gedashen and Shahumyan district villages.
14. No less than a dozen techno-military treaties were signed between 1991 and 1997. This last treaty is the most important military agreement of Armenia with a foreign country. It explicitly specifies that in the case of aggression against one partner, the other is committed to providing help. It was signed on August 29 and is in force for twenty years, renewable thereafter. Russia also signed a Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Security with Azerbaijan in July 1997, but the latter does not contain such a clause.
15. This was quite a heated debate, as some circles in Armenia have been accusing the administration of "selling" Armenia to Russia, particularly after the so-called "swap agreement" of November 2002, in which five Armenian major companies were transferred to Russian management in exchange for the cancellation of a $98 million debt. This movement is still going on with Russia acquiring more Armenian companies.
16. As one can infer from this quotation by Ter-Petrossian in his now famous article "War or Peace? Time for Thoughtfulness," in Hayastani Harapetutyun, November 2, 1997.
17. Carl Schmitt, The Notion of Politics, trans. George Schwab (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985).
18. Carl Schmitt, The Notion of Politics, (1985) Ibid.
19. Carl Schmitt, The Notion of Politics, (1985) Ibid. "Il n'est pas de finalité rationnelle, pas de norme, si juste soit-elle, pas de programme, si exemplaire soit-il, pas d'idéal social si beau soit-il, pas de légitimité ni de légalité qui puissent justifier le fait que des êtres humains se tuent les uns les autres en leur nom. Car, si à l'origine de cet anéantissement physique de vies humaines, il n'y a pas la nécessité vitale de maintenir sa propre forme d'existence face à une négation tout aussi vitale de cette forme, rien d'autre ne saurait la justifier."
20. Unofficial translation of Michel Marian, Entretien avec Levon Ter-Petrossian, "Arménie: le pivot caucasien" in Politique Internationale, no. 75 (1997). "Notre attachement à l'autodétermination ne traduit pas une visée nationaliste mais reflète notre lucidité. Car dans le cas de la solution qui a été proposée [lors du sommet de Lisbonne de l'OSCE en novembre 19962], le risque de génocide pèserait constamment, comme une épée de Damoclès, au-dessus de la tête des Arméniens du Karabakh. Le peuple arménien a déjà été victime d'un génocide, il n'en tolèrera pas un second."
21. The HHD is the party that claims to be the most representative of the diaspora, until recently. Two other political parties are important in the diaspora: the Ramkavar Azatakan Party, or Liberal Democrat, and the Huntchakian Social Democratic Party. The three parties returned to the homeland after Armenia gained independence. The HHD is the only one that played a significant political role. It has been a member of the ruling coalition since 2003.
22. Levon Ter-Petrossian, "War or Peace?"
23. Those are the aforementioned horrors perpetrated in Armenia first by the Sumgait pogroms, then by the cleansing of twenty-four Armenian villages north of Nagorno-Karabakh by the Soviet army and the Azerbaijani OMON - The Ministry of Interior forces.
24. Levon Ter-Petrossian's annual address to the nation, December 31, 1995.
25. Levon Ter-Petrossian, "War or Peace?"
26. Lettre de l'UGAB, "Levon Ter-Petrossian à Paris," no. 124, March 20, 1993.
27. The two methods are known under the names of "step-by-step approach" and "package deal approach." Whereas Ter-Petrossian preferred the first, Kocharian and Nagorno-Karabakh insisted on the second; Azerbaijan eventually favored the step-by-step approach. The differences between the two being well known, it should be emphasized that they are not necessarily incompatible. From what is known about the current phase of discussions between Armenia and Azerbaijan, a new basis of negotiations would be under discussion mixing elements of the two approaches, to give room to both parties' desires.
28. Robert Kocharian, inauguration speech to the National Assembly, April 9, 1998.
29. That is given the local conditions of a military regime and the absence of a significant opposition.
30. Replacing Armen Sarkisian, who resigned for health reasons.
31. In the aftermath of the presidential elections, the opposition resorted to acts of violence, attacking the president of the National Assembly and the two vice presidents.
32. Prior to this Serge Sargsyan was chief of the National Security Agency. Vano Siradeghian, former interior minister, was appointed mayor of Yerevan.
33. Diplomacy was not the only branch in which diaspora Armenians were recruited. Agriculture, energy, and other spheres also welcomed the help of Armenians from abroad.
34. This is the case of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, despite not being a power ministry.
35. A study aimed to compare the efficiency of Armenia's international relations under the two administrations might have underlined more differences in achievement than the present study, particularly regarding the growing diplomatic isolation facing Armenia. This aspect of foreign policy would be more linked to the views that other powers hold toward Armenia and/or the whole South Caucasus region, which was deliberately not focused on in this article.