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3
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0003443838
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Macro Economic Research Group (MERG), (Cape Town: Centre For Development Studies, University of the Western Cape)
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For a detailed summary of the major social and physical infrastructure challenges confronting the new government in 1994, see Macro Economic Research Group (MERG), Making Democracy Work: A Framework For Macroeconomic Policy in South Africa (Cape Town: Centre For Development Studies, University of the Western Cape, 1993).
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(1993)
Making Democracy Work: A Framework for Macroeconomic Policy in South Africa
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5
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33845810255
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Planact, (Johannesburg: Planact)
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and Planact, Analysis, Critique and Strategic Implications of the De Loor Report (Johannesburg: Planact, 1993), which challenged even these assumptions and recommended even further policy measures to address the housing challenge once the new government had been elected.
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(1993)
Analysis, Critique and Strategic Implications of the de Loor Report
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6
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33845790325
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Pearson Education, South Africa, 1991
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Pearson Education, South Africa, 1991.
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7
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33845738036
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IMF International Finance Statistics, 1985
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IMF International Finance Statistics, 1985;
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10
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84902727917
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Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund
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James Boughton, The Silent Revolution (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2001), pp. 590-595.
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(2001)
The Silent Revolution
, pp. 590-595
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Boughton, J.1
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11
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33845735305
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note
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A serious regional drought in 1992 had prompted the authorities to seek an SDR 614.4 million (US$850 million) Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility from the IMF. The resources, used to help compensate for a shortfall in export revenues and an unexpected increase in cereal imports, were received in December 1993 and assisted the country in maintaining its foreign exchange reserve levels.
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14
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33845801544
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and Padayachee, The IMF and World Bank. The authors observe that access to IMF financing invariably occurred immediately following political challenges to the apartheid state, including in the immediate aftermath of the Sharpeville massacres in 1960, and five months after the 1976 Soweto uprising. Gisselquist's analysis is particularly direct, suggesting that IMF funding, both in 1976 and 1977, was used to stabilize sentiment among South Africa's foreign bank creditors after Soweto.
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The IMF and World Bank
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Padayachee1
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15
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33845794139
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African National Congress, ANC Policy Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa
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None of the key policy documents prior to 1994 mention the policy approach to be taken with regard to external borrowing. There is no mention of external borrowing strategy in, for example, African National Congress, Ready to Govern, ANC Policy Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa, 1992;
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(1992)
Ready to Govern
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17
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0003486307
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Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Finance, Government of South Africa
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Moreover, external borrowing strategy is also not referred to in the Reconstruction and Development Programme white paper, nor in the government's subsequent macroeconomic strategy adopted in 1996 (Ministry of Finance, Growth, Employment and Redistribution: A Macroeconomic Strategy, Ministry of Finance, Government of South Africa, 1996).
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(1996)
Growth, Employment and Redistribution: A Macroeconomic Strategy
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