Predicting and confirming the effectiveness of systems for managing low-probability chemical process risks

Process Safety Progress

Volumn 25, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 135-155

  Rosenthol, Isadora ^a   Kleindorfer, Paul R ^a   Elliott, Michael R ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

Accident epidemiology; Prediction; Prevention; Process safety management system

Indexed keywords

ACCIDENT EPIDEMIOLOGY; PREDICTION; PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (PSMS); RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM (RMP);

ACCIDENT PREVENTION; INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH; RISK ASSESSMENT; RISK MANAGEMENT; SURVEYS;

CHEMICAL INDUSTRY;

ACCIDENT PREVENTION; CHEMICAL INDUSTRY; INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH; RISK ASSESSMENT; RISK MANAGEMENT; SURVEYS;

EID: 33845720530     PISSN: 10668527     EISSN: 15475913     Source Type: Trade Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/prs.10124     Document Type: Article

References (90)

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