Compatibility incentives of a large network facing multiple rivals

Journal of Industrial Economics

Volumn 54, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 527-567

  Malueg, David A ^a   Schwartz, Marius ^b  

^a TULANE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33845698735     PISSN: 00221821     EISSN: 14676451     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6451.2006.00299.x     Document Type: Article

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