Do countries fail to raise environmental standards? An evaluation of policy options addressing ‘regulatory chill’

International Journal of Sustainable Development

Volumn 4, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 231-244

  Neumayer, Eric ^a  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

capital flight; energy tax; global warming; harmonization; multilateral trade restrictions; regulatory chill

Indexed keywords

EID: 33845673091     PISSN: 09601406     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1504/IJSD.2001.004446     Document Type: Article

References (38)

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33. Zarsky, L. (1997) ‘Stuck in the mud? Nation-states, globalisation, and environment’, in Globalisation and environmnent - preliminary perspectives. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris, pp. 27–51.
34. The GCC counts 39 US corporations and industry associations among its members (BNA, 2000a). The companies mainly come from the steel, oil, agriculture, electricity, rail and chemical industries. The associations include such important ones as the American Petroleum Institute, the US Chamber of Commerce, the Chemical Manufacturers Association and the National Mining Association. 0CC lost several prominent members, including Royal Dutch Shell, BP Amoco, DaimlerChrysler, Ford and Texaco. Shell and BP changed their position and support the Kyoto Protocol by now and Chrysler had to change its position after being taken over by Daimler. Ford and Texaco, on the other hand, left the coalition merely for image reasons as they considered their continued membership to be detrimental to their reputation. However, both companies have pledged to continue opposing the Kyoto Protocol as well as any other mandatory greenhouse gas emission cuts (BNA, 1999; BNA, 2000).
35. As a substitute, EU countries are now considering the imposition of minimum excise duties to a wide range of energy products. However, even this rather minimalist solution is currently blocked by opposition from environmental daggers’, such as Ireland and Spain (ENS, 1999).
36. Note that BTAs are only applicable for the imposition of a tax. They are not to be confused with so-called eco-tariffs, which are supposed to compensate for international differences in environmental compliance costs, whether these differences are due to taxes or not. Daly (1993, p. 26), for example, demands that ‘whoever sells in a nation’s market should play by that nation’s rules or pay a tariff sufficient to remove the competitive advantages of lower standards’. Arden-Clarke (1993, p. 81) from the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) wants ‘environmental leaders’ to be able to ‘take trade measures that “level the playing field” between environmentally sound and unsound goods.’ The international Pollution Deterrence Act, unsuccessfully introduced into the 102nd US Congress as motion S.984 by Senator Boren (D-OK), called for countervailing duties equivalent to the cost that it would take a foreign firm to comply with US domestic environmental standards (OTA, 1992, p. 92).
37. This is the case, for example, with the German ecological tax reform, where energy-intensive manufacturing firms can get a rebate on their tax. The draft European Council Directive in its Article 10 pomised this rebate for all energy-intensive firms. Similar exemptions apply with respect to the Danish and Swedish carbon/energy taxesBrack et al., 2000).
38. For a detailed explanation of the quite complicated legal issues involved see Brack et al. (2000, pp. 81–90), Schoenbaum (1997, pp. 308–312) and Düerkop (1994, pp. 820–823). However, a final judgment on this question cannot be made as no WTO panel has ever decided on it.