Terrorist recruitment and radicalization in Saudi Arabia

Middle East Policy

Volumn 13, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 39-60

  Hegghammer, Thomas ^a,b  

^a NORWEGIAN DEFENCE RESEARCH ESTABLISHMENT FFI   (Norway)

^b SCIENCES PO   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 33845645095     PISSN: 10611924     EISSN: 14754967     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-4967.2006.00269.x     Document Type: Review

References (127)

1. The most detailed studies of militancy in Saudi Arabia have been carried out by Saudi academics. A Western diplomatic source in Riyadh told me in November 2005 that, since 2003, the Saudi Interior Ministry has commissioned several studies of the profiles and backgrounds of Saudi militants. However, none of these studies have been made public so far. A good, but rather brief review of QAP profiles is found in Roel Meijer, "The 'Cycle of Contention' and the Limits of Terrorism in Saudi Arabia," in Saudi Arabia in the Balance, ed. Paul Aarts and Gerd Nonneman (London: Hurst, 2005).
2. Other relevant studies include Nawaf Obaid and Anthony Cordesman, "Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia: Asymmetric Threats and Islamic Extremists" (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2005);
3. Nawaf Obaid and Anthony Cordesman, "Saudi Militants in Iraq: Assessment and Kingdom's Response" (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2005);
4. and The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (W. W. Norton & Co., 2004), p. 231-235.
5. The scope of this article does not include the broader community of Saudi veterans from foreign conflicts such as Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya or Iraq. For an analysis of 205 biographies of Saudi fighters in Iraq, see Thomas Hegghammer, "Combattants saoudiens en Irak: Modes de radicalisation et de recrutement,"Cultures et Conflits, No. 64, 2006.
6. See, for example, Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Anatomy of Egypt's Militant Islamic Groups: Methodological Notes and Preliminary Findings," International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 12, No. 4 (1981);
7. Ayla Hammond Schbley, "Torn between God, Family and Money: The Changing Profile of Lebanon's Religious Terrorists," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 23 (2000);
8. Ami Pedahzur, Leonard Weinberg, and Arie Perliger, "Altruism and Fatalism: The Characteristics of Palestinian Suicide Terrorists," Deviant Behaviour, Vol. 24 (2003);
9. Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Malecková, "Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 17, No. 4 (2003);
10. Marc Sageman, Understanding Terrorist Networks (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004);
11. Petter Nesser, "Jihad In Europe: A Survey of the Motivations for Sunni Islamist Terrorism in Post-Millennium Europe," in FFI/Report (Kjeller: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 2004);
12. Quintan Wiktorowicz, Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in The West (Rowman & Littlefield, 2005);
13. and Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, 1st ed. (Random House, 2005).
14. One exception is Marc Sageman, who includes some 30 Saudis in his sample of 172 militants in Understanding Terrorist Networks.
15. The QAP produced its own magazines Sawt al-Jihad [Voice of Jihad], Muaskar al-Battar [Camp of the Sabre] and al-Khansa [named after a seventh-century female poet], as well as a large number of statements. They also produced several films containing portraits and interviews of militants, such as Wasaya al-Abtal [Wills of the Heroes], Shuhada al-Muwajahat [Martyrs of the Confrontations] and Badr al-Riyadh [Badr of Riyadh] (February 2004). Biographical information about Saudi militants has also been available on radical Internet message boards. A total of 33 individuals are portrayed at length or interviewed in Sawt al-Jihad.
16. The core sample of 70 includes only individuals who were portrayed in Sawt al-Jihad and/or figured in one of the three "wanted lists" published by the Saudi Interior Ministry in May 2003, December 2003 and June 2005.
17. The total number of militants arrested and killed is unclear. Prince Turki al-Faisal said in 2005 that the government had arrested over 600 people and questioned 2000 in connection with terrorism charges since September 11, 2001; see Anthony H. Cordesman and Nawaf E. Obaid, National Security in Saudi Arabia: Threats, Responses, and Challenges (Praeger Security International, 2005), p. 122.
18. In March 2006, news agencies quoting official sources said a total of 120 or 130 militants had died since May 2003; see for example "Saudi Arabia Arrests 40 Suspected Militants," Reuters, March 29, 2006. However, my review of press clippings between May 2003 and March 2006 indicates that at least 164 militants have died since the outbreak of the campaign.
19. Stéphane Lacroix and Thomas Hegghammer, "Saudi Arabia Backgrounder: Who Are the Islamists?" in Middle East Report (International Crisis Group, 2004)
20. A small number of Saudis also went to Afghanistan between 1996 and 1999, but the flow of volunteers only gained momentum in 1999.
21. For more on al-Ayiri, see Brynjar Lia and Thomas Hegghammer, "Jihadi Strategic Studies: The Alleged Policy Study Preceding the Madrid Bombings," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 27, No. 5 (2004).
22. See, for example, the biography of Fahd al-Saidi (Sawt al-Jihad, No. 16).
23. In the beginning, al-Ayiri's group referred to themselves as al-mujahidun fi jazirat alarab [Mujahidun on the Arabian Peninsula]. The name al-qaeda fi jazirat al-arab [al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula] was in fact not used until November 22, 2003. A number of other names have also been used to describe sub-units or branches of the organization. However, in this article we have chosen to use the name QAP for the organization during in all its phases and manifestations, for simplicity's sake.
24. There is overwhelming evidence of the existence of training camps inside Saudi Arabia in 2002 and 2003. Militants have described the camps in their publications (e.g., Sawt al-Jihad, No. 15)
25. and in televised confessions (e.g., "Saudi Militants Shown Repenting on State TV," Reuters, January 12, 2004). QAP videos showing military training inside houses and in desert camps have also surfaced on radical Islamist Internet sites.
26. Interview with Western diplomat in Riyadh, November 2005.
27. This is excluding the assassination of the police interrogator Mubarak al-Sawat in June 2005.
28. Thomas Hegghammer, "Saudi Arabia: Terror Threat Reduced - for Time Being," Oxford Analytica Daily Brief (2006).
29. In December 2003, the QAP created a unit called the "Haramayn Brigades" [kataib al-haramayn] to which the organization "outsourced" the ideologically controversial attacks on police targets.
30. In December 2003, there were rumors in the press about a foiled assassination attempt on Muhammad bin Nayif, the son of Interior Minister Nayif bin Abd al-Aziz, but these reports were never confirmed.
31. See, for example, ghazwat al-hadi ashar min rabi al-awwal: amaliyyat sharq al-riyadh wa-harbuna ma amrika wa umalaiha [The 12 May Raid: The East Riyadh Operation and Our War with America and its Agents], (Markaz al-Dirasat wal-Buhuth al-Islamiyya, 2003).
32. Women seem to have been involved as writers on women-related jihad issues. Sawt al-Jihad included several articles signed with female pseudonyms, and the magazine al-Khansa was allegedly produced by a group of women calling themselves the "Women's Information Office in the Arabian Peninsula." A number of women were arrested in connection with police raids on QAP safe houses and flats, but the authorities have released very little information about them.
33. Many of the youngest members are likely to have been among the least known and are thus probably underrepresented in our sample.
34. The average age of the two militant Egyptian groups studied by Saad Eddin Ibrahim in the late 1970s was 22 and 24 years, respectively; see Ibrahim, "Anatomy of Egypt's Militant Islamic Groups," p. 439. The Hizbollah militants studied by Alan Krueger were on average 22 years old when they died;
35. see Krueger and Malecková, "Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?" p. 132.
36. The geographical origin of the militants is defined as their main residence in the five years preceding their inclusion in the QAP. We have chosen to focus on the recent residence rather than the birthplace for two reasons: first, most biographies indicate the recent residence, not the birthplace; and second, the social environment is presumed to be more important than the birth environment for understanding radicalization processes.
37. The overall figures are from the Central Department of Statistics, "Demographic Survey Report 1421H-2001" (Saudi Ministry of Planning [http://www.planning.gov.sa]).
38. Charles M. Sennott, "Why Bin Laden Plot Relied on Saudi Hijackers," Boston Globe, March 3, 2002.
39. The high-level al-Qaeda member Tawfiq bin Attash has told interrogators that Bin Ladin wanted the large southern tribes to be represented in the 9/11 operations in order to send a message to the Saudi regime. However, this is contradicted by other key planners such as Khalid Shaykh Muhammad; see The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 232 and 524. There may also have been operational reasons for choosing hijackers from the same tribe, region or social circle. Preexisting friendships and sociocultural affinities would have increased their in-group loyalty, a security advantage during extended operations on foreign territory.
40. Thomas Hegghammer, "Combattants saoudiens en Irak," Cultures et Conflits, No. 64, 2006.
41. The governorate of Riyadh includes many towns and cities in addition to the city of Riyadh itself. Of the people in our sample counted as Riyadh governorate residents, about one-sixth were from smaller places such as Zulfi and Kharj.
42. From the late 1990s, the most prominent radical Saudi shaikhs were based in Riyadh (Nasir al-Fahd, Abd al-Aziz al-Jarbu et al.) and Burayda (Ali al-Khudayr, Sulayman al-Ulwan et al.).
43. A former QAP member interviewed by a Saudi newspaper in 2005 said recruiters targeted people who came from small villages and rural areas; Okaz, October 8, 2005.
44. Sennott, "Why Bin Laden Plot Relied on Saudi Hijackers."
45. This confirms some of the preliminary observations made by Saudi sociologists regarding the QAP militants; see Faris Bin Huzzam, "qiraa lil-tarkiba al-jiusiyasiya li-qaimat al-26 [A Reading of the Geopolitical Structure of the List of 26]," al-Sharq al-Awsat, December 9, 2003.
46. "Demographic Survey Report 1421H-2001."
47. A former QAP member told a Saudi newspaper in 2005 that the group's recruiters had been looking for "unemployed and idle youngsters in need of money"; Okaz, October 8, 2005.
48. In the category "religious professions," we include a wide range of occupations in ministries (of education, Islamic affairs), courts, schools and universities, the religious police, and missionary or relief organizations.
49. Notable exceptions were Turki al-Dandani, who studied medicine; Abd al-Rahman al-Jubara, who studied engineering in Canada; and Ali al-Ghamidi, who studied economics. However, none of them practiced his profession.
50. Ibrahim, "Anatomy of Egypt's Militant Islamic Groups;" Diego Gambetta and Steffen Hertog, "Engineers of Jihad," paper presented at a workshop at the Peace Research Institute in Oslo, August 10, 2006.
51. A few, like Khalid al-Baghdadi, were involved in petty crime and spent time in prison. Others, like Salih al-Awfi and Uthman al-Amri, had been dismissed from their work for embezzlement or other irregularities. A number of people, such as Talal al-Anbari and Faisal al-Dukhayyil, are described in the jihadist literature as having been "in sin" before becoming religious, though it is not clear whether this refers to delinquency or immorality.
52. Exceptions include Khalid al-Baghdadi, who was from a wealthy Riyadh family; Rakan al-Saykhan, whose father was a high-level civil servant in the trade ministry; and Isa al-Awshan, who was the son-in-law of Abdallah bin Jibrin, one of the country's top religious scholars.
53. See, for example, the biographies of Abd al-Ilah al-Utaybi (Sawt al-Jihad, No. 4), Mitib al-Muhayyani (Sawt al-Jihad, No. 4), Turki al-Dandani (Sawt al-Jihad, No. 7), Amir al-Shihri (Sawt al-Jihad, No.12), Fahd al-Sa'idi (Sawt al-Jihad, No. 15), Talal al-Anbari (Sawt al-Jihad, No. 17), Khalid al-Baghdadi (Sawt al-Jihad, No.18), Turki al-Mutayri (Sawt al-Jihad, No. 20), Ali al-Harbi (Sawt al-Jihad, No. 24), Faisal al-Dukhayyil (Sawt al-Jihad, No. 28) and the interviews with Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin (Sawt al-Jihad, Nos. 1 and 2), Salih al-Awfi (Sawt al-Jihad, No. 8) and Abd al-Rahman al-Yaziji (Sawt al-Jihad, No. 28).
54. The real number is probably higher, as many biographies are not detailed enough to include past prison experience. Among the 33 militants who are portrayed in Sawt al-Jihad in biographies or interviews - and whose biographies are hence best known - as many as 12 were imprisoned before 2003.
55. See, for example, the biography of Yusuf al-Ayiri (Sawt al-Jihad, p. 1) and Khalid al-Baghdadi (Sawt al-Jihad, p. 18) or the interview with Ali al-Harbi in the film Badr al-Riyadh. There are many other accounts of suffering in Saudi prisons in the broader jihadist literature.
56. The "ideologues" were preoccupied with ideological production and rarely took part in fighting. There were two kinds of ideologues: the "shaikhs" - such as Faris al-Zahrani and Abdallah al-Rushud - who provided overall religious guidance, and the media officers - such as Isa al-Awshan and Abd al-Aziz al-Anzi - who were responsible for the QAP's publications. The term "fighters" refers to those people who were part of operational cells and regularly engaged in combat with security forces; most core QAP members belong to this category.
57. The two most important QAP leaders were Yusuf al-Ayiri and Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin. Others, such as Sultan al-Qahtani, Khalid al-Hajj and Salih al-Awfi, were also reported to have held leadership positions at various periods, but their real degree of authority is unclear.
58. The main ideologues in the QAP were Abdallah al-Rushud, Faris al-Zahrani, Ahmad al-Dukhayyil, Isa al-Awshan, Sultan al-Utaybi, Abd al-Aziz al-Anzi, Abd al-Latif al-Khudayri, Abd al-Majid al-Mani and Hamad al-Humaydi. Apart from al-Humaydi, who was in Afghanistan for a short while in the 1980s, and al-Awshan, who made it to the Iranian-Afghan border in late 2001, none of these ideologues had foreign jihad experience.
59. All of those with formal religious training had attended Imam Muhammad bin Saud University in Riyadh or Burayda.
60. See note 39 above.
61. These "revived" veterans included Ibrahim al-Rayis, Khalid al-Sabit, Ali al-Harbi, Saud al-Utaybi, Bandar al-Ghamidi and others.
62. A notable exception is Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin, who described the process of his 1991 departure to Afghanistan in an interview in the first issue of Sawt al-Jihad.
63. Recently declassified transcripts of testimonies of Guantanamo prisoners shed new light on motivations for going to Afghanistan; see Testimony of Detainees Before the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (U.S. Department of Defense, 2006); available from http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/ csrt/index.html [accessed April 3, 2006].
64. See also Sharon Curcio, "Generational Differences in Waging Jihad," Military Review, Vol. 85, No. 4 (2005)
65. and Sharon Curcio, "The Dark Side of Jihad: How Young Men Detained at Guantanamo Assess Their Experiences," in A Future for the Young, ed. Cheryl Benard (RAND, 2006).
66. The near-absence of the name "al-Qaeda" in the pre-2001 jihadist literature has fuelled doubts over the very existence of al-Qaeda as a formal organization; see, for example, the 2004 BBC documentary The Power of Nightmares by Adam Curtis. However, recently published testimonies and declassified documents have removed all doubt that al-Qaeda existed as an organization from the late 1980s onward;
67. See Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower (Knopf, 2006);
68. Peter Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know (Free Press, 2006);
69. and Combating Terrorism Center, "Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting al-Qaeda's Organizational Vulnerabilities" (United States Military Academy, 2006). These new documents also make it clear that before 2001, the name al-Qaeda was for internal use and not for propaganda (as is the case today).
70. Lacroix and Hegghammer, "Saudi Arabia Backgrounder: Who Are the Islamists?" Vol. 7.
71. The Faruq camp in Qandahar (not to be confused with the old Faruq camp in Khost) was established in 1999. It was probably the first camp for new recruits that was controlled entirely by Bin Ladin and his closest associates (as opposed to more loosely affiliated partners such as Abu Zubayda). The fact that practically all Saudis who went to Afghanistan after 1999 began their training in al-Faruq, and not elsewhere, points to the importance of this camp in al-Qaeda's recruitment policy toward Saudi Arabia.
72. Al-Ayiri was released from Dammam prison in 1998, but in the months after his release he seems to have been preoccupied with the Chechen cause. He probably only started working directly for Bin Ladin in late 1999 or 2000. See al-Ayiri's biography in Sawt al-Jihad, Nos. 1 and 2.
73. Al-Ayiri had particularly close links with Sulayman al-Ulwan. Al-Ayiri's wife was the sister of al-Ulwan's wife, and the two families were next-door neighbors in Burayda (author's interview with former Saudi Islamist, Riyadh, 2005).
74. Biographies of Saudi martyrs in the first Afghan war and in the Bosnian war indicate that a majority came from the Hijaz; for the Afghan war, see for example the 1980s jihadist magazines al-Jihad and al-Bunyan al-Marsus [The Firm Structure]; for Bosnia, see Hamad al-Qatari and Majid al-Madani, min qisas al-shuhada alarab fi al-busna wal-harsak [From the Stories of the Arab Martyrs in Bosnia and Herzegovina] (2002). The center of gravity of the Saudi jihadist community thus seems to have shifted from Hijaz to Najd in the late 1990s.
75. See the biography of Faisal al-Dukhayyil (Sawt al-Jihad, No. 28) and Abd al-Rahman al-Jubara (Sawt al-Jihad, No. 14). See also The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 233;
76. and Curcio, "Generational Differences in Waging Jihad," p. 84.
77. See the biography of Mitib al-Muhayyani (Sawt al-Jihad, No. 4) and the interview with Abd al-Rahman al-Yaziji (Sawt al-Jihad, No. 28).
78. At least five QAP militants (Abd al-Ilah Sultan al-Utaybi, Nasir al-Khalidi, Talib al-Talib and Isa al-Awshan, Abd al-Muhsin Shabanat) went or tried to go to Afghanistan for the first time after 9/11, ostensibly motivated by a desire to defend Bin Ladin and the Taliban regime. Saudi detainees in Guantanamo have also said they went to Afghanistan to fight for the Taliban against the Northern Alliance; see Testimony of Detainees, p. 1126-31.
79. Many quote a general desire to "get jihad training," seemingly without reflecting on the practical and political content of the jihad that they were embarking on. Several recruits seem to have had a very vague idea of what they were actually going to do beyond firing a Kalashnikov and jumping hurdles.
80. See, for example, Testimony of Detainees, p. 1115-20.
81. See, for example, the biography of Abd al-Muhsin Shabanat (Sawt al-Jihad, No. 23).
82. See, for example, Testimony of Detainees, p. 1275-82.
83. See, for example, the biographies of Musaid al-Subay'i (Sawt al-Jihad, No. 19) and Amir al-Shihri (Sawt al-Jihad, No. 12).
84. Sageman, Understanding Terrorist Networks.
85. See, for example, the biographies of Talal al-Anbari (Sawt al-Jihad, No. 17) and Musaid al-Subay'i (Sawt al-Jihad, No. 19).
86. See, for example, the biography of Faysal al-Dukhayyil (Sawt al-Jihad, No. 28).
87. See, for example, the biography of Khalid al-Sabit (Sawt al-Jihad, No. 15).
88. See, for example, the biography of Talal al-Anbari (Sawt al-Jihad, No. 17). In the biographies of Saudi martyrs in Iraq, there are several accounts of people being inspired by visions and dreams; see Muhibb al-Jihad, "shuhada ard al-rafidayn [Martyrs of the Land of the Two Rivers]," (2005) a list of 400 martyrs' biographies in Iraq, circulated on radical Islamist websites in May 2005.
89. See, for example, the biographies of Mihmas al-Dawsary (Sawt al-Jihad, No. 22) and Talal al-Anbari (Sawt al-Jihad, No. 17).
90. See, for example, the account of the recruitment of Nayif al-Shammari in Arab News, July 11, 2005.
91. A former militant described this gradual initiation process in an interview with a Saudi newspaper; Okaz, October 8, 2005.
92. Mecca has been a key recruiting ground for jihad activity abroad since the early 1980s. Several Saudis in Guantanamo say they went to Afghanistan after meeting someone in Mecca; see, for example, Testimony of the Detainees, p. 1439-46.
93. Shaykh Sulayman al-Ulwan is believed to have recruited many Saudis to go to Afghanistan; he allegedly recruited one of the 9/11 hijackers; see The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 233. Many of the Saudis detained at Guantanamo say they went to Afghanistan on the urging of a local imam or shaikh;
94. see, for example, Testimony of Detainees, p. 1132-34.
95. All the Saudi Guantanamo prisoners who say they heeded calls from religious scholars to go to Afghanistan say they went to fight for the Taliban, not al-Qaeda or Bin Ladin.
96. According to a list of martyrs' biographies circulated on Islamist websites in mid-2005, as many as 99 Saudis died in the Mazar-e-Sharif battle (November 9-10, 2001) alone; see hatta la nansa qissat al-mujahidin al-asra wa'l-shuhada kamilatan fi qalat janji ma suwar wa asma al-shuhada [Lest We Forget the Complete Story of the Mujahidin Taken Prisoner and Fallen Martyrs in the Janji Fortress - with Pictures and Names of the Martyrs], accessed on www.hkmah.net on June 6, 2005.
97. See, for example, the biography of Khalid al-Baghdadi (Sawt al-Jihad, No. 18).
98. Stéphane Lacroix, "Le champ politico-religieux en Arabie Saoudite après le 11 septembre" Master's thesis, Institut d'Etudes Politiques, 2003.
99. The rhetorical escalation reached its pinnacle in May 2003 with the publication on the Internet of Nasir al-Fahd's infamous risala fi hukm istikhdam aslihat al-damar al-shamil didd al-kuffar [Letter about the Ruling on the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction against the Infidels].
100. The first shootout between security forces and QAP followers took place in Riyadh on November 16, 2002. A number of other arrests and shootouts followed in early 2003.
101. Thomas Hegghammer, "Global Jihadism after the Iraq War," Middle East Journal, Vol. 60, No. 1 (2006).
102. This line of argument is cited throughout the publications of the QAP.
103. For more on these injunctions, see Gilles Kepel, Jihad : expansion et déclin de l'islamisme (Gallimard, 2000), p. 416.
104. See for example the biographies of Mitib al-Muhayyani (Sawt al-Jihad, No. 4) and Talal al-Anbari (Sawt al-Jihad, No. 17).
105. For example, Mansur al-Faqih joined the QAP when his brother Hassan was arrested in May 2003; see Raid Qusti, "Background of the Most Wanted Terrorists: Part 4," Arab News, December 14, 2003. Fahd al-Juwayr deepened his involvement in the QAP after two of his brothers were killed by Saudi police;
106. see Abdullah al-Shihri, "Leader of al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia Killed," Associated Press, February 28, 2006.
107. For example, Ahmad al-Suwailimi joined the militants after seeing his brother Muhammad's name on the list in June 2005; see "majmuat maqalat al-shahid muhammad bin abd al-rahman al-suwailimi [Collection of Articles by the Martyr Muhammad bin Abd al-Rahman al-Suwailimi]," posted at www.al-hesbah.org on April 13, 2006.
108. See, for example, the biography of Musaid al-Subayi (Sawt al-Jihad, No. 19).
109. According to a former jihadist interviewed by a Saudi newspaper, QAP member Sultan al-Utaybi was one of the main organizers of this kind of event; Okaz, October 8, 2005.
110. See the biography of Ahmad al-Dukhayyil (Sawt al-Jihad, No. 5). See also the biography of al-Dukhayyil's driver, Nasir al-Sayyari (Sawt al-Jihad, No. 25).
111. Abd al-Latif al-Khudayri (portrayed in Sawt al-Jihad, No. 27) was allegedly one of Ali al-Khudayr's favourite students.
112. See, for example, the biography of Turki al-Mutayri (Sawt al-Jihad, No. 20). Some returnees from Afghanistan carried out attacks before they could be included in the QAP. One such group notably carried out a series of assassinations of government officials in the province of Jawf between September 2002 and April 2003;
113. see Saad Al-Matrafi, "Three Saudi Extremists Executed in Sakaka for Criminal Acts," Arab News, April 2, 2005.
114. See the interview with Saud al-Utaybi (Sawt al-Jihad, No. 12).
115. This strategy was described by repentant militants in the Saudi TV documentary Inside the Cell;
116. see Rawya Rageh, "Ex-Militants: al-Qaeda Preys on Young Men," Associated Press, September 22, 2004.
117. See the biography of Sami al-Luhaybi (Sawt al-Jihad, No. 6).
118. See the numerous "Letters to the editor" published in Sawt al-Jihad, Nos. 8, 20, 21, 26, 27 and 28.
119. Krueger and Malecková, "Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?"
120. Sageman, Understanding Terrorist Networks.
121. Ibrahim, "Anatomy of Egypt's Militant Islamic Groups."
122. Steffen Hertog, "Segmented Clientelism: The Politics of Economic Reform in Saudi Arabia." DPhil thesis, Oxford University.
123. Gilles Kepel, The Roots of Radical Islam, 2nd English ed. (Saqi Books, 2005).
124. Studies of secular terrorist groups indicate that nationalist-separatist groups tend to have a broader recruitment base than the sociorevolutionary organizations; see for example Peter Waldmann, "Ethnic and Sociorevolutionary Terrorism: A Comparison of Structures," in Social Movements and Violence: Participation in Underground Organizations, ed. Donatella Della Porta (JAI, 1992). The distinction between sociorevolutionary and nationalist-separatist ideologies is applicable to Islamist groups. It can be used to distinguish between those groups fighting for state power (such as in Egypt and Algeria) and those fighting for territory (such as in Palestine and Chechnya).
125. Thomas Hegghammer, "Combattants saoudiens en Irak."
126. Sageman, Understanding Terrorist Networks, p. 121-22.
127. The roots of pan-Islamic nationalism in Saudi political culture go back to at least the 1960s, when King Faisal promoted "Islamic solidarity" (al-tadamun al-islami) as an alternative to Nasser's Arab nationalism. See Abdullah M. Sindi, "King Faisal and Pan-Islamism," in King Faisal and the Modernisation of Saudi Arabia, ed. Willard Beling (London: Croom Helm, 1980)."